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The COVID-19 pandemic that began in early 2020 resulted in changes to both the form 
and content of bail hearings and reviews within Ontario.  While the statutory framework 
contained within sections 515, 520, 525 and 679 of the Criminal Code remained 
unchanged, practical changes were necessary in order to allow bail matters to occur 
virtually and safely.  Initially, the existence of COVID-19 may have allowed for the release 
of some accused persons who would not have been let out on bail prior to the pandemic.  
By early 2021, bail courts appear to have settled into a pattern where the COVID-19 
pandemic could be a factor that could lead to release, usually under the tertiary grounds in 
clause 515(10)(c) of the Criminal Code, for any particular defendant, as long as some 










Bail in the time of COVID-19 
 
INTRODUCTION 
The application of the procedures concerning bail in Ontario have been the subject of much 
interest and commentary in recent years.  Reports have been commissioned by such 
organizations as the Canadian Civil Liberties Association1 and the John Howard Society,2 
government studies have been undertaken,3 articles have been published,4 and the Supreme 
Court of Canada has rendered several landmark decisions, including R v St-Cloud,5 R v 
Jordan,6 R v Antic7 and R v Zora8 on the topic of judicial interim release.   
Yet the sudden onset of the COVID-19 pandemic throughout the world in March 2020 has 
radically changed the procedures of bail courts and also has led to a need to re-interpret 
and apply the law that governs bail.  This paper will examine the impact and the effect of 
the pandemic on how bail decisions have been made in Ontario, how they have been 
reviewed, as well as, briefly, the logistics of how bail hearings are in fact occurring during 
the pandemic.  I will also consider other developments, relevant to bail, that occurred 
around the same time as the COVID-19 pandemic, such as the Supreme Court’s landmark 
decision in Zora9 and the coming into force of sections 493.1 and 493.2 of the Criminal 
 
1 Deshman, Abby & Nicole Myers, Set Up to Fail: Bail and the Revolving Door of Pre-Trial 
Detention (Toronto: Canadian Civil Liberties Association and Education Trust, 2014), online: 
https://ccla.org/dev/v5/_doc/CCLA_set_up_to_fail.pdf (“Set Up to Fail”) 
2 Reasonable Bail? (Toronto:  John Howard Society of Ontario, 2013). 
3 Cheryl Marie Webster.  “Broken Bail” in Canada:  How We Might Go About Fixing It.  (Ottawa:  
Government of Canada, 2015). 
4 See e.g., Berger, Benjamin L and James Stribopoulos. “Risk and the Role of the Judge:  
Lessons from Bail” in Benjamin L Berger, Emma Cunliffe and James Stribopoulos, eds, To 
Ensure that Justice is Done:  Essays in Memory of Marc Rosenberg (Toronto:  Thomson Reuters, 
2017) 305 - 326; Friedland, Martin L. “The Bail Reform Act Revisited” (2012) 16 Can Crim LR 
315; Friedland, Martin L. “Reflections on Criminal Justice Reform in Canada” (2017) 64 Crim LQ 
274; Myers, Nicole Marie. “Eroding the Presumption of Innocence:  Pre-Trial Detention and the 
Use of Conditional Release on Bail” (2017) 57 Brit J Crim 664; Roach, Kent. “A Charter Reality 
Check:  How Relevant is the Charter to the Justness of Our Criminal Justice System?” (2008) 40 
SCLR 717; Yule, Carolyn and Rachel Schumann.  “Negotiating Release?  Analysing Decision 
Making in Bail Court” (2019) 61 Can J Corr 45. 
5 R v St-Cloud, 2015 SCC 27, [2015] 2 SCR 328 [St-Cloud]. 
6 R v Jordan, 2016 SCC 27, [2016] 1 SCR 631, 335 CCC (3d) 403 [Jordan]. 
7 R v Antic, 2017 SCC 27, [2017] 1 SCR 509 [Antic]. 




Code10 as COVID-19 was not the only evolution within bail in recent years, and its impact 
cannot properly be considered within a vacuum.  Practical issues, such as the form and 
content of what information or data with respect to COVID-19 would actually be relevant 
to a court’s consideration of bail are also looked at, and this will necessitate a review of 
how the legal construct of judicial notice has had to evolve in the time of COVID-19. 
By the second half of 2021, consensus seems to have resulted in the courts, at either the 
initial release or bail review stage, could consider the impact of COVID-19 on any of the 
statutory grounds of release.  A pattern has also developed that specific health information 
regarding individual accused persons and their circumstances would be more influential to 
a court in deciding whether to release someone rather than generalized information about 
the COVID-19 pandemic.   
 
BACKGROUND 
While some aspects of judicial interim release, such as regular daily video remand courts, 
have occurred in a virtual setting for many years in Ontario, the main components of the 
bail process, for decades, have occurred in person in a physical courtroom.  An individual 
arrested by a police officer, if not released by the police at the station, would be physically 
brought in front of a justice of the peace without unreasonable delay and, in any event, 
within 24 hours of the arrest, pursuant to the requirements set out in section 503 of the 
Criminal Code.11 The only regular exceptions to this initial in-person appearance would 
be, in some parts of the province, if the arrest occurred on a weekend or a statutory holiday 
or if the accused person was in a medical facility.  In those cases, the accused person might 
appear before a justice, either by telephone or video, from either a police station or a 
hospital. 
If an accused person brought before a justice of the peace could not be released 
immediately, subsequent appearances before the court might well occur by video or 
telephone from a detention centre.  But in almost all occasions, before the advent of 
 




COVID-19, the actual show cause hearing would occur in a courtroom, with the accused 
person brought in person from the detention centre or the police station to the courthouse. 
With COVID-19, all that has now changed.  All appearances before a justice, and virtually 
all bail hearings, are now occurring remotely.  Individuals may appear by video or audio 
from the police detachment in order to satisfy the initial requirements of section 503, and 
all subsequent appearances including show cause hearings are now occurring, again by 
video or audio, with the accused person remaining at the detention centre. 
These practical changes to how bail hearings have traditionally been conducted are 
permitted by various provisions of the Criminal Code.12  While they are likely not formally 
acknowledged in most bail hearings, these provisions could include, for example, the 
justice making rulings that it is necessary to preside by audioconference due to the COVID-
19 pandemic,13 that the Crown and defence counsel are both “participants” and that they 
are permitted to appear via audioconference,14 and, if necessary, that both counsel have 
confirmed their consent to a contested bail hearing involving witness evidence by way of 
audioconference.15 
Because of the technological limitations of the detention centres, this has effectively 
limited the amount of time that is available for most courts to conduct show cause hearings. 
Previously, as noted, all individuals potentially having a bail hearing on any given day 
would be physically transported from the detention centre to the relevant courthouse.  The 
court itself then controlled who would appear in front of it, in what order those appearances 
would occur, how long those appearances would take, and how long each day the court 
would sit.  All this has changed with the need to co-ordinate, in advance, the specific times 
during each day when each detention centre – which may well have individuals virtually 
appearing in many courthouses in different regions throughout Ontario – would be able to 
bring specific individuals into one of their limited number of video suites for them to be 
remotely visible in the appropriate courtroom for their bail hearings.  Once the pandemic 
 
12 Ibid. 
13 Ibid, s 502.1(5). 
14 Ibid, ss 502.1(4) and 715.25(1). 
15 Ibid, s 515(2.3). 
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occurred, the Ontario Court of Justice16 recognized that this would seriously curtail the 
flexibility that courts previously enjoyed with respect to conducting bail hearings and that 
serious time pressures would develop.17   
 
HOW COVID-19 HAS CHANGED THE APPLICATION OF THE LAW OF BAIL 
IN HEARINGS   
Along with changing the structure and format of show cause hearings, the COVID-19 
pandemic has also resulted in a great number of judicial rulings that have considered how 
the pandemic has changed the application of the law itself.  This has involved both bail 
hearings of first instance as well as bail reviews and applications for bail pending appeal. 
Initial grounds for detention are set out in section 515 of the Criminal Code.18 Much of the 
relevant bail jurisprudence considers the impact of COVID-19 as a factor when looking at 
the secondary and tertiary grounds for detention, as outlined respectively in clauses 
515(10)(b) and (c) of the Criminal Code.19  Another category of bail cases examines the 
consideration of COVID-19 as a material change in circumstances justifying a bail review 
by a Superior Court judge in Ontario pursuant to section 520, or a detention review pursuant 
to section 525, of the Criminal Code.20  Yet another category looks at COVID-19 as a 
factor forming part of the public interest criterion under clause 679(3)(c) of the Criminal 
Code21 where a judge of the Ontario Court of Appeal may be considering an individual’s 
release on bail pending determination of that person’s appeal to the highest court in 
Ontario, as well as other COVID-19 pronouncements by the Court of Appeal.  There is, 
 
16 The Ontario Court of Justice is the court that conducts all bail hearings in Ontario, with the 
exception, as outlined in s 515(1) of the Criminal Code, supra note 10, of individuals charged with 
one of the few offences listed in s 469 of the Criminal Code.  Show cause hearings in Ontario for 
those individuals are held in the Superior Court of Justice. Most Ontario Court of Justice bail 
hearings are heard by justices of the peace, though judges of that court certainly hear them on 
occasion, in accordance with local practice or necessity. 
17 Among the new initiatives put in place is a Bail Hearings Protocol, originally published on May 
11, 2020 and updated on April 22, 2021.  I was a member of the committee that helped develop 
this protocol:  https://www.ontariocourts.ca/ocj/covid-19/covid-19-protocol-bail-hearings// . 






however, a great deal of overlap of the issues and factual considerations of COVID-19 
within all these categories.  I will also briefly examine the impact of COVID-19 on other 
specific types of cases, such as those involving youths or indigenous accused, as well as 
cases from other jurisdictions within Canada.  Within each of these categories of cases, I 
will, for the most part, be reviewing the relevant decisions on a chronological basis.   
 
THE BAIL SECTIONS OF THE CRIMINAL CODE AND LEADING 
JURISPRUDENCE 
I will begin with a brief review of the relevant sections of the Criminal Code22 and the 
leading case law.  I will then review some of the COVID-19 bail cases as they consider 
various themes and issues. 
 
INITIAL BAIL HEARINGS PURSUANT TO SECTION 510 OF THE CRIMINAL 
CODE 
Subsection 515(10) of the Criminal Code23 sets out the only three reasons by which the 
detention of an accused in custody is justified.  What is generally referred to as the 
“primary” ground of detention is set out in clause 515(10)(a).  It reads as follows: 
(a) where the detention is necessary to ensure his or her attendance in 
court in order to be dealt with according to law. 
During the pandemic, some bail courts specifically opined on whether the pandemic itself 
was to be considered under what is commonly referred to as the “secondary” ground of 
detention, found in clause 515(10)(b).  That clause currently reads as follows: 
(b) where the detention is necessary for the protection or safety of the 
public, including any victim of or witness to the offence, or any person 
under the age of 18 years, having regard to all the circumstances 






from custody, commit a criminal offence or interfere with the 
administration of justice. 
Even more frequently, the pandemic was considered as relevant to clause 515(10)(c) of the 
Criminal Code,24 commonly referred to as the “tertiary” ground.  It currently reads as 
follows: 
(c) If the detention is necessary to maintain confidence in the administration of 
justice, having regard to all the circumstances, including 
(i) the apparent strength of the prosecution’s case, 
(ii) the gravity of the offence, 
(iii) the circumstances surrounding the commission of the offence, including 
whether a firearm was used, and 
(iv) the fact that the accused is liable, on conviction, for a potentially 
lengthy term of imprisonment or, in the case of an offence that involves, 
or whose subject-matter is, a firearm, a minimum punishment of 
imprisonment for a term of three years or more.  
Parliament has had its difficulties over the years coming up with appropriate wording for 
what is now clause (c) of subsection 515(10).  What was originally referred to as the “public 
interest” ground contained within the former wording of clause 515(10)(b) was struck 
down by the Supreme Court of Canada in R v Morales25 as it authorized pre-trial detention 
in terms that the Court found to be both vague and imprecise.   
As a result of Morales,26 Parliament enacted its first version of clause 515(10)(c),27 but its 
original wording included the ability to deny bail “on any other just cause being shown.”  
The Supreme Court of Canada, in R v Hall,28 found that phrase violated sections 7 and 
11(e) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.29 The constitutionality of the rest 
of the tertiary ground in clause 515(10)(c) was upheld.30  As McLachlin CJC stated:  
“Where, as here, the crime is horrific, inexplicable, and strongly linked to the accused, a 
 
24 Ibid. 
25 R v Morales, [1992] 3 SCR 711, 77 CCC (3d) 91 [Morales cited to SCR]. 
26 Ibid. 
27 Criminal Law Improvement Act, 1996, SC 1997, c 18, s 59. 
28 R v Hall, 2002 SCC 64, [2002] 3 SCR 309, 167 CCC (3d) 449 [Hall]. 
29 Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule 
B to the Canada Act 1982 (UK), 1982, c 11 [Charter]. 
30 Subsequent to Hall, supra note 28, s 515(10)(c) was amended by the Tackling Violent Crime 
Act, SC 2008, c 6, s 37(5). 
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justice system that cannot detain the accused risks losing the public confidence upon which 
the bail system and the justice system as a whole repose.”31 
The use of the tertiary ground is further clarified by the Supreme Court of Canada in St-
Cloud,32 in which it held that the tertiary ground is a separate and distinct ground for 
detention.  It should not be interpreted narrowly or applied sparingly, nor is its application 
to be limited to exceptional circumstances, as some pre-St-Cloud33 cases such as R v B(A)34 
and R v LaFramboise35 had ruled.  As Wagner J (as he then was) states in St-Cloud,36 
referring to the use of the tertiary ground:  “In conclusion, if the crime is serious or very 
violent, if there is overwhelming evidence against the accused and if the victim or victims 
were vulnerable, pre-trial detention will usually be ordered.”37 
The broad wording of the tertiary ground, especially in its use of the phrase “having regard 
to all the circumstances” led many bail courts, primarily in the early days of the COVID-
19 pandemic, to examine whether the existence of the pandemic itself would influence 
tertiary ground considerations.  It is fair to say, as well, that far more reported cases during 
the pandemic have considered COVID-19 as relevant to the tertiary ground considerations 
as opposed to the secondary ground considerations.38 
 
BAIL REVIEWS PURSUANT TO SECTION 520 OF THE CRIMINAL CODE 
In the early weeks of the COVID-19 pandemic, the Superior Court in Ontario faced an 
increased number of applications for bail review pursuant to the provisions of section 520 
of the Criminal Code.39  Many of the cases already discussed in this paper are section 520 
 
31 Hall, supra note 28 at para 40. 
32 St-Cloud, supra note 5. 
33 Ibid. 
34 R v B(A) (2006), 204 CCC (3d) 490 (Ont Sup Ct). 
35 R v LaFramboise (2005), 203 CCC (3d) 492 (Ont CA) in chambers. 
36 St-Cloud, supra note 5. 
37 Ibid at para 88. 
38 See e.g. R v Ledinek, 2020 ONCJ 374, [2020] OJ No 3614 [Ledinek] at para 95: “Counsel 
agreed that concerns about Covid-19 in the jails informs the tertiary grounds, but not the 
secondary grounds.” 
39 Criminal Code, supra note 10. 
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decisions.  The particularly relevant portions of section 520 are subsections (1) and (7) 
which read as follows: 
(1) If a justice….makes an order under subsection 515(2), (5), (6), (7), or (12) 
or makes or vacates any order under paragraph 523(2)(b), the accused 
may, at any time before the trial of the charge, apply to a judge for a review 
of the order. 
 
(7) On the hearing of an application under this section, the judge may consider 
a. the transcript, if any, of the proceedings heard by the justice and 
by any judge who previously reviewed the order made by the 
justice, 
b. the exhibits, if any, filed in the proceedings before the justice, and  
c. such additional evidence or exhibits as may be tendered by the 
accused or the prosecutor, and shall either 
d. dismiss the application, or 
e. if the accused shows cause, allow the application, vacate the order 
previously made by the justice and make any other order provided 
for in section 515 that he considers is warranted. 
Subsection 520(8) permits an accused person to make multiple applications for bail review 
under section 520 so long as a period of at least thirty days has elapsed since the most 
recent application. 
The St-Cloud40 decision, written by Wagner J, now Chief Justice of Canada, as well as 
clarifying the consideration of the tertiary ground under subsection 515(10) of the Criminal 
Code,41 as discussed earlier, also alters the approach to section 520 bail reviews that can 
consider any or all of the primary, secondary and tertiary grounds.   
In St-Cloud,42 the Supreme Court confirms that a reviewing judge, pursuant to section 520 
of the Criminal Code,43 can review an initial bail decision if new evidence is submitted by 
either the defence or the prosecution that shows a material and relevant change in the 
circumstances of the accused’s case. This is in addition to a reviewing judge’s powers to 
intervene if the initial bail justice had erred in law, or had rendered a decision that was 
 
40 St-Cloud, supra note 5. 
41 Criminal Code, supra note 10. 
42 St-Cloud, supra note 5 at paras 120 and 121. 
43 Criminal Code, supra note 10. 
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clearly inappropriate, by giving excessive weight to one relevant factor or insufficient 
weight to another. 
St-Cloud also sets out a framework44 for determining when such new evidence would be 
admissible.  In so doing, the Supreme Court of Canada modifies its prior decision 
concerning the admissibility of new evidence on appeal in Palmer v R45 and the four criteria 
set out therein.   These categories, as modified by St-Cloud46 in the context of bail, are as 
follows:  First, the evidence should generally not be admitted if, by due diligence, it could 
have been adduced at trial.  In the context of a bail review, as set out in St-Cloud,47 the 
reviewing judge may consider evidence that is either truly new or that did exist at the time 
of the initial show cause hearing but was not tendered at such hearing for a reason that was 
both legitimate and reasonable.  Second, the evidence must be relevant in the sense that it 
bears upon a decisive or potential decisive issue in the trial or bail review.  Third, the 
evidence must be credible in the sense that it is reasonably capable of belief, interpreted 
within the context of the rules of evidence being relaxed at the bail stage.  This same 
expansive approach to relevance is applicable to evidence led by the accused and the Crown 
alike48 and is also codified in clause 518(1)(a) of the Criminal Code49 which permits a 
justice conducting a bail hearing to make such inquiries, whether or not under oath, about 
an accused, as the justice considers desirable.  Fourth, the evidence must be such that if 
believed it could reasonably be expected to have affected the result of the trial or bail 
hearing. 
In Zora, the Supreme Court potentially expands a reviewing judge’s powers in section 520 
bail reviews with these general comments: 
A bail review under ss. 520 and 521 is the primary way to challenge or change 
bail conditions which are not, or which are no longer, minimal, reasonable, 
necessary, least onerous, and sufficiently linked to risks posed by the accused 
(except for accused charged with very serious offences under s. 469). 
 
44 Ibid at paras 132 to 137. 
45 Palmer v R, [1980] 1 SCR 759 [Palmer]. 
46 St-Cloud, supra note 5. 
47 Ibid at para 132. 
48 See Gary Trotter, The Law of Bail in Canada, 3rd ed (Toronto: Thomson Reuters Canada, 
2017), c 5, s 5.5. 
49 Criminal Code, supra note 10. 
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Conditions set in the bustle of a busy bail court with limited information can, 
and when necessary should, be fine-tuned through bail review.50 
 
DETENTION REVIEWS PURSUANT TO SECTION 525 OF THE CRIMINAL 
CODE 
The framework under which section 525 detention review hearings must occur is set out in 
the Supreme Court of Canada’s decision in R v Myers.51  The paramount consideration is 
whether the continued detention of the accused in custody is justified within the meaning 
of subsection 515(10) of the Criminal Code.52 The judge conducting the review should 
respect findings of fact by the initial bail hearing justice if there is no cause to interfere 
with them.  But the section 525 judge must also take into consideration any new evidence 
or material change in circumstances with respect to the accused and analyze whether the 
accused’s continued detention in custody is justified.53   
The key purpose of section 525 is to prevent accused persons from languishing in pre-trial 
custody and to ensure that trials occur as promptly as possible.  It accomplishes this, in 
indictable offence cases, by placing a responsibility on the jail, the “person having the 
custody of the accused”54 where the accused is being held, to apply for a detention review 
hearing 90 days after the date on which the accused was first taken before a justice.   
 
BAIL ON APPEAL PURSUANT TO SECTION 679 OF THE CRIMINAL CODE 
A judge from a provincial court of appeal also becomes involved in bail considerations 
when dealing with applications brought pursuant to section 679 of the Criminal Code.55  
Many of the considerations under section 679 are similar to those in subsection 515(10), 
 
50 Zora, supra note 8 at para 64. 
51 R v Myers, 2019 SCC 18 [Myers]. 
52 Criminal Code, supra note 10. 
53 Myers, supra note 51 at paras 46 to 49. 




with one notable difference being that section 679 applies to persons who are no longer 
presumed innocent.  The relevant statutory provisions of section 679 are as follows: 
679(1) A judge of the court of appeal may, in accordance with this section, 
release an appellant from custody pending the determination of his appeal if, 
(a) in the case of an appeal to the court of appeal against conviction, 
the appellant has given notice of appeal or, where leave is 
required, notice of his application for leave to appeal pursuant to 
section 678; 
(b) in the case of an appeal to the court of appeal against sentence 
only, the appellant has been granted leave to appeal; or 
(c) in the case of an appeal or an application for leave to appeal to 
the Supreme Court of Canada, the appellant has filed and served 
his notice of appeal or, where leave is required, his application 
for leave to appeal. 
679(3) In the case of an appeal referred to in paragraph (1)(a) or (c), the 
judge of the court of appeal may order that the appellant be released pending 
the determination of his appeal if the appellant establishes that 
(a) the appeal or application for leave to appeal is not frivolous; 
(b) he will surrender himself into custody in accordance with the 
terms of the order; and 
(c) his detention is not necessary in the public interest. 
In Ontario, these section 679 applications provided the earliest opportunities for individual 
judges of the Court of Appeal to consider the application of COVID-19 to bail, as some of 
these cases arrived on that court’s docket before it had any chance to consider any Superior 
Court decisions on bail reviews. 
The leading case for considering a section 679 application for possible release from custody 
pending an appeal from conviction is the Supreme Court of Canada’s decision in R v 
Oland.56 It requires a court to conduct a three-pronged analysis.  The first criterion is 
outlined in clause 679(3)(a) of the Criminal Code57 and as stated in Oland, “requires the 
appeal judge to examine the grounds of appeal with a view to ensuring that they are ‘not 
frivolous,’”58 a standard which the Supreme Court of Canada acknowledges is a test that 
 
56 R v Oland, 2017 SCC 17, [2017] 1 SCR 250 [Oland]. 
57 Criminal Code, supra note 10. 
58 Oland, supra note 56 at para 20. 
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“is widely recognized as being a very low bar.”59  The second prong of the Oland60 analysis, 
set out in clause 679(3)(b), asks whether the defendant will surrender himself into custody 
when necessary.  The third prong in Oland, the one that attracts the most attention,61 is the 
public interest component, and this will be further reviewed later in this paper. 
 
COVID-19 AS A FACTOR AFFECTING ENSURING ATTENDANCE IN COURT 
UNDER THE PRIMARY GROUND FOR DETENTION IN CLAUSE 515(10)(A) OF 
THE CRIMINAL CODE 
The COVID-19 pandemic is rarely considered as being relevant when considering the 
primary ground for detention – to ensure the defendant’s attendance in court.  This makes 
sense, as there is no obvious causal link between the pandemic and attending court, which 
has mostly been remote since the beginning of the pandemic.  However, the primary ground 
is directly mentioned in a couple of COVID-19 bail decisions.  On June 8, 2020, Mr. Justice 
Leach of the Superior Court releases his written reasons in the section 520 matter of R v 
Morris,62 which he heard by teleconference on June 2, 2020.  While it is discussed later in 
greater detail, it is one of the few COVID-19 cases that specifically mentions the primary 
ground for interim detention, and it does so by referencing the decision in R v Grant,63 
decided in May 2020, which did consider that an accused’s health issues and fear of 
contracting COVID-19, coupled with pandemic-related travel restrictions, might reduce 
primary ground concerns even where the accused has a history of fleeing to escape 
consequences.  In Morris,64 it is the accused’s history of prior convictions for resisting a 
police officer, resisting arrest and escaping from lawful custody, as well as existing 
allegations of failing to report for probation and failing to attend for trial65 that cause his 
counsel at the review application to concede that the court could have legitimate concerns 
 
59 Oland, supra note 56 at para 20. 
60 Ibid. 
61 Ibid at paras 23 – 51.  
62 R v Morris, 2020 ONSC 3526, [2020] OJ No 2548 [Morris]. 
63 R v Grant, 2020 ONSC 2957, [2020] OJ No 2109 [Grant]. 
64 Morris, supra note 62. 
65 Ibid at paras 11(d) and 18. 
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on the primary ground about releasing Morris.  COVID-19 itself does not influence the 
Morris66 decision with respect to the primary ground. 
 
COVID-19 AS A FACTOR AFFECTING PUBLIC SAFETY UNDER THE 
SECONDARY GROUND FOR DETENTION IN CLAUSE 515(10)(B) OF THE 
CRIMINAL CODE 
There are several bases on which COVID-19 could be considered relevant with respect to 
the secondary ground.  Pandemic restrictions put in place by the federal and provincial 
legislation, either through existing or new legislation67 which have included closing 
businesses, restricting movement and cancelling large gatherings, may reduce the 
opportunities for some individuals to commit certain crimes.  For those accused who are 
released on bail with sureties, there may well be an increased number of sureties either now 
unemployed or now working from home who may have an increased ability to supervise.  
Other individuals may have underlying health conditions, with potentially more serious 
risks of negative effects if exposed to COVID-19.  These may cause such people to have 
less incentive for conducting criminal activity than they previously would have had.68  
Cases considering each of these factual issues will be reviewed later in this paper.  
Following these lines of reasoning, the pandemic could result in more individuals being 
released on the secondary ground.  At this point, I will review a few of the COVID-19 bail 
cases that discuss the relevance of the pandemic, in general terms, to the secondary ground. 
The case of R v TK69 was decided on March 30, 2020.  T.K. had been detained by 
Woloschuk JP after a bail hearing in Hamilton on March 8, 2019.  He had been charged 
 
66 Ibid. 
67 See e.g. Quarantine Act, SC 2005, c 20, Emergency Management and Civil Protection Act, 
RSO 1990, c E.9, Health Protection and Promotion Act, RSO 1990, c H.7, and Reopening 
Ontario (A Flexible Response to COVID-19) Act, 2020, SO 2020, c 17.  Other relevant 
government actions in Ontario included the Declaration of Emergency in Order in Council 518/20 
on March 17, 2020, as well as O Reg 52/20, effective March 28, 2020, Organized Public Events, 
Certain Gatherings; O Reg 104/20, effective March 30, 2020, Closure of Outdoor Recreational 
Amenities; O Reg 82/20, effective April 4, 2020, Rules for Areas in Shutdown Zone and at Step 1; 
and O Reg 51/20, Closure of Establishments, effective April 16, 2020. 
68 Cases in which release was granted on the secondary ground, apart from those discussed later 
in this paper, include R v Boast, 2020 ONSC 2684; R v Smith, 2020 ONSC 2668; and R v 
Osman, 2020 ONSC 2490. 
69 R v TK, 2020 ONSC 1935 [TK].   
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with several offences contrary to the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act70, including 
possession of a Schedule I substance, methamphetamine, for the purpose of trafficking,71 
along with some Criminal Code72 offences.  T.K. appeared before Goodman J of the 
Superior Court for a bail review.  In his decision, Mr. Justice Goodman reviews other pre-
pandemic section 520 bail decisions, including R v Obayendo73, R v Bonito74, and R v 
Samuels,75 before concluding that “the jeopardy and risk posed to inmates from COVID-
19 while incarcerated at detention centres awaiting trials (that are currently suspended) is 
also a valid factor when considering the secondary ground for detention; in particular for 
non-violent offenders on a bail review.”76 It is interesting that Goodman J, in this very early 
COVID-19 decision, invokes the secondary ground, as subsequent COVID-bail cases refer 
more frequently to the tertiary ground, as opposed to the secondary.  
In the particulars of this specific case, His Honour, while describing the current pandemic 
as “daunting and challenging”,77 notes that “the court must be mindful of the risks of release 
of violent offenders back in the community for the sake of reducing the prison population 
in detention centres.”  He concludes:  
When I consider the current state of affairs in the detention centres and with 
due consideration to the COVID-19 pandemic, I am persuaded by Ms. McCourt 
[T.K.’s counsel on the bail review] that the applicant will abide by the release 
conditions imposed instead of remaining in detention awaiting trial…In adding 
the COVID-19 pandemic into the proposed release plan’s ‘mix’…I am 
persuaded that the release plan proferred will address the Crown’s primary, 
secondary and tertiary concerns.78   
Judgment in the section 520 bail review of R v TL79 is issued on March 30, 2020.  T.L. had 
initially been detained by Ng JP pursuant to the secondary and tertiary grounds on 
November 13, 2019 after a hearing in which three sureties were proposed.80  The bail 
 
70 Controlled Drugs and Substances Act, SC 1996, c 19, as amended [CDSA]. 
71 Ibid, s 5(2). 
72 Criminal Code, supra note 10. 
73 R v Obayendo, 2015 ONSC 6630, [2015] OJ No 5705. 
74 R v Bonito, 2015 ONSC 4928, [2015] OJ No 4629. 
75 R v Samuels, 2015 ONSC 5798. 
76 TK, supra note 69 at para 60. 
77 Ibid at para 67. 
78 Ibid at paras 72 and 73. 
79 R v TL, 2020 ONSC 1885 [TL]. 
80 Ibid at para 2. 
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review begins, in person, in front of Molloy J of the Superior Court on March 13, 2020.  
Two proposed sureties testify, one of whom is T.L.’s grandmother.  The judge is concerned, 
however, that the proposed plan of release would involve T.L. living with his grandmother, 
but there is no indication that his grandfather, who also lives there, is aware of or agrees 
with this plan.  The matter is adjourned to March 23, 2020 as several of the involved parties 
have March break plans during the intervening time period.  Of course, during this week, 
the COVID-19 crisis worsens severely, and in-person court hearings are suspended.  The 
matter continues in front of Her Honour by conference call, though without the 
participation of T.L.81  At the conclusion of the conference call, Molloy J advises that she 
would be ordering T.L.’s release.  Relevant terms are discussed and “the final form of the 
order was then transmitted through various email exchanges.”82  Her Honour’s written 
reasons followed.  In light of the proposed house arrest with multiple sureties, Molloy J 
advises that the secondary ground concerns have been met.  The Crown raises one last 
interesting argument in that since the grandparents were seniors, “admittedly in a higher 
risk group in terms of the possible ramifications of infection,”83 it would endanger them to 
have T.L. come live with them.  Her Honour responds as follows: “[T]hey are capable, 
competent adults.  They are aware of the pandemic and its risks. They understand those 
risks and they accept them, because they love their grandson and they think it is the right 
thing to do.  That is a choice they are entitled to make.”84    
COVID-19 also plays a role in Schreck J’s decision on May 26, 2020 to release an 
individual in the case of R v GP.85  It is an application for a detention review pursuant to 
section 525 of the Criminal Code86 and was heard on May 7, 2020.  While there is a 
subsection 517(1) ban in place in GP,87 it specifically allows for publication and quotation 
 
81 Ibid at paras 4 and 5. 
82 Ibid at para 7. 
83 Ibid at para 37. 
84 Ibid at para 37. 
85 R v GP, 2020 ONSC 3240 [GP]. 
86 Criminal Code, supra note 10. 
87 The non-publication and non-production orders in GP, supra note 85 were issued, as is quite 
typical, pursuant to the provisions of s 517(1) of the Criminal Code, supra note 10.  These orders 
direct that “the evidence taken, the information given or the representations made and the 
reasons, if any, given or to be given by the justice shall not be published in any document, or 
broadcast or transmitted in any way before such time as (a) if a preliminary inquiry is held, the 
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of general principles, though still prohibits publication of any facts about the applicant, his 
personal circumstances or the evidence.  This case is worth reviewing because of the 
question posed by Schreck J in the very first sentence of his decision:  “What happens when 
there are secondary ground concerns about an accused person but he or she has already 
spent time in custody that is equivalent to or greater than any sentence he or she would 
receive if convicted?”88  His Honour goes on to answer his own question:   
Although I have secondary ground concerns and concerns about the adequacy 
of the proposed plan, in my view there is a significant risk that if he is not 
released, the applicant will serve more time in custody than he would be 
sentenced to if found guilty.  The principle of proportionality in sentencing 
requires that a sentence be as long as necessary to make it proportionate to the 
gravity of the offence and the moral blameworthiness of the offender, but no 
longer.  In my view, that principle is an important factor in this case which tips 
the balance in favour of release.89  
COVID-19 influences Schreck J’s decision to release as a result of a proportionality 
consideration as His Honour acknowledges that, if eventually convicted and sentenced, 
G.P. would receive more than usual pre-trial credit because of the grimmer conditions in 
the detention centre as a result of COVID-19.90   
Relying solely on the number of reported cases that discuss the application of COVID-19 
to bail, it would appear that, far more often, when courts consider the COVID-19 pandemic 
in bail hearings specifically as a factor concerning the secondary ground, detention results 
more frequently than release.  This is the case especially if the court finds no strong link 
between the particular accused and the pandemic.91  At least one decision has emphasized 
that COVID-19 considerations should carry less weight when the risk is greater that any 
further offences committed by accused persons on interim release would be violent ones.92  
Other decisions go further and conclude that an accused does not become less of a risk to 
 
accused in respect of whom the proceedings are held is discharged; or (b) if the accused in 
respect of whom the proceedings are held is tried or ordered to stand trial, the trial is held.”   
88 GP, supra note 85 at para 1. 
89 Ibid at para 3.  On the principle of proportionality, see Myers, supra note 51 at para 51 and R v 
Nasogaluak, 2010 SCC 6, [2010] 1 SCR 206 at para 42.  
90 GP, supra note 85 at para 34. 
91 These include R v Hastings, 2020 ONSC 2083 [Hastings], [2020] OJ No 1427; R v Halovich, 
2020 ONSC 2709, R v Hassan, 2020 ONSC 2265 and R v BMD, 2020 ONSC 2671 [BMD].  
Some of these cases will be discussed in more detail later in this paper. 
92 R v JL, 2020 ONSC 2144. 
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public protection and safety because of COVID-19, and that the protection of the public, 
an important component of the secondary ground, is the paramount concern, trumping any 
possible threat of inmates being exposed to the pandemic while in custody.93  
On April 9, 2020, the decision in the case of R v Syed94 is released by Harris J.  It is pursuant 
to section 522 of the Criminal Code,95 and is therefore the initial bail hearing for Mr. Syed, 
who was charged with a section 469 offence.  Again, without going into great detail 
regarding this case, as subsection 517(1) and 520(9) orders are in place,96 His Honour 
comments that “if an accused should be detained for the protection of the public, the risk 
of contracting the virus in jail does not alter that fact.  A person does not become less of a 
risk because of COVID-19.”97 
An interesting bail decision in the early days of the pandemic is R v Ibrahim,98 a decision 
of Bird J released on April 14, 2020. Mr. Ibrahim was charged with first degree murder.99 
The Crown does not allege that Mr. Ibrahim is one of the people who shot the victim in 
this case, but rather that he is a party to the first degree murder by virtue of his actions in 
the days leading up to the shooting.  The evidence against him, while strong, is therefore 
primarily circumstantial.100  Ibrahim also has no criminal record nor any other outstanding 
charges against him.101   
In weighing the COVID-19 risk for accused persons in custody against the grounds 
outlined in subsection 515(10) of the Criminal Code,102 Her Honour concludes that 
 
93 See e.g. R v Williams, 2020 ONSC 2237 [Williams], at paras 123 – 126. 
94 R v Syed, 2020 ONSC 2195 [Shayan Syed]. 
95 Criminal Code, supra note 10. 
96 The non-publication and non-broadcast provisions of s 517 are incorporated into s 520 
proceedings by virtue of s 520(9). 
97 Shayan Syed, supra note 94 at para 49.  A similar decision was reached in R v Morgan 
(unreported) (31 March 2020), M54170 (C67536) (Ont CA) [Morgan#1] in which Trotter JA 
dismisses an application for bail pending appeal notwithstanding COVID-19 concerns, as he finds 
that Morgan poses a risk to public safety that was not lessened by his proposed release plan, due 
to his risk of reoffending as well as the inadequacy of his sureties to supervise him. 
98 R v Ibrahim, 2020 ONSC 2241, [2020] OJ No 1570 [Ibrahim].   
99 Pursuant to ss 231 and 235 of the Criminal Code, supra note 10.  As murder (s 235) is an 
offence listed in s 469 of the Criminal Code, s 522 of the Criminal Code required Mr. Ibrahim’s 
initial bail hearing to occur in the Superior Court of Justice. 
100 Ibrahim, supra note 98 at para 7. 
101 Ibid at paras 23 and 32. 
102 Criminal Code, supra note 10. 
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“COVID-19 is a factor to be considered but is not determinative of a bail application.  If it 
were dispositive, no one would be detained in custody pending trial until the pandemic is 
over.”103  After reviewing the specifics of Mr. Ibrahim’s situation, including what she refers 
to as his “antisocial lifestyle,” his alleged involvement in the “planned and deliberate 
execution” of the victim and his “lack of respect in the past for both his mother and sister” 
who are his proposed sureties, Her Honour concludes that she must detain him on the 
secondary ground, and his application for bail is dismissed.104  In coming to that conclusion 
on the secondary ground, she declines to conduct a detailed analysis of the case under the 
tertiary ground. 
On June 4, 2020, North J gives his oral decision in the matter of R v O’Brien.105  If for no 
other reason, it is worth reading because it is a transcript of the oral delivery of his decision 
by His Honour.  Thus, it is full of complaints by various parties of their difficulty hearing, 
of feedback and of interruptions.106 Such occurrences are all too common in pandemic-era 
remote audio proceedings where the various parties cannot properly hear or see each other.  
By virtue of his outstanding release orders and the allegations that he committed indictable 
offences while on release, Mr. O’Brien was in a “reverse onus” situation107 wherein it was 
his onus to show to the court why his release should be justified rather than the Crown’s 
onus to prove to the court why his detention was necessary.  When considering whether he 
should take the pandemic into account when considering the secondary ground, North J 
states: 
[66] Defence counsel argues that COVID-19 is a relevant consideration on 
the secondary ground in this case.  Some courts have accepted that COVID-19 
should be taken into account when assessing the secondary ground.   
[67] In this case, even I were to accept that COVID-19 is a factor that 
should be taken into account when assessing the secondary ground, it is not a 
significant consideration in assessing whether there would be a substantial 
likelihood that Mr. O’Brien will, if released from custody, commit a criminal 
offence.   
 
103 Ibrahim, supra note 98 at para 29. 
104 Ibid at paras 45, 48, 49 and 51. 
105 R v O’Brien, [2020] OJ No 2805 (ONCJ) [O’Brien].  
106 Ibid at paras 2 and 9. 
107 See s 515(6) of the Criminal Code, supra note 10. 
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[68] Given his record for not complying with court orders in the past and 
the serious nature of the alleged breaches in this case (which were allegedly 
committed during the middle of the COVID-19 pandemic), I am not convinced 
that the potential prospect of being arrested and held in custody pending his 
trial during the pandemic would lower the substantial likelihood that, if 
released, Mr. O’Brien would commit a serious criminal offence.  
North J. makes these comments regarding the applicability of COVID-19 to a secondary 
ground consideration after he has already concluded that Mr. O’Brien should be detained 
on the secondary ground.108  
Morris109 is briefly discussed earlier in this paper under the primary ground.  On all three 
grounds, Leach J orders the detention of Mr. Morris, finding that the accused does not 
suffer from any relevant health conditions or any subjective fears of contracting COVID-
19.  With respect to the secondary ground, His Honour also considers that, because of the 
pandemic, if he were to release Mr. Morris, there are unfortunately fewer supports available 
during the pandemic to help Mr. Morris with his drug addiction and mental health issues.  
He also notes that there are – at the time of his decision – no cases of COVID-19 at the 
Elgin-Middlesex Detention Centre, where Morris is being held, and the probability is 
strong that Morris would not follow the directions and rules of his proposed surety.110 
 
For the most part, the courts have generally concluded that on the secondary ground, the 
existence of the COVID-19 pandemic has not often been the tipping point that results in an 
accused person getting bail.  Perhaps Quigley J summarizes it best in R v Bell:111 
There is also the question of the impact of COVID-19, but the jurisprudence 
that has developed makes clear that will not be an answer where primary or 
secondary ground concerns are the basis for detention. Persons who present a 
substantial likelihood of endangering the public by committing offences or 
interfering with the administration of justice will likely remain in detention.  
 
108 O’Brien, supra note 105 at paras 65 to 68. His Honour comes to a similar conclusion when 
considering the tertiary ground:  “In the circumstances of this case, I have concluded that a 
tertiary ground release order would be inappropriate, as it would be almost entirely dependent on 
the COVID-19 factor and would significantly under-weigh all of the other relevant considerations.”  
O’Brien at para 100. 
109 Morris, supra note 62. 
110 Ibid at para 22. 
111 R v Bell, 2020 ONSC 3962 [Bell]. 
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Accused persons who were previously un-releasable will likely remain un-
releasable.112 
Similarly, Molloy J states, in a comment that applies to both the secondary and tertiary 
grounds: “As many other judges have noted, the COVID-19 pandemic is not a ‘get out of 
jail free’ card.  There are individuals who represent such a risk to the community that 
releasing them prior to trial would undermine public confidence in the justice system.”113   
To summarize, substantial case-specific secondary ground concerns will not generally be 
overcome by factoring the COVID-19 pandemic into the equation.  It would appear that, 
only when the secondary ground concerns are not as serious, such as when there is no, or 
limited, history of violence, will the pandemic give that extra push to nudge an otherwise 
wavering judicial official into releasing someone on the secondary ground. 
 
COVID-19 CONSIDERED AS A FACTOR RELEVANT TO PUBLIC 
CONFIDENCE IN THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE UNDER THE 
TERTIARY GROUND FOR DETENTION IN SECTION 515(10)(C) OF THE 
CRIMINAL CODE 
One of the earliest cases in which COVID-19 is considered in relation to the tertiary 
grounds is R v JS,114 decided on March 20, 2020 by Copeland J of the Superior Court in a 
section 520 bail review, held by teleconference in which the proposed sureties are with 
defence counsel, but J.S. himself does not participate.115  While there are publication bans 
in effect pursuant to subsections 517(1) and 520(9) of the Criminal Code,116 I believe I can 
make the following general comments and reference some quotations from the case.  The 
Crown in this case acknowledges that changes in circumstances have occurred, both in 
terms of new sureties being proposed and also because of the existence of the COVID-19 
pandemic, which arose after the original detention of J.S. by a justice of the peace.117  In 
 
112 Bell, supra note 111 at para 83. 
113 R v Newman, 2020 ONSC 4879 at para 21.  
114 R v JS, 2020 ONSC 1710 [JS]. 
115 Ibid at para 1. 
116 Criminal Code, supra note 10. 
117 JS, supra note 114 at paras 4 and 5. 
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this case, the stricter terms of supervision which the new sureties offer lead Her Honour to 
conclude as follows:   
Where there may be tertiary ground concerns, the terms of a proposed release 
plan, if sufficiently strict, may be sufficient to address these concerns.  In other 
words, depending on all of the circumstances, the confidence in the 
administration of justice of a reasonable and well-informed member of the 
public may not be diminished even where the Crown makes a strong showing 
on the four St.-Cloud factors, if a defendant is released on a restrictive bail 
plan.118 
J.S’s lack of a criminal record also helps Justice Copeland determine that release is 
possible, along with her considerations of the implications of COVID-19:  “In my view, 
the greatly elevated risk posed to detained inmates from the coronavirus, as compared to 
being at home on house arrest is a factor that must be considered in assessing the tertiary 
ground.”119  She goes into further details when she considers the impact of COVID-19 in 
a custodial setting:   
But I take notice of the fact, based on current events around the world, and in 
this province, that the risks to health from this virus in a confined space with 
many people, like a jail, are significantly greater than if a defendant is able to 
self-isolate at home.  The virus is clearly easily transmitted, absent strong social 
distancing or self-isolation, and it is clearly deadly to a significant number of 
people who it infects.  The practical reality is that the ability to practice social 
distancing and self-isolation is limited, if not impossible, in an institution where 
inmates do not have single cells.120 
Not surprisingly, some of the earliest reported COVID-19 cases are initial bail hearings in 
front of justices of the peace.  Two of these occurred on March 26, 2020, both in Toronto.  
In R v Chaouche,121 Justice of the Peace Bhattacharjee takes COVID-19 into account when 
considering the tertiary ground.  His Worship concludes that tertiary ground concerns are 
offset by the possibility of coronavirus in jails, and that a reasonable member of the public 
 
118 Ibid at para 10.  See also R v Dang, 2015 ONSC 4254. 
119 JS, supra note 114 at para 18. 
120 Ibid at para 19.  JS is one of the cases referenced and cited in R v Ali, 2020 ONSC 2374 [Ali]:  
“Although certainly not a universal view, many judges are now placing an increased focus on the 
strength of the release plan in terms of protection of the public and the impact of COVID-19 on 
the tertiary ground even when there is no evidence that a particular defendant is at a higher risk if 
he or she contracts COVID-19.” Ali at paras 72 and 73. 
121 R v Chaouche, [2020] OJ No 1462 (ONCJ) [Chaouche]. 
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would take into consideration the individual and public health interest in having an accused 
put under house arrest, where feasible, rather than being detained in custody. 
Also on March 26, 2020, Justice of the Peace Lee releases his decision in R v Cotterell.122  
In this case, in reasoning similar to that expressed in Chaouche,123 Lee JP concludes that 
COVID-19 is relevant to the tertiary ground, as courts must consider the elevated risk of 
infection in correctional institutions. His Worship’s conclusion in Cotterell124 is that the 
accused met his onus on both the secondary and tertiary grounds.   
Another early COVID-19 bail review application was that of R v Rajan,125 a decision by 
Harris J.  It is subject to publication bans under subsections 517(1) and 520(9) of the 
Criminal Code126 with respect to the evidence of the offences alleged against Mr. Rajan.  
His Honour summarizes his conclusions in the first two paragraphs of his decision: 
[1] Sohail Rajan makes his fourth application for bail release pending his 
trial.  Crown counsel agrees that there has been a material change of 
circumstances but opposes release.  This bail hearing was heard by way of 
audioconference due to the COVID-19 pandemic. 
[2] I have with considerable reluctance come to the conclusion that the 
applicant’s argument that he should now be released on bail must succeed.  The 
secondary ground which has been the main concern in the past has shifted and 
now weighs in favour of release.  With reference to the tertiary ground, it has 
been fundamentally altered by the COVID-19 pandemic and the threat it poses 
to inmates and staff in jails.  The applicant has discharged his onus on the 
tertiary ground as well. 
His Honour finds that the COVID-19 pandemic has “radically altered”127 tertiary ground 
considerations, and that these are “extraordinary, dire times.”128  He goes on to state that 
“the simple fact is that a reasonable and informed member of the public would be wary of 
 
122 R v Cotterell, [2020] OJ No 1433 (ONCJ) [Cotterell]. 
123 Chaouche, supra note 121. 
124 Cotterell, supra note 122. 
125 R v Rajan, 2020 ONSC 2118 [Rajan]. 
126 Criminal Code, supra note 10. 
127 Rajan, supra note 125 at para 38.  Harris J elaborates upon this further at para 66 when he 
states: “There are major ramifications arising from the COVID-19 pandemic for the tertiary 
ground.  In situations where the tertiary ground may have authorized detention in the past, the 
threat of COVID-19 to an individual seeking bail must now be incorporated into ‘all the 
circumstances’ in Section 515(10)(c).” 
128 Ibid at para 53. 
23 
 
keeping alleged offenders in pre-trial custody for the sole purpose of advancing confidence 
in the system of justice.  The dangers to the prison population – both inmates and staff – 
posed by the risk of contagion have reordered the usual calculus.”129  He concludes that 
“the tertiary ground must, for the time being, be looked at in a new light.”130  In considering 
the tertiary ground in this new light, Harris J becomes quite eloquent: 
[68] While the tertiary ground reasons for detention are based on a visceral 
reaction against release – a somewhat abstract notion premised on gauging the 
reasonable views of the public – the threat of COVID-19 in a jail setting is 
based on cold, hard scientific reality. 
[69] The two must be counterbalanced against each other.  The traditional 
grounds for the imposition of tertiary ground detention expressed in Hall, 
Mordue and St. Cloud as quoted above continue to militate towards detention.  
However, the threat of the virus pulls strongly in the other direction, towards 
release.  In the end, the threat, if not the actuality of COVID-19, goes a long 
way to cancelling out the traditional basis for tertiary ground detention. 
[70] …In the face of the pandemic, bail release, in the absence of primary 
or secondary ground concerns, may well not shake the confidence of the public. 
The bail review case of R v MK131 heard on April 8, 2020, with the decision released by 
London-Weinstein J on April 15, 2020, is interesting in that it is a review of a detention 
order issued against M.K. by a justice of the peace on March 19, 2020.  By that date, the 
scope of the COVID-19 pandemic is public knowledge.  While both the Crown and defence 
counsel at the original bail hearing reference the pandemic, the justice of the peace 
somewhat surprisingly does not address COVID-19 in the March 19 decision.  Her Honour 
relies on the offer of a new surety at the bail review as providing the material change in 
circumstances that allow her to conduct a de novo hearing pursuant to section 520 of the 
Criminal Code.132 
The case of R v Tully133 raises an interesting jurisdictional issue.  Andre Tully had been 
arrested in November 2018, but he does not seek bail until April 2020.  Tully’s counsel 
 
129 Ibid at para 39.  See also at para 56: “In all of this upheaval, to be in jail as an inmate or a staff 
member must count as one of the most dangerous places imaginable.” 
130 Ibid at para 40. 
131 R v MK, 2020 ONSC 2266 [MK]. 
132 Criminal Code, supra note 10. 
133 R v Tully, 2020 ONSC 2762, [2020] OJ No 1969 [Tully]. 
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frames the application to Superior Court as a section 525 detention review arguing that 
such a review is available to detainees “who, for whatever reason, do not contest their initial 
detention.”134  Dawe J is skeptical for several reasons of the validity of this argument, one 
of which is the acknowledged fact that there is no earlier bail hearing for this detention 
review to consider.135 
Nevertheless, for a variety of reasons, including the very practical one that “scheduling 
multiple hearings in different levels of court during the COVID-19 pandemic is no easy 
matter,”136 His Honour decides to go ahead with the bail hearing in the Superior Court.  
Dawe J concludes that, if necessary, he is prepared to exercise his ex officio powers as a 
justice of the peace137 to conduct the hearing under section 515 of the Criminal Code.138  
While His Honour acknowledges that there is case law that states this power should not be 
used “save in the most unusual situation”139 he is prepared to rule that the pandemic – “an 
unprecedented public health crisis” – fits the definition of most unusual.140 
His Honour’s tertiary ground considerations are twofold.  First, extremely strict house 
arrest conditions are being proposed141 and “the second major factor that I see as weighing 
in favour of release under the tertiary ground is the fact that Mr. Tully brings this 
application during the COVID-19 pandemic”142 citing support for this proposition in cases 
such as JS,143 TL,144 Rajan,145 Williams146 and Ali.147 
 
134 Myers, supra note 51 at para 43. 
135 Tully, supra note 133 at paras 4 – 6.  See R v Watts, 2014 ONSC 6246 where C Speyer J 
held, at para 25:  “It is the function of the Ontario Court of Justice to conduct a bail hearing, in the 
first instance, where no determination of detention or release has previously been made….It is 
the function of the Superior Court to review a detention or release order.  When there is no record 
to review, and the accused in seeking release for the first time, as in the case at bar, the proper 
practice is to remit the case to the Ontario Court of Justice for a bail hearing.” 
136 Tully, supra note 133 at para 7. 
137 See Justices of the Peace Act, RSO 1990, c J.4, s 5. 
138 Criminal Code, supra note 10. 
139 R v LaFontaine (1973), 13 CCC (2d) 316 at 317 (Ont HC) per Zuber J. 
140 Tully, supra note 133 at para 9. 
141 Ibid at para 32. 
142 Ibid at para 33. 
143 JS, supra note 114. 
144 TL, supra note 79. 
145 Rajan, supra note 125. 
146 Williams, supra note 93. 
147 Ali, supra note 120. 
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Dawe J expands upon the relevance of the pandemic, and outlines in Tully148 how he 
believes, based on other court decisions, that it bears on tertiary ground analyses in three 
different ways.  The first is the “greatly elevated risk posed to detained inmates from the 
coronavirus,”149 the second is the probable length of time in custody of accused persons 
awaiting delayed trial dates,150 and the third is the impact that detaining or releasing a 
defendant has on others who are required to remain in detention.151  The first two of these 
issues are specifically considered in greater detail later in this paper.  In His Honour’s 
opinion, explains in further detail his belief that all three of these considerations weigh in 
favour of Tully’s release.152 
On December 5, 2018, Justice of the Peace Nestico detained Rina Mansour on the tertiary 
ground only, even though Ms. Mansour had no criminal record.  It is alleged that she drove 
a motor vehicle from the United States back into Canada with twenty-five handguns hidden 
in the fuel tank.  On a first bail review on May 16, 2019, His Worship Nestico’s decision 
was upheld.  A further review occurs on May 29, 2020, and Mr. Justice Nakatsuru releases 
his decision in R v Mansour153 on June 3, 2020.  As His Honour puts it succinctly: “This 
case turns on the consideration of the tertiary ground and the material change in 
circumstances brought by the COVID-19 pandemic.  The parties do not dispute that this is 
a material change.”154   
Mr. Justice Nakatsuru sets out his framework for considering COVID-19 and the tertiary 
ground as follows: 
In assessing the impact of COVID-19 on the tertiary ground, I am guided by 
the following propositions: 
(1) judicial notice can be taken about the nature and effects of COVID-19 
and the pandemic; 
(2) where the detainee is particularly vulnerable to COVID-19 in the 
institutional setting, this factor significantly supports release; and 
 
148 Tully, supra note 133 at paras 34 to 36. 
149 JS, supra note 114 at para 18. 
150 Ali, supra note 120 at para 88. 
151 Williams, supra note 93 at para 124. 
152 Tully, supra note 133 at paras 37 to 42. 
153 R v Mansour, 2020 ONSC 3478 [Mansour]. 
154 Ibid at para 24. 
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(3) even if the detainee is not so vulnerable, their own individual health, the 
health and safety of others such as that of other inmates and correctional 
employees as well as their families and extended community contacts 
should be considered on the tertiary ground.155  
In Ms. Mansour’s case, Nakatsuru J outlines what he believes are the specific health 
concerns that put her at higher risk as well as a possible delay in her trial as a result of the 
pandemic.156  His Honour concludes, notwithstanding his comment that “the COVID-19 
pandemic is not a free pass out of jail,”157 that her release is warranted on strict 
conditions.158  His Honour concludes:   
I agree with the jurisprudence holding that the current pandemic is a factor that 
can support release from pre-trial custody.  Put in terms of the test for the 
tertiary ground, this just makes common sense.  The reasonable public’s 
confidence in the administration of justice will not be undermined when an 
accused’s release can assist in addressing a societal crisis.  Said in a different 
way, the community expects the administration of justice itself to play a role 
in fighting this pandemic.159 
Throughout the summer of 2020, as the first wave of the pandemic recedes, fewer reported 
bail cases consider the impact of COVID-19.  But, in October 2020, as case numbers rise 
and the second wave approaches, one case that looks again at the pandemic is R v Hoo-
Hing.160  Bawden J, looking back, refers to “the concerns which animated the lenient bail 
decisions released during the heart of the first wave are still present.”161  
Fantasia Hoo-Hing is a woman in her 30s, with no criminal record, who is charged with 
second degree murder.162  The COVID-19 pandemic, in combination with case law, leads 
Bawden J to conclude that Ms. Hoo-Hing can be released.  His Honour frames the 
relationship between COVID-19 and recent seminal bail decisions in an interesting 
manner:   
It must also be recognized that the pandemic has only accelerated an evolution 
in the law of bail which began with the release of St. Cloud from the Supreme 
 
155 Ibid at para 35. 
156 Ibid at paras 37 and 50. 
157 Ibid at para 56. 
158 Ibid at para 59. 
159 Ibid at para 34. 
160 R v Hoo-Hing, 2020 ONSC 6343, 2020 CarswellOnt 15248 [Hoo-Hing]. 
161 Ibid at para 39. 
162 Ibid at paras 1, 18 and 30. 
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Court of Canada in 2015, and has continued with Antic in 2017, Myers in 2019, 
and Zora in 2020.  The Supreme Court of Canada has set a clear direction to 
courts of first instance concerning the interpretation of s. 510 of the Code.  
Fairness and the recognition of the presumption of innocence lie at the heart of 
that new direction.163 
His Honour’s decision in Hoo-Hing164 is also one of the few that recognizes that not only 
has COVID-19 likely resulted in longer pre-trial custody for those who remain in detention, 
it has made that pre-trial detention harsher:  “It has also come at the cost of the freedoms 
and privileges ordinarily enjoyed by inmates.”165 
Bawden J. takes into account the pandemic and a change in sureties and concludes that “the 
combination of these two material changes in circumstance tip the balance in favour of the 
applicant on the tertiary ground.”166   
Nevertheless, while the tertiary ground provides more fertile ground for COVID-19 to be 
used in cultivating releases167 than the secondary ground has, by no means does a tertiary 
ground consideration always result in the accused’s release.  There is no shortage of cases 
where, after considering the impact of COVID-19 on the tertiary ground, detention is 
ordered. 
Janson Jeyakanthan applies for a section 520 bail review which is heard on March 27 and 
31, 2020.   Madam Justice McWatt, now Associate Chief Justice of the Superior Court, 
releases her decision on March 31, 2020 in R v Jeyakanthan.168 While he has no criminal 
record, Mr. Jeyakanthan is facing three different sets of charges.169  On November 4, 2019, 
he was detained by Justice of the Peace Kirke following a contested hearing. 
At the bail review in front of McWatt J, two material changes in circumstances are alleged.  
First, there is a proposed tightening of the terms of release, including house arrest, and 
 
163 Ibid at para 40. 
164 Ibid. 
165 Ibid at para 39. 
166 Ibid at para 42. 
167 Other cases where release was granted on the tertiary ground, after considering the COVID-
19 pandemic, include R v Hui, 2020 ONSC 3212 and R v Mustard, 2020 ONSC 2973. 
168 R v Jeyakanthan, 2020 ONSC 1984, [2020] OJ No 1409 [Jeyakanthan]. 
169 Ibid at paras 6, 8, 9, 12 and 13. 
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second, the existence and prevalence of COVID-19, especially in jails.170 While Her 
Honour accepts that COVID-19 is a “material change to be considered in this 
application,”171 she is not prepared to go any further. 
She rejects Copeland J’s conclusions in JS,172 released eleven days earlier, specifically 
disagreeing with Madam Justice Copeland’s comments that “the greatly elevated risk posed 
to detained inmates from the coronavirus, as compared to be being at home on house arrest 
is a factor that must be considered in assessing the tertiary ground.”173  McWatt J further 
believes that Copeland’s conclusions, found in paragraph 19 of JS,174 are “conclusions 
based on speculation and not on evidence.”175  She goes on to criticize those who have 
followed JS:176  “I have reviewed cases provided by the applicant which follow the line of 
reasoning set out in JS and do not accept the reasoning therein – mainly because they also 
are not founded on any evidence.”177 
The only evidence that McWatt J has before her is a news article from March 20, 2020 
indicating that only one guard, and no inmates, at the Toronto South Detention Centre 
where Mr. Jeyakanthan was housed have tested positive.  She also relies on the data 
included in the Ministry of the Solicitor General’s “Briefing Note – Institutional Services 
Response to COVID-19” which indicates that the number of inmates in custody in all 
provincial correctional centres has decreased from 8211 on March 13, 2021 to 6925 on 
March 25, 2021.178 
Madam Justice McWatt instead follows the reasoning set out in the cases of R v Nelson179 
and R v Budlakoti,180 both discussed later in this paper, that at least some medical evidence, 
 
170 Ibid at paras 18, 22 and 23. 
171 Ibid at para 27. 
172 JS, supra note 114. 
173 Jeyakanthan, supra note 168 at para 28, citing JS, supra note 114 at para 18. 
174 Ibid. 
175 Jeyakanthan, supra note 168 at para 29.  The conclusions referred to in JS include that health 
risks in confined spaces such as jails are significantly greater than in situations where someone is 
able to self-isolate, as well as that theCOVID-19 virus is easily spreadable. 
176 JS, supra note 114. 
177 Jeyakanthan, supra note 168 at para 32. 
178 Ibid at para 31.  Further discussion of the Ministry’s Information Notes will occur later in this 
paper. 
179 R v Nelson, 2020 ONSC 1728 [Nelson]. 
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specific to the individual accused, must be provided to a bail court if the COVID-19 
material change in circumstances argument is to be successful.  As there is no such 
evidence in Jeyakanthan, Her Honour affirms his detention by the justice of the peace.181 
A week later, on April 3, 2020, Mr. Justice Phillips releases a brief decision in the matter 
of R v Frantzy.182 While His Honour says “I take judicial notice of the fact that the custodial 
environment exposes inmates to higher risk of contracting the virus than would otherwise 
be the case” he goes on to state that “the existence of the Covid-19 pandemic cannot be a 
trump-card argument against the notion of custody itself.”183  Mr. Frantzy’s criminal 
record, including a history of failing to attend court or to follow court orders, leads His 
Honour to conclude that Mr. Frantzy has failed to discharge his onus:  “But, it remains the 
case that the public must have faith in its justice system, and that those who ought to be 
awaiting their trials in custody remain in custody, notwithstanding the higher risk of 
exposure to the coronavirus.”184  Interestingly, Phillips J takes note of the fact and indeed 
says he is “comforted to a significant degree”185 that the Ottawa jail has not yet had any 
COVID-19 cases, and he does hold open the possibility of revisiting Mr. Frantzy’s situation 
in the future:  “The Covid-19 pandemic is a dynamic circumstance and I am open to re-
considering the matter if the present environment at the detention centre should 
deteriorate.”186 
In R v Brown,187 Crawford J follows the line of reasoning outlined by McWatt J in 
Jeyakanthan,188 as well as that of the judges in Nelson189 and Budlakoti.190  In Brown,191 
there is no evidence of any COVID-19 cases at the Central East Correctional Centre where 
Brown is being held, nor is there any evidence from a medical professional that Mr. 
Brown’s pre-existing health issues (resulting from childhood asthma and having been 
 
181 Jeyakanthan, supra note 168 at paras 33 through 37. 
182 R v Frantzy, [2020] OJ No 1549 (ONSC) [Frantzy]. 
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stabbed in the lung as an adolescent) make him more susceptible to contracting COVID-
19.  Her Honour, after commenting that “the court cannot be seen to be giving the 
impression that as a result of this virus, the criminal justice system is a free-for-all”192 
concludes:   
This is a case where, given the seriousness of the charges (including a 
consideration of the safety and security of the victim and public as a whole), 
Mr. Brown’s prior criminal record, the court’s lack of confidence that Mr. 
Brown will follow the proposed plan of release, and the absence of medical or 
other evidence that Mr. Brown may be more susceptible to contracting the virus 
or the consequences of it, I am not satisfied that there would be confidence in 
the administration of justice if Mr. Brown was released from jail.193  
On April 20, 2020, Lemon J releases his decision in R v Kinghorn.194  Delano Kinghorn 
had been detained after a bail hearing on October 18, 2019 on charges of assault, aggravated 
assault, unlawful confinement, uttering a death threat and breach of probation, all of which 
resulted from an altercation that Mr. Kinghorn had with his spouse.195  Defence counsel 
argues that a change in his release plan and the COVID-19 pandemic constitute material 
changes that would permit the judge to conduct a de novo hearing.  Without going into 
great detail, His Honour quickly concludes that he is satisfied that a material change has 
occurred such that Mr. Kinghorn is entitled to a review.196 
With respect to the tertiary ground analysis, His Honour reviews the relevant passages from 
St-Cloud197 as well as the statutory provisions of clause 515(10)(c) of the Criminal Code.198  
He then concludes:   
Taking all of these circumstances into account, I would expect that an informed 
person would lose confidence in the administration of justice if an individual 
facing a strong case alleging that he committed repeated offences against the 
same victim and with a lengthy history of failing to comply with terms of court 
orders were released to his optimistic brother prior to trial.199 
 
192 Ibid at para 62. 
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A bail decision that does arise during the second wave is R v HK200 which is a bail review 
for the accused after his initial detention in October 2019.  A bail review occurred in May 
2020.  Quigley J conducts this second bail review on December 20, 2020 and releases his 
written reasons on January 8, 2021.201  One material change in circumstances alleged by 
H.K. is that “the number of positive COVID-19 cases in Ontario is rising and that there has 
been a recent outbreak at Toronto South, where the applicant is in custody.”202  Quigley J, 
in his analysis, requires that the material change in circumstances be specific to H.K. 
himself, and he believes that “the preponderance of COVID-19 litigation that has taken 
place since the onset of the pandemic” has taken the same position.203  He therefore narrow 
the options for finding that a material change has occurred, stating that “[T]he pandemic, 
in and of itself, does not automatically constitute a material change in circumstance.  The 
fact that the number of cases in Ontario or even inside a correctional facility may be rising 
is not evidence that there has been any corresponding effect on HK.”204  His Honour 
acknowledges that as of December 9, 2020 Toronto Public Health has declared an outbreak 
of COVID-19 at the Toronto South Detention Centre, but he notes that, “at this time, HK 
is not housed on a precautionary unit.  That means that as of the date of this hearing, there 
were no reported positive or potential cases on his unit.”  His Honour goes on to say:   
Evidence of rising cases of COVID-19 in the province of Ontario is of concern 
for all residents of the province of Ontario, while evidence of rising cases inside 
a correctional facility will obviously be of concern to the inmates of that 
facility.  Generally, however, that does not establish that it represents a material 
change in circumstance for HK specifically.205   
His Honour therefore concludes that there have been no material changes and concludes 
that thus he does not have the jurisdiction to conduct a de novo hearing.  H.K.’s bail review 
application is dismissed.206 
 
200 R v HK, 2021 ONSC 182 [HK]. 
201 Ibid at paras 3 and 6. 
202 Ibid at para 24. 
203 Ibid at para 26. 
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In many ways, COVID-19’s effect on tertiary ground analysis is quite similar to its 
influence on secondary ground analysis.  However, especially in the early cases, such as 
JS207 and Rajan,208 decided during the first wave of the pandemic in the spring of 2020, 
there are clear examples of COVID-19 leading judges to release individuals when they 
plainly did not wish to do so.  As 2020 continues and the first wave subsides, the ability of 
the pandemic to lead to releases on the tertiary ground subsides, so that, by the time of 
HK209 in early January 2021, as the second wave of COVID-19 cases in Ontario is arriving, 
it is no longer the game-changer that it so often was earlier in the year. 
 
COVID-19 CONSIDERED AS A MATERIAL CHANGE IN CIRCUMSTANCE 
JUSTIFYING A BAIL REVIEW UNDER S. 520 OF THE CRIMINAL CODE 
Section 520 bail review cases consider the context of the pandemic under the same 
framework of the secondary or tertiary grounds and, as such, many are reviewed elsewhere 
in this paper.210  An example of this is Cain, Madam Justice London-Weinstein bluntly 
concludes that “I am of the view that the existence of the Covid 19 virus in Ottawa 
constitutes a material change of circumstances such that it permits me to conduct a de novo 
hearing under s. 520.”211 
There are several other cases, not yet reviewed in this paper, that specifically consider the 
issue of COVID-19 within the context of a section 520 bail review.  One of these is R v 
Sappleton,212 a decision of Bird J of the Superior Court released on March 26, 2020.  
Gregory Sappleton is charged with possessing a loaded restricted or prohibited firearm, 
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possession of that firearm despite being the subject of a weapon prohibition, and two counts 
of failing to comply with a recognizance.  He was detained by a justice of the peace on 
October 22, 2019, and an initial application for a bail review was dismissed by a Superior 
Court judge on December 20, 2019.213  One of the three new changes in circumstances 
alleged by Sappleton in this second bail review is the COVID-19 pandemic.  As this new 
hearing occurs in the early days of the pandemic, it is somewhat disorganized:  
On consent, Mr. Sappleton’s current bail review was held by teleconference.  
A judge’s Order was signed requiring the detention centre to bring Mr. 
Sappleton to a telephone in the facility so that he could participate in the call.  
That did not happen.  Despite the best efforts of Mr. Sappleton’s lawyer and 
the Trial Coordinators, Mr. Sappleton never joined the conference call.  It is 
not necessary for an accused person to be present for his bail review and all 
parties agreed to proceed in his absence.214 
In Her Honour’s consideration of Sappleton’s situation with respect to COVID-19, she 
does note that he suffers from asthma.215  On this point, though, she concludes as follows: 
In this case, I am not satisfied that the Covid-19 pandemic is a material change 
of circumstances that ought to lead to Mr. Sappleton’s release.  In coming to 
this conclusion, I do not in any way wish to minimize the seriousness of the 
virus or its potential impact on a large segment of the population.  However, 
there is no evidence that at the current time Mr. Sappleton’s health is at risk.  
There is no evidence that there are cases of Covid-19 in his detention centre.  
Nor is there evidence of any failure on the part of correctional staff to 
appropriately manage the health concerns created by the virus.216 
Interestingly, and despite having come to this conclusion that COVID-19, in Sappleton’s 
case, was not a material change in circumstances, Bird J does release him.  One of the other 
material changes alleged in Sappleton217 concerned a section 8 Charter218 argument in 
relation to the seizure of the gun, an argument that Her Honour notes “appears to have 
considerable merit.”219 
 
213 Ibid at paras 1 – 3.  As more than 90 days had passed since his initial bail review, this 
proceeding also went ahead, not just as another section 520 review, but as a section 525 
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The case of R v McArthur220 is slightly different, in that the bail review is considered 
pursuant to section 521 of the Criminal Code,221 rather than section 520.222  The procedure 
in section 521 must be used when it is the Crown seeking to review a release order that had 
been made by a justice under any of subsections 515(1), (2), (7) or (12) or of an order by a 
justice under clause 523(2)(b) of the Criminal Code,223 after a preliminary hearing, 
vacating a prior order.  The legal principles governing section 521 hearings are the same 
as those considered under section 520. 
Steven McArthur was arrested on February 1, 2020, on charges of aggravated assault and 
failing to comply with the terms of a pre-existing recognizance, and he was released at his 
reverse onus bail hearing on February 7, 2020 by Justice of the Peace Worku.224  The 
Crown brings the section 521 review application and it is heard by Quigley J on April 9, 
2020.  The Crown alleges both that the justice of the peace’s decision to release McArthur 
was clearly inappropriate and that there is a material change in circumstances in terms of 
new video footage of the alleged attacks that is now available.225  His Honour disagrees 
with the Crown’s submissions and concludes that it has not met its onus in this application:  
“In my view, it is not open to me to vacate the J.P.’s order, considered in its entirety and 
contextually applying the review principles mandated in R v St. Cloud.”226  
Quigley J states that the actual material change in circumstances that has transpired since 
McArthur’s release on bail is the pandemic: “[W]hat is quite clear today is that there is a 
different material change in circumstances.  It is the ominous presence of the COVID-19 
pandemic in our communities and our correctional institutions, only 2 months after the 
accused was released.”227 
 
220 R v McArthur, 2020 ONSC 2276 [McArthur]. 
221 Criminal Code, supra note 10. 
222 “As of April 9 [2020], however, when this hearing was conducted just before the Easter 
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as in this case.” McArthur, supra note 220 at para 56. 
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This review decision by Quigley J is also a rare but refreshing example of a higher court 
acknowledging some of the inherent obstacles that a justice of the peace often faces when 
crafting a bail decision:   
It is important in the context of this review proceeding to understand the 
circumstances of the show cause hearing and the position taken by counsel at 
that time.  The hearing took place at the Scarborough courthouse on a 
frantically busy day Friday, February 7, a week after Mr. McArthur was 
arrested.  The matter was quite literally squeezed in that day.  Indeed, I 
understood from counsel that the J.P. permitted the matter to go ahead even 
though it took an hour and a half and ate materially into the midday break.  
Nevertheless, the matter was completed and the J.P. gave his decision on the 
spot.  The J.P.’s reasons may not be linguistically perfect, but in my view some 
of the alleged deficiencies in his reasons for releasing the accused need to be 
considered and viewed in that context.228 
Quigley J finds no reason to disturb the decision of the justice of the peace229 and 
concludes:   
Even if COVID-19 can itself constitute a material change in circumstances, in 
my view it is not open to a reviewing judge to use the existence of that change 
alone to reopen a hearing where the accused was previously released, absent a 
conclusion by the reviewing judge that the decision of the J.P. was clearly 
inappropriate, or otherwise failed one of the two other tests set out in paragraph 
121 of St. Cloud, that is, an error of law or the presence of new evidence, neither 
of which is present in this case.230 
It appears that Quigley J is attempting to alter the framework that permits judges to vary 
initial bail decisions, but only in the context of Crown applications pursuant to section 521 
of the Criminal Code.231  While the wording of the Supreme Court of Canada in St-Cloud232 
is quite clear that, as previously reviewed, any one of first, an error in law, second, a clearly 
inappropriate decision or third, new evidence that shows a material and relevant change in 
the circumstances of the case can allow a reviewing judge to vary the initial decision, 
Quigley J is arguing that a section 521 review requires the finding of either the first or 
 
228 Ibid at para 28.  See also para 40: “As reviewing judge, however, I need not and must not look 
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second factor, and that the third factor – the material change in circumstances – is not 
enough in and of itself to permit a judge to overturn a releasing justice’s decision.  
The case of R v Yusuf233 is an early example of a case – the hearing occurred on April 2 
and 6, 2020, and the decision was released on April 8, 2020 –  where the court finds that 
COVID-19 constitutes a material change in circumstances that could allow the Superior 
Court to conduct a de novo bail review.  Despite this finding, Laliberte J concludes that 
Mr. Yusuf has not shown, on the balance of probabilities, that his continued detention is 
not warranted. He remained in custody.234 
As is often the case in these recent bail decisions, the material changes in circumstances 
alleged in R v Dawson235 include the COVID-19 pandemic.  Daniel Dawson is charged 
with assault causing bodily harm, assault with a weapon and two counts of breach of 
probation, all arising out of incidents that occurred on October 8, 2019.  He was detained 
by Justice of the Peace Stevely on the secondary ground after a bail hearing on January 20, 
2020.236  The section 520 bail review is heard by Goodman J on April 20, 2020 by 
videoconference, in the absence of Mr. Dawson, but with counsel and the proposed surety 
participating.  Mr. Dawson provides an unsworn affidavit, and the Crown does not feel the 
need to cross-examine him.  His Honour renders his decision three days later.237 
Having read Goodman J’s decision in TK,238 the Crown in Dawson239 wisely concedes that 
there is a material change in circumstances in this case and that His Honour could consider 
the matter as a de novo hearing.  The crown argues, though, that the material change does 
not address the pre-existing secondary ground concerns.240  In great detail, His Honour 
goes through the process outlined in St-Cloud241 and Palmer.242  Relying on his own 
precedent in TK243 and the fact of what defence counsel refers to as “the preponderance of 
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recent jurisprudence [that] opens wide the threshold consideration of a material change in 
circumstances and allows for a hearing de novo”244 Goodman J concludes that the material 
change exists.245  He does, however, make it clear that this is only a first step:   
Suffice it to state, that while I am entitled to conduct a hearing de novo at this 
stage, it doesn’t mean that the aforementioned consideration of the global 
pandemic allows for a de facto release. These factors must also be balanced 
with the plan being proposed, along with the jurisprudence related to the 
secondary grounds for detention.246 
Upon completing his analysis of the release plan, Goodman J chooses not to take the 
second, necessary step that would result in Mr. Dawson’s release.  He notes that, “at this 
juncture, there is no evidence of a COVID-19 outbreak at the Hamilton Detention 
Centre.”247  In considering the tertiary ground, he reviews, among other cases, 
Jeyakanthan,248 Nelson,249 Budlakoti,250 TL,251 Cain,252 and Rajan253 finding that he can 
distinguish most of them from Dawson on the facts.254   
His Honour makes an interesting conclusion when considering the link between the 
accused’s history of non-compliance with prior court orders and the pandemic:   
Indeed, during this pandemic, an individual is required to adhere to social 
distancing and any rules implemented under quarantine legislation.  An 
accused’s personal history regarding non-compliance with previous court 
orders is particularly relevant in assessing whether the accused would likely 
adhere to social distancing and stay-at-home rules.  An accused who violates 
social distancing rules and stay at home rules would not be any safer at large 
than in an institution where risk is being managed adequately.255  
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On the very same day, April 23, 2020, that he releases his decision in Dawson,256 Goodman 
J begins hearing another section 520 bail review matter, that of PK.257 The hearing 
continues on April 27, and His Honour releases his decision on April 30, 2020.  While there 
is a section 517(1) and 520(9) publication ban in this case, there are a few general 
comments that can be made about this case.  P.K. was detained by Justice of the Peace 
Child following a bail hearing on September 27, 2019, a pre-pandemic date.  Therefore, it 
is the pandemic, along with the time he has spent in pre-trial custody, that form the basis 
for his argument that a material change in circumstances has occurred.258 
Not surprisingly, given the close connection in time, His Honour’s conclusions are similar 
to those he expresses in Dawson.259  PK may have had a more exuberant Crown260 and an 
outbreak is declared at the Hamilton jail on April 24, 2020,261 but Goodman J concludes in 
PK that secondary and tertiary concerns are not met, and P.K.’s continued detention is 
ordered.262 
There are other cases in which not only is release denied, but the courts find that no material 
change in circumstances exists, notwithstanding the COVID-19 epidemic.  One of the 
earliest of these cases is R v Baidwan,263 released on April 20, 2020.  In this decision, 
Skarica J takes a strict, narrow view with respect to finding that a change in proposed 
sureties offered to a reviewing court can create a material change in circumstances, relying 
on R v Ferguson.264   
Another major reason why His Honour finds no material change in circumstances in 
Baidwan265 is a result of his narrow interpretation of the concept of judicial notice, which 
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will be discussed later in this paper.  This leads him to suggest that a reviewing justice, 
when assessing risk to a detained accused, in the context of whether there has been a 
material change in circumstances due to the COVID-19 pandemic, should consider certain 
factors.  
These include first, recent reliable data, second, specific risks to the particular accused 
including age and underlying medical conditions, third, the specific risk of an accused at a 
particular institution, fourth, any medical evidence particular to an accused’s physical 
and/or mental health, fifth, the accused’s personal history regarding compliance with prior 
court orders, specifically in order to assess whether the accused would likely adhere to 
social distancing and stay at home rules, and sixth, any other relevant circumstances such 
as the development of vaccines, cures or improved testing and treatment.266 
While I am not suggesting that these factors are not relevant, I do not, with respect, feel 
that they are necessary preconditions to determining whether a material change of 
circumstances has, in and of itself, occurred.  In many of the other cases where judges have 
quite quickly jumped over the first hurdle and determined that the material change in 
circumstances has occurred, this has not led inexorably to a release order.  The proper 
review of whether the material change impacts the considerations of the subsection 515(10) 
analysis on the primary, secondary and tertiary grounds must still occur.  Baidwan267 
appears to conflate the two step process set out by the Supreme Court in St-Cloud268 in its 
analysis of section 520 by, especially in the fifth factor outlined above, considering the 
accused’s personal history of non-compliance with court orders as a pre-condition for 
finding that the new evidence provided constitutes a material change in circumstances.   
The result, in any case, is likely the same.  In the conclusion to his decision in Baidwan, 
Skarica J states: 
However, the Crown, in its written submission, took the position that it does 
not dispute that there has been a material change in circumstances, but I 
disagree for the reasons outlined.  I am not bound by the Crown’s submission 
as to the law…I might add, that even if I had found that there was a change in 
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material circumstances, I would have detained the accused in any event on the 
secondary ground.269  
His Honour then analyzes the specific data with respect to COVID-19 that he feels are 
appropriate to consider within his interpretation of judicial notice, concluding that, at that 
time, “in the accused’s age range, there is only one person in Ontario was has died after 
being infected by the virus”270 and that Baidwan “has presented no medical evidence 
regarding any health/mental conditions that would make him more susceptible to serious 
consequences from an infection from the virus.”271 
In case there is any doubt about His Honour’s overall opinions regarding COVID-19 as a 
reason for releasing accused persons, he states the following: 
The last thing that the Canadian public needs right now is a third wave of fear 
arising from an emptying out of the jails of persons charged with serious and 
violence crimes who have been legitimately detained after being afforded due 
process and after having been provided the full panoply of legal rights provided 
by the Charter of Rights and Freedoms and the Canadian judicial system.  The 
wholesale release of dangerous persons who would otherwise be detained but 
for the COVID-19 pandemic would seriously undermine the confidence of the 
public in the administration of justice.272 
An important reason why the court in R v Virag273 finds that there is no material change in 
circumstances is because, as in MK,274 the bail hearing being reviewed in this section 520 
application itself occurs after the onslaught of the COVID-19 pandemic.  Joshua Virag’s 
initial bail hearing was on April 8, 2020 at what Goodman J, ironically in retrospect, 
describes as “the height of the COVID-19 pandemic.”275  The review occurs on May 20, 
2020 and His Honour releases his decision on May 26, 2020. 
While Mr. Virag’s counsel agrees that Child JP276 considered the COVID-19 pandemic in 
coming to his initial bail decision to detain his client, he nonetheless argues that the material 
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change in circumstances arises because of a recent COVID-19 outbreak at the Hamilton 
Wentworth Detention Centre that had not existed at the time of the initial hearing.  An 
affidavit from Mr. Virag, dated April 29, 2020, outlines some of his concerns: 
I am still being triple bunked.  The size of our cell makes staying six feet apart 
from one another at all times impossible.  There are currently 28 people being 
housed on my range, 5C Right, with 10 cells… 
Since my arrival at the detention centre…our detention conditions have 
deteriorated…Our access to the telephone and counsel have decreased.  Access 
to programming has decreased and is currently non-existent. 
As of April 29, 2020, there are twenty-eight inmates on my range sharing two 
phones, although one of the two phones stopped working two-days ago.  The 
phones are not cleaned between each inmates use and we are not provided with 
wipes or materials to clean the phones ourselves. 
I am very fearful for my health and safety.  I am concerned about the impact 
the Corona virus will have on me if I were to contract it while in custody at the 
Hamilton Wentworth Detention Centre. 
While many of the guards, food service workers and health care workers have 
been wearing masks in recent days, many are not which concerns me.  Also of 
concern is the fact that I have not been provided or offered a mask for my own 
protection.  While detained at Hamilton Wentworth Detention Centre, I have 
not seen a single inmate be provided with a mask…277 
Nevertheless, while acknowledging that Mr. Virag is under no obligation to provide any 
evidence of the personal impact of COVID-19 on him, Goodman J notes that since no such 
evidence is provided, “any effect on him is speculative as best.”278  He goes on to state that 
“the applicant tends to overstate his observations or concerns about cleaning, lockdowns, 
correctional officers and other related issues at HWDC.  He makes various bald assertions 
intermixed with some conjecture.”279 
His Honour concludes:  “More importantly on the threshold issue, from my perspective, 
with the justice of the peace addressing the COVID-19 issue, even with the updated 
information presented in this review, as well as with all of the evidence adduced in this 
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hearing, the applicant has not met his onus to show a material change in circumstances on 
this basis.”280 
The bail review application is dismissed.281  While this may be viewed as a harsh 
conclusion, it is an important recognition that if COVID-19 played a role in the initial bail 
hearing, it will be much more difficult for a detained accused to argue on review that the 
pandemic provides a court the option to determine that a material change in circumstances 
has occurred and that a de novo hearing can occur on this basis. 
Baidwan282 and Virag283 are by no means the only cases that consider the specific medical 
concerns (or lack thereof) of a defendant.  Other decisions that that look at these issues will 
be considered later in this paper.  
 
COVID-19 CONSIDERED  BY THE ONTARIO COURT OF APPEAL  
One of the earliest COVID-19 bail decisions is R v Kazman,284 heard on April 1, 2020 by 
Harvison Young JA.  Reasons are released a week later, on April 8.  It is a section 679 
application.  Marshall Kazman was charged in 2011 and convicted in 2017.  The Court of 
Appeal dismissed the appeal of the disbarred lawyer in late 2019285 and he now seeks bail 
pending his application for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada.  Justice 
Harvison Young characterizes Mr. Kazman’s charges as serious, noting that he was “at the 
center of a multi-layered, sophisticated scheme to fraudulently obtain small business loans 
from Canadian banks.”  She also notes that, apart from these charges, Mr. Kazman has no 
criminal record.  The only ground of appeal to the Supreme Court from his conviction was 
that the trial judge had erred in summarily dismissing Mr. Kazman’s subsection 11(b) 
Charter286 motions.287 
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In Kazman, even though Harvison Young JA feels it “unclear at best whether leave to 
appeal will be granted in this case”288 by the Supreme Court, she finds that Kazman meets 
the low bar of the first prong – that it not be frivolous – of the Oland289 test.  Justice 
Harvison Young also concludes that Mr. Kazman satisfies the second prong of the Oland290 
analysis, that he would surrender himself into custody when necessary, as he had done this 
after his appeal was denied by the Court of Appeal.291 
Justice Harvison Young devotes most of her decision to considering the third prong in 
Oland, the public interest component.292 Mr. Kazman’s counsel acknowledges that “where 
this court [the OCA] has dismissed an appeal and the appellant does not have an appeal as 
of right, bail is seldom granted before the SCC has granted leave to appeal.”293  Despite 
this, she argues that the COVID-19 pandemic creates exceptional circumstances, including 
the close quarters and poor living conditions for inmates in custody, and that older people 
and those with underlying health conditions are at greater risk from COVID-19.   The 
specific evidence regarding Mr. Kazman is that he is 64 years old and suffers from asthma, 
respiratory issues and a heart condition.  Mr. Kazman’s counsel submits: “If COVID-19 
spreads amongst the prison population, staff will also contract the virus and carry it into 
the community”294 and she concludes that a reasonable, well-informed public would not 
find Mr Kazman’s immediate detention necessary in these exceptional circumstances.295  
In response, the Crown points to Doherty JA’s statement in R v Drabinsky,296 that “the 
pendulum must swing towards enforceability and away from bail pending further review 
after the correctness of the convictions entered at trial has been affirmed.”297   
Justice Harvison Young does note that the merits, while not frivolous, are weak.  However, 
she points out that the Supreme Court has granted leave in cases regarding section 11(b) 
 
288 Kazman, supra note 284 at para 6. 
289 Oland, supra note 56. 
290 Ibid. 
291 Kazman, supra note 284 at paras 5 and 6. 
292 Oland, supra note 56 at paras 23 – 51.  
293 Kazman, supra note 284 at para 8. 
294 Ibid at para 8. 
295 Ibid at para 9. 
296 R v Drabinsky, 2011 ONCA 647, 276 CCC (3d) 277 [Drabinsky]. 
297 Ibid at para 10. 
44 
 
Charter298 cases and how they need to be interpreted and clarified in light of Jordan.299  
Harvison Young JA’s conclusion is that “the particular circumstances of this case justify 
release”300 as Mr. Kazman’s crimes are not violent, and these are the only convictions on 
his record.  She also takes into account his specific health concerns, as well as the inherent 
difficulties in social distancing in prisons, and concludes that “the appellant’s release for a 
limited period would not undermine a reasonable and informed person’s confidence in the 
administration of justice.”301  She distinguishes this from an earlier Court of Appeal bail 
pending appeal decision, Morgan#1,302 where bail was denied due to that individual’s risk 
of reoffending and the inadequacies of his sureties. 
Another case where the Court of Appeal grants release, on April 22, 2020, is R v WM303 in 
which W.M. applies for bail pursuant to sections 515 and 679(7.1) of the Criminal Code.304   
In WM,305 subsection 679(7.1) applies because while he was convicted on May 30, 2017 
and sentenced to four years for sexual interference306 the Court of Appeal allowed W.M.’s 
appeal and ordered a new trial.307  The provisions of subsection 679(7.1) are relevant in 
this case as the Crown is appealing the Court of Appeal’s ordering of the new trial.  The 
subsection reads as follows: 
679(7.1) Where, with respect to any person, the court of appeal or the Supreme 
Court of Canada orders a new trial, section 515 or 522, as the case may be, 
applies to the release or detention of that person pending the new trial or new 
hearing as through that person were charged with the offence for the first time, 
except that the powers of a justice under section 515 or of a judge under section 
522 are exercised by a judge of the court of appeal.  
W.M’s bail is thus considered by Brown JA of the Court of Appeal as if were a de novo 
hearing.  Therefore, in this case, the provisions of subsections 679(1) and (3) do not apply.  
Nevertheless, as it is a bail decision of the Court of Appeal, I have chosen to include it in 
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this section of this paper.  Like many bail decisions in the spring of 2020, COVID-19 
considerations are at the forefront.  The proposed release for W.M. involved being under 
the supervision of the Toronto Bail Program, as no surety was available.  The Toronto Bail 
Program’s normal procedure of meeting regularly in person with those whom they are 
supervising is of course suspended as a result of the pandemic.  While Justice Brown is 
clearly concerned by this, he does not hold the inability of W.M. to have direct in person 
supervision against the effectiveness of his release plan.308  Brown JA also considers 
W.M.’s health risks, and concludes, both on the secondary and tertiary grounds, that 
W.M.’s detention is not necessary.309 
On May 20, 2020, Jamal JA310 hears an application for bail pending conviction and 
sentence appeal and he releases his decision in R v Sangster311 on May 28, 2020.  The 
Crown opposes the application on the grounds that Sangster fails to establish that his 
detention is not necessary in the public interest pursuant to clause 679(3)(c) of the Criminal 
Code.312  The Crown concedes that Sangster had met his onus under clauses 679(3)(a) and 
(b).313   
The clause 679(3)(c) analysis requires considering both public safety and public confidence 
in the administration of justice.314  Sangster’s apparent ability to overcome his drug and 
alcohol addictions and his mother’s now willingness to act as a residential surety for him 
satisfies Jamal JA that the public safety concerns could be met.315  The public confidence 
component involves what Justice Jamal describes as “two competing interests:  
enforceability and reviewability.”316 
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Justice Jamal concludes that the enforceability interest is enhanced by his renewed family 
connections as well as his sobriety, and this leads the judge to believe that there is an 
absence of flight risk.  This satisfies him on the enforceability issue.   
The strength of the appeal is key to assessing the reviewability interest.317  Justice Jamal 
believes that there is “a general legal plausibility and a foundation in the record” to Mr. 
Sangster’s appeal on the ground that his Charter318 right to privacy had been infringed.319  
Reviewing the other grounds of appeal that Sangster puts forward, Jamal JA concludes that 
his “preliminary assessment is that while some grounds of appeal are stronger than others, 
cumulatively they clearly surpass the ‘not frivolous’ standard.”320 
With specific respect to COVID-19, Justice Jamal accepts that the pandemic is a factor that 
may be considered as part of the public interest criterion, citing Kazman,321 as well as R v 
Omitiran322 and R v Jesso,323 which are both discussed in greater detail later in this paper.  
In the specific circumstances of this case, Jamal JA takes into consideration that Mr. 
Sangster may have greater access to addiction support in the community, as opposed to in 
custody, as well as the fact that Mr. Sangster’s request seeking bail pending appeal is not 
happening at the beginning of a long sentence.  Sangster has already served over three years 
of his sentence and would be eligible for parole within three months.  Considering all these 
factors, Justice Jamal concludes that the public interest in reviewability outweighs the 
interest in enforceability, and that Mr. Sangster has established that his continued detention 
is not necessary in the public interest.324 
Justice Jamal grants bail pending conviction and sentence appeal in another case, R v 
McRae,325 a decision which he releases on August 4, 2020.  On July 14, 2018, John McRae 
had been convicted of the second-degree murder of his son.  He spends much of the 
intervening time between the commission of the offence on July 7, 2015 and his conviction 
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by the jury out on bail, without incident.326  McRae, who is in his 70s, suffers from, among 
other ailments, a heart condition, diabetes, hepatitis C and gallstones.327 
Again, it is only on the third ground set out in subsection 679(3) – the public interest 
criterion – that the Crown opposes Mr. McRae obtaining bail at this time.328  Jamal JA is 
satisfied that, despite McRae’s conviction being for murder, the applicant poses no 
significant risk to public safety.329  On the enforceability interest issue, Jamal JA reviews 
McRae’s grounds of appeal, including grounds that the trial judge erred by failing to charge 
the jury on the partial defence of provocation and well as by giving the jury a special 
hearsay caution, even though the relevant utterances had been adduced for a non-hearsay 
purpose.330  Justice Jamal is satisfied that some of these grounds of appeal weigh in favour 
of reviewability.331 
At this point, Justice Jamal considers COVID-19 as a factor that can be considered as part 
of the public interest criterion.  In this case, as noted, the applicant is elderly and has serious 
underlying medical issues. Taking all this into consideration, Jamal JA concludes that “the 
reviewability interest overshadows the enforceability interest and therefore the applicant’s 
detention is not necessary in the public interest” based on the “attenuated public safety 
concerns, the absence of flight risks and the strong plan of supervision with a proven track 
record of success, the applicant’s advanced age and health challenges in the context of the 
current public health climate, and because the applicant has already served three years of 
his sentence and has a clearly arguable appeal.”332  The application for bail pending appeal 
is granted. 
Another case in which bail is granted by the Ontario Court of Appeal, though pursuant to 
a different section of the Criminal Code,333 is R v Jaser,334 a decision released by Doherty 
JA on September 24, 2020.  It results from an application pursuant to section 680 of the 
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Criminal Code,335 seeking to appeal a denial of Mr. Jaser’s bail which had been the result 
of a section 522 application for bail in the Superior Court.336  The relevant portion of section 
680 reads as follows: 
680(1) A decision made by a judge under section 522…may, on the direction 
of the chief justice of acting chief justice of the court of appeal, be reviewed by 
that court and that court may, if it does not confirm the decision, 
(a) vary the decision; or 
(b) substitute such other decision as, in its opinion, should have been 
made. 
The Jaser337 case is somewhat notorious.  He is one of two co-accused, alleged by the 
Crown to have conspired to commit mass murder, including derailing a passenger train and 
systematically assassinating prominent community members.338  Mr. Jaser and his co-
accused were convicted at trial of some, though not all, of the charges.339  In 2019, the 
Court of Appeal ordered a new trial on the ground that the jury selection process had been 
improper.340  While this ordering of a retrial has now been appealed by the Crown to the 
Supreme Court of Canada, Mr. Jaser in the interim brought a second section 522 bail 
application for release pending the retrial, the failure of which provides the basis for this 
decision by Doherty JA.  That bail judge had detained Mr. Jaser on both the secondary and 
tertiary grounds.   
The Oland341 decision also sets out the framework for section 680 reviews.  As Justice 
Moldaver states: 
Ultimately, in my view, a panel reviewing a decision of a single judge under s. 
680(1) should be guided by the following three principles.  First, absent 
palpable and overriding error, the review panel must show deference to the 
judge’s findings of fact.  Second, the review panel may intervene and substitute 
its decision for that of the judge where it is satisfied the judge erred in law or 
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in principle and the error was material to the outcome.  Third, in the absence 
of legal error, the review panel may intervene and substitute its decision for 
that of the judge where in concludes that the decision was clearly 
unwarranted.342 
Doherty JA sees the Oland343 standard of review as the basis for considering any errors by 
the bail judge.  Citing R v Gale344 and R v D(R),345 Doherty JA is of the opinion that, while 
there is no right to produce new evidence in a section 680 matter, fresh evidence can be 
routinely received if it is both relevant and relates to matters that post-date the bail decision 
being reviewed.346 
There are three main categories of fresh evidence that Jaser’s counsel wishes to introduce 
on his behalf.  These are evidence regarding the added delay in the scheduling of the retrial, 
evidence with respect to psychological testing and spiritual counselling of Jaser, and – not 
surprisingly – the COVID-19 pandemic.347 
In Jaser, Justice Doherty concludes his COVID-19 comments as follows:   
The presence of COVID-19 is a factor to be balanced in the tertiary ground 
analysis, especially where there is a viable alternative to actual incarceration, 
which can go a long way to achieving de facto incarceration outside of the 
correctional institution.  I must, however, reject the contention that post-
COVID-19 detention on the tertiary ground will ‘rarely be justified’.  Like all 
other factors in the tertiary ground balancing, the significance of the pandemic 
depends on the individual case and the evidence provided to the court.  On the 
evidence I have, COVID-19 concerns are relevant in the tertiary ground 
assessment.  They are far from determinative.348 
Doherty JA concludes that “appropriate terms can be fashioned” for Jaser’s release which 
will minimize his movements outside his mother’s home, limit his contact with non-family 
members and provide the police with broad oversight powers to monitor Jaser’s movements 
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and compliance.349  In drafting the terms, some of which are quite onerous, Doherty JA 
does make note of the Supreme Court’s comments: 
In attempting to formulate appropriate terms, I have borne in mind the strong 
admonition in R. v. Zora, at paras. 83 – 89, cautioning against unclear, 
unnecessary, punitive bail terms, and terms which seem calculated to produce 
a breach of the bail order.  I am satisfied the conditions I propose are directly 
related to the risks associated with Jaser’s release.  The terms are needed to 
ameliorate those risks to the extent detention will not be necessary on either the 
secondary or tertiary ground.350 
Perhaps following the thinking of Doherty JA in Drabinsky,351 noted earlier, it appears that 
more of the section 679 applications in the COVID-19 context fail than succeed.  Soon 
after her decision in Kazman,352 in which Harvison Young JA releases Mr. Kazman, she 
issues Omitiran353 on April 20, 2020. 
Adekunle Omitiran seeks to appeal both his conviction on several fraud charges and his 
four-year sentence, and he wishes to be released on bail pending the appeal.  Mr. Omitiran 
has previous convictions for other fraud-related offences, and these offences now being 
appealed occur while he is on probation, in violation of the terms of that probation.354  
COVID-19 is among the public interest factors that Omitiran believes should result in him 
getting bail.355  As Justice Harvison Young puts it, “this application turns on the public 
interest factor under s. 679(3)(c).  As I have just indicated, the merits of the appeal are 
arguable but weak.  The central concern in this case is public safety.  His offences were not 
violent, but they were serious, complex, and motivated by greed.”356  Harvison Young JA 
picks up on a suggestion by the Crown357 that COVID-19 and the difficult economic 
circumstances it has created increase the importance of protection of the public:   
Many individuals, businesses, and Canada’s financial institutions are currently 
under increased stress due to the COVID-19 crisis.  Given the applicant’s 
repeat offending and the current economic climate, protecting the public 
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against the fraudulent schemes is an important factor weighing against the 
applicant’s release.358 
While acknowledging that her own decision in Kazman359 went the other way, Justice 
Harvison Young concludes that, in this case, “the public interest analysis favours 
enforceability over reviewability.  I cannot conclude that a reasonable, fully informed 
member of the public would understand his release to be warranted in these circumstances.”   
Mr. Omitiran’s application is dismissed.360 
On April 29, 2020, Brown JA releases his decision in Jesso.361  It is another case in which 
the Crown opposes the application for bail pending appeal on the grounds that Mr. Jesso 
has not demonstrated that his detention is not necessary in the public interest, pursuant to 
clause 679(3)(c) of the Criminal Code.362  In so doing, the Crown again relies on the public 
safety component of the public interest criterion.363 
For several reasons, Justice Brown denies the application.  Fundamentally, he feels there 
is a substantial likelihood that Mr. Jesso would commit further criminal offenses if 
released, even under a more restrictive bail plan. These include the allegations that Jesso 
had already recently committed further drugs and weapons offences while released on a 
prior bail and while already bound by firearms prohibition orders.364  Justice Brown notes 
that the financial consequences to his mother and sister – his prior sureties – of breaching 
his bail terms did not deter Mr. Jesso.  As well, Mr. Jesso has a substantial record, including 
a prior conviction for failing to comply.365  Justice Brown also notes the limitations to the 
practical effectiveness of the GPS monitoring being proposed by the defence as part of its 
bail plan.366 
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Brown JA then reviews what impact the COVID-19 pandemic has in Jesso.367  He 
acknowledges that Omitiran368 has held that it can be relevant to the public interest 
criterion.  He sums up Mr. Jesso’s situation with respect to COVID-19: 
In the present case, the applicant is detained in the Hamilton-Wentworth 
Detention Centre.  He is 23 years old.  His affidavit does not disclose any 
medical condition that puts him in a group with increased vulnerability to the 
effects of COVID-19.  While his counsel’s supporting affidavit states that in 
late March one employee at the Hamilton-Wentworth Detention Centre tested 
positive for the virus, the applicant’s record does not contain evidence of a 
significant COVID-19 outbreak at the facility.369 
Justice Brown concludes that “consequently, I do not see the fact of the COVID-19 
pandemic outweighing, on its own or in combination with the merits of the applicant’s 
appeal, the substantial risk to public safety that I have identified” and he dismisses Mr. 
Jesso’s application for bail pending appeal.370 
The very next day, on April 30, 2020, Brown JA releases another bail pending appeal 
decision that considers COVID-19 as a factor when considering such applications:  R v 
Stojanovski.371  The applicants are twin brothers convicted on May 30, 2018 of attempted 
murder and discharging a firearm with attempt to endanger a life.372  Each was sentenced 
to eighteen years’ imprisonment.373  The Crown opposes their application for bail pending 
appeal on the basis that they have not met any of the criteria set out in subsection 679(3) 
of the Criminal Code,374 especially on the enumerated ground that their detention is not 
necessary in the public interest, pursuant to clause 679(3)(c).375   
Justice Brown holds that the public safety component of clause 679(3)(c) “essentially 
tracks the requirements” of clause 515(10)(b) – the secondary ground – in its governance 
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of release on bail pending a retrial376 relying both on Oland377 and Morales378 for this 
conclusion.  Therefore, his conclusion that the release plan is weak, specifically because of 
the “lack of any requirement that they be in the presence of a surety when they leave the 
residence” directly relates to his concerns that there would be a substantial likelihood they 
would commit further offences if released.379 
A factor that tilts towards reviewability rather than enforceability, in the opinion of the 
appellants’ counsel, is the COVID-19 pandemic.  In their affidavits, both Stojanovski 
brothers state that social distancing is impossible in the Beaver Creek institution where 
they are incarcerated, that neither inmates nor staff have been given personal protective 
equipment, and that there is much anxiety concerning a possible COVID-19 outbreak.380   
Again citing Omitiran,381 Brown JA acknowledges that the current COVID-19 outbreak 
can be taken into account when considering the public interest criterion, but that the weight 
it is given must be dependent upon the individual circumstances of each applicant.  Justice 
Brown outlines the brothers’ situation:  
In the present case, the applicants are 36 years old.  Neither deposed to having 
a medical condition that would increase his vulnerability to the virus.  The 
Crown filed a Correctional Services Canada document reporting on inmate 
COVID-19 testing in federal correctional institutions as of April 21, 2020.  It 
recorded that two tests of Beaver Creek inmates had been taken.  One returned 
negative; the other result was pending.  As of April 21, 2020, no positive tests 
of inmates at the institution had been recorded.382   
Brown JA conducts what he believes to be the appropriate “qualitative and contextual”383 
assessment, taking into account the extremely serious offences of the applicants and the 
corresponding lengthy sentences, the weakness of their release plan, the weakness of their 
 
376 Stojanovski, supra note 371 at para 18. 
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grounds of appeal, and their relative non-vulnerability to COVID-19 and dismisses their 
applications for bail pending appeal.384 
In R v Stone,385 Juriansz JA is quickly prepared to grant leave to appeal sentence to the 
applicant, but more thoroughly reviews whether he should grant bail pending that appeal.  
The applicant’s main argument supporting the request is that release should be granted 
because of the COVID-19 pandemic.  Because Mr. Stone is only appealing his sentence, 
and not his conviction, the relevant statutory provisions are found in subsection 679(4) of 
the Criminal Code,386 as opposed to subsection 679(3). While the wording is not identical 
between the two subsections, the practical considerations are virtually the same.387  
Juriansz JA reviews the legal test of “unnecessary hardship” under clause 679(4)(a) of the 
Criminal Code388 as it is discussed by the Court of Appeal in R v Hassan.389  It depends on 
the likelihood that the applicant would spend more time in custody than his sentence is 
ultimately determined to be, considering the merits of the appeal, and Justice Juriansz 
concludes that there is little likelihood of that happening in Mr. Stone’s case.390  The 
COVID-19 pandemic becomes relevant when considering clause 679(4)(c), identical in 
wording to clause 679(3)(c).  Citing Omitiran391 and Jesso,392 Justice Juriansz 
acknowledges that the pandemic is a factor to be considered in assessing the public interest 
criterion.  Looking at the specific COVID-19 concerns of Mr. Stone, Juriansz JA has this 
to say: 
In this case, the applicant is in custody at Bath Institution where no inmate has 
tested positive to date.  The applicant is diabetic and a former smoker and says 
he is especially vulnerable to the virus.  He attributes his high sugar levels to 
being incarcerated.  The Crown has introduced evidence that he has 
consistently been purchasing from the canteen a high number of products high 
in carbohydrates such as pop, cookies, swiss rolls, and Fudgee-O cookies.  The 
 
384 Stojanovski, supra note 371 at paras 38 and 39. 
385 R v Stone, 2020 ONCA 448 [Stone]. 
386 Criminal Code, supra note 10. 
387 The only difference is that s 679(3)(a) requires that the appeal is “not frivolous” and s 679(4)(a) 
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evidence does not satisfy me the applicant’s high sugar levels are attributable 
to his incarceration.393   
Aside from that somewhat sarcastic comment by Justice Juriansz, he also considers Stone’s 
record, including breaches of recognizances, his weak release plan and the seriousness of 
his offences.  Based on this, Juriansz J concludes that Mr. Stone has not satisfied the court 
that his detention is not necessary in the public interest, and the application for release 
pending appeal is dismissed.394 
One further case where subsection 679(3) of the Criminal Code395 is discussed is that of R 
v Cole,396 a decision released on November 6, 2020.  Margaret Cole’s application for 
interim release pending the hearing of her appeal is viewed skeptically by Roberts JA, the 
motions judge hearing the matter.  Despite having been sentenced to life imprisonment in 
2015 after being convicted of first-degree murder, Ms. Cole has not previously sought bail 
at any time.  Justice Roberts, in a brief decision, concludes that her grounds of appeal are 
very weak, the charge is patently extremely serious and the release plan is “not adequate to 
ensure that the serious risk she poses to public safety is appropriately diminished.”397 
Her plan, which the judge finds unsatisfactory, would have the Elizabeth Fry Society 
monitor her while she resides in a hotel.  The last issue raised by Ms. Cole in support of 
her release is the COVID-19 pandemic.  Justice Roberts, citing McRae,398 acknowledges 
that “[I]t is common ground that the COVID-19 pandemic is a factor to be considered on 
an application for judicial interim release pending appeal, though the weight given to this 
factor depends on the particularities of the case.”399   
In her decision, Roberts JA makes no mention of any specific health concerns of Ms. Cole.  
Her Honour notes that “the evidence falls short of showing any serious or immediate risk 
to the applicant” based on information that there are no active cases of COVID-19 at the 
institution where Ms. Cole has been residing and that the institution has “a rigorous 
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cleaning protocol in place that, as the results appear to show, attenuates the spreading of 
the virus.”400  Justice Roberts therefore concludes that the public interest in the 
enforceability of the judgement under appeals outweighs the public interest in its 
reviewability, and that to release Ms. Cole would undermine a reasonable member of the 
public’s confidence in the administration of justice.401 
A sentence appeal to the Court of Appeal, as opposed to an application for bail pending 
appeal heard by a single judge, provides an early opportunity for that court to consider 
COVID-19, when the panel of MacPherson, Benotto and Nordheimer JJA hear the case of 
R v Morgan.402  The matter proceeds by way of teleconference on April 29, 2020 and the 
panel releases its decision on May 4, 2020.  Mr. Morgan, who is acting in person, raises an 
interesting argument: “The appellant does not dispute that the sentence was a fit one at the 
time that it was imposed.  Rather, the appellant submits that intervening events, namely the 
COVID-19 pandemic, have served to render the sentence unfit.  He seeks a reduction in 
his sentence as a consequence of these events.”403  
Mr. Morgan is serving his sentence at the Central North Correctional Centre in 
Penetanguishene.  He states that the only way the authorities there can hope to maintain 
physical distancing among the inmates is to confine them to their own cells as much as 
possible.  Therefore, he is only out of his cell, at most, for three hours each day, and only 
twenty minutes of that can be spent outside in the fresh air.  As a result of this confinement, 
rehabilitative programs normally provided to inmates are cancelled:   
The appellant says that it is clear that the sentencing judge imposed the 
sentence that she did in an effort to maximize the prospect for rehabilitation 
and now that prospect is being thwarted.  The appellant says that, had the 
sentencing judge been aware that these events would happen, she would have 
imposed a lesser sentence to accommodate the rehabilitative goal.404 
 
400 Ibid at para 18. 
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Morgan thus requests a reduction in his sentence by one-third, so that he would 
immediately be eligible for parole.  The Crown, in contrast, says that the sentence is fit, 
even taking into account the pandemic.405  
In the specific circumstances of Morgan#2,406 the Court of Appeal is of the opinion that 
the sentence already imposed was “at the very low end” and that “to reduce the sentence 
any further would result in a sentence that is unfit, one that would be disproportionate to 
the gravity of the offence.  In coming to this conclusion, they cite the Supreme Court of 
Canada in R v Pham:407  “It follows that where a sentence is varied to avoid collateral 
consequences, the further the varied sentence is from the range of otherwise appropriate 
sentences, the less likely it is that it will remain proportionate to the gravity of the offence 
and the responsibility of the offender.”  The Court of Appeal goes on to suggest that perhaps 
Mr. Morgan will obtain some COVID-19 related relief from the Parole Board.408 
On October 21, 2020, a three judge panel of the Ontario Court of Appeal weighs in on 
many of the legal issues concerning COVID-19 and bail, when Miller, Nordheimer and 
Thorburn JJA release their decisions in R v JA.409  J.A. is charged with two counts of first-
degree murder, one count of attempted murder, and count of conspiracy to commit murder.  
As these are section 469 Criminal Code410 offences, his bail hearing occurred in the 
Superior Court.  J.A. was detained on the primary and secondary grounds.  A section 680 
review by J.A. was unsuccessful, but a section 522 review by a second bail judge did 
succeed and J.A. was released on bail, as that judge held that not only had the Crown’s 
case substantially weakened, but that COVID-19 represented a material change in 
circumstances.  The Crown then sought a section 680 review of this second bail decision, 
alleging, among other things, that the second bail judge made an error in law in determining 
that COVID-19 per se constituted a material change in circumstances.411 
 
405 Ibid at paras 6 and 7. 
406 Ibid. 
407 Ibid at para 11, citing R v Pham, 2013 SCC 15, [2013] 1 SCR 739 at para 18. 
408 Morgan#2, supra note 402 at para 12. 
409 R v JA, 2020 ONCA 660 [JA]. Thorburn JA wrote the majority decision with Miller JA 
concurring.  Nordheimer JA wrote a dissenting opinion. 
410 Criminal Code, supra note 10. 
411 JA, supra note 409 at paras 7 – 14.   
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Justice Thorburn sets aside the release order of the second bail judge and substitutes a 
detention order pending J.A.’s trial.412  Thorburn JA begins by clarifying some of the 
confusion that results in these situations as to how to choose between a section 522 review 
and a section 680 review.  Section 522 reviews – second or subsequent bail applications – 
should be brought in the Superior Court where the applicant concedes the validity of the 
bail decision but wishes a review on the basis of a material change in circumstances.413 
Section 680 reviews to a court of appeal should be sought when the applicant challenges 
the denial of bail on the basis of the correctness of the bail decision.  This does not foreclose 
considering a material change in circumstances in a section 680 application.  In such cases, 
both the Superior Court of Justice and the Court of Appeal have concurrent jurisdiction to 
determine whether a material change in circumstances has occurred, such that release on 
bail should occur.414 
In the second bail hearing, that judge held that there was a material change in circumstances 
by virtue of COVID-19’s existence.  In this review, the Crown acknowledges that while 
COVID-19 can constitute a relevant circumstance, it does not in JA,415 because J.A. had 
been detained on the primary and secondary grounds, not the tertiary ground.  As well, 
J.A.’s youth, health and current safe conditions in the Stratford jail where he would be 
housed are such that COVID-19 is not relevantly material.  J.A.’s counsel argues that the 
materiality of COVID-19 can apply to any or all grounds of detention, not just the 
tertiary.416  J.A.’s lawyer also makes the interesting point that “the Crown’s suggestion of 
proving a medical history that would make one more susceptible to COVID-19 is 
impractical and, for many bail applicants, impossible to meet as many are marginalized 
individuals for whom access to medical records would present a significant, perhaps 
insurmountable hurdle.”417   
 
412 Ibid at para 17. 
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Drawing both on St-Cloud418 and Whyte,419 the Court of Appeal, in its majority decision, 
concludes that COVID-19 constitutes a material change where its circumstances are 
relevantly material to a specific individual in that specific individual’s circumstances.420  
The Court of Appeal is of the opinion that the second bail judge decided that COVID-19, 
in and of itself, is a material change justifying a new bail hearing, without first considering 
if COVID-19 was relevantly material before deciding to hear the second bail application 
and, in so doing, made an error in law.421 
In JA,422 the Court of Appeal also makes clear that, depending on the circumstances, the 
COVID-19 pandemic can be a factor to be considered pursuant to any or all of the 
primary,423 secondary,424 and tertiary grounds,425 setting out that the determination of 
relevance and materiality require a review of the specific individual’s age and health, the 
conditions at the relevant institution where detention would occur and whether COVID-19 
would affect the individual’s attendance at court or threaten public safety if the individual 
were released.426  The Court of Appeal continues:  “All this COVID-19 evidence then needs 
to be considered, along with the findings of the earlier bail judge, to determine whether the 
new evidence could reasonably be expected to affect the conclusion reached by the first 
bail judge [emphasis in original].427 
Thorburn JA states that the specific, new evidence relating to J.A.’s health and the 
conditions at the Stratford jail would not have altered the original bail judge’s concerns on 
the primary or secondary grounds, qualifying this by stating that she is not suggesting that 
an accused must present evidence of a particular risk with respect to COVID-19, only that 
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the absence of a particular risk is relevant is assessing whether the pandemic evidence is 
relevantly material.428 
Justice Thorburn’s conclusion is clear: 
I do not agree that the existence of the COVID-19 pandemic necessarily 
constitutes a material change in circumstance for every bail decision rendered 
before the pandemic struck Ontario.  I accept however, that in a proper case, 
circumstances arising from the COVID-19 pandemic may amount to a material 
change in circumstance in respect of any of the grounds for detention such that 
a new hearing should be conducted.  For that to be the case, however, the 
pandemic must reasonably be expected to have affected the result, bearing in 
mind the reasons given by the first bail judge for denying bail.429 
Using this analysis, she concludes that, in J.A.’s specific case, COVID-19 does not 
constitute a relevant and material change.  The second bail judge, therefore, was in error in 
conducting a review of the first bail judge’s decision and in deciding to release J.A.  The 
Crown’s application is thus granted and J.A. is detained pending his trial.430 
A key part of Justice Nordheimer’s dissent431 is on the issue of the role of COVID-19.  He 
clearly believes that his colleagues on this Court of Appeal panel interpret its impact too 
narrowly.  His initial premise in his argument is that “in my view, there can be no 
reasonable debate that COVID-19 impacts directly on the incarceration of individuals”432 
and he expands upon this belief when he states: 
[109] I am of the view that COVID-19 constitutes a material change in 
circumstances with respect to every detention order that was made prior to the 
advent of the pandemic.  COVID-19 changed the lives of every person in this 
country.  Indeed, it has changed the lives of almost everyone on this planet.  
The appearance of the pandemic necessitated a review of every person who 
was being held in custody pending their trial, just as it necessitated a review of, 
and change to, the manner in which detention facilities dealt with incarcerated 
individuals, including the release of individuals who might not otherwise have 
strictly merited release in the traditional sense. 
[110] The impact of the pandemic does not mean that detention orders will 
not still be warranted.  What it does mean is that the detention of every person 
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needs to be reviewed, in light of the extraordinary situation that the pandemic 
poses, to ensure that the continued incarceration of a person pending trial will 
not result in a disproportional impact.   It also means that, going forward, the 
impact of the pandemic must properly be considered in every bail hearing when 
determining whether a detention order is warranted. 
Justice Nordheimer continues by stating that there can be no serious issue taken with the 
proposition that correctional facilities are locations of inherent higher risk, because of 
correctional officers moving through public spaces and the detention centre, as well as a 
consistent influx of new accused persons arriving at detention centres.  Nordheimer JA also 
notes that “by requiring inmates to eat meals in their cells and exercise on an individual 
basis, those steps, while militating the risk of transmission of the virus, only increase the 
negative psychological impact of being incarcerated.  Indeed, that general approach to 
incarceration comes perilously close to a state of facility-wide solitary confinement.”433   
He also disagrees with the majority’s position that the absence of particular risk is 
relevantly material, and he does so for three reasons.  The first is that bail hearings are often 
conducted very quickly after arrests have been made, on a rushed basis, with little or no 
time to procure and present medical evidence regarding the individual charged.434  The 
second is that, in Justice Nordheimer’s opinion, it is impractical and prejudicial to impose 
an evidentiary burden on an accused to provide medical evidence with respect to COVID-
19, “given its medical complexity and ever-evolving nature.”435  The third reason builds 
on the second.  It is unrealistic to expect an accused will be able to provide evidence of his 
or her specific vulnerability to COVID-19 when experts cannot yet explain why some 
people react horribly badly to the virus while others are asymptomatic:  “There is a great 
deal that we still do not know about this virus, so to require an accused person to provide 
evidence of the type suggested by the applicant is to impose on him or her an unrealistic, 
and unachievable, burden.”436 
Justice Nordheimer also notes that the inevitable delays in trials occurring is a clear 
indication of another material change in circumstances.  Based on this, he concludes that 
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COVID-19, in JA, is a material change.437  Once having found that the material change 
existed, Nordheimer JA believes that the second bail judge was fully entitled to conduct a 
de novo hearing.438   
In Justice Nordheimer’s opinion, the majority on the JA439 panel too narrowly interprets 
the scope of the authority of the second bail judge to the point where “even if a material 
change in circumstances could be shown, the second bail judge was not entitled to grant a 
release to the respondent, unless the material change in circumstances itself drove that 
result.440  For Nordheimer JA, this narrow interpretation is inconsistent with the general 
principle “often enunciated but too often not respected”441 that “release – at the earliest 
opportunity and in the least onerous matter – is the default presumption in Canadian 
criminal law.”442  Justice Nordheimer also feels that his opinion is supported by St-Cloud:  
“If the new evidence meets the four criteria for admissibility, the reviewing judge is 
authorized to repeat the analysis under s. 515(10)(c) Cr.C. as if he or she were the initial 
decision maker.”443 
In individual cases, whether the approach of the majority or the minority of the JA444 panel 
to the material change issue is invoked may not make much practical difference, especially 
for bail hearings of first instance.  The issue in JA445 can be seen as, for the most part, 
simply a dispute over how many hurdles must be jumped.  Nordheimer JA’s decision, that 
– in and of itself – the simple presence of COVID-19 creates a material change appears to 
be more realistic and sensible.  This would not result in a “get out of jail free” card for 
everyone.  It merely allows the reviewing court to move past this threshold issue and to 
conduct the de novo hearing where the specific issues relevant to the particular defendant 
can be considered.  The majority’s approach runs the risk of requiring too much COVID-
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19 specific medical evidence to be presented by defendants who may well have little ability 
to provide it to a court. 
 
YOUTH CASES 
Reported bail decisions dealing with young persons are rare.  Rather than being governed 
by the provisions of section 515 of the Criminal Code,446 legislative authority for judicial 
interim release for young persons is found within the Youth Criminal Justice Act447 which 
originally came into force on April 1, 2003 and which was substantially amended in 2012, 
with respect to bail for young persons, by the Safe Streets and Communities Act.448  The 
grounds for detention in custody of young persons,449 much narrower than those outlined 
in the Criminal Code,450 are specifically found in section 29 of the YCJA.451  The portions 
of the YCJA452 that correspond substantially to the primary, secondary and tertiary grounds 
for detention found in subsection 515(10) of the Criminal Code453 are found in clause 
29(2)(b) of the YCJA.454  One important distinction, however, is found in the “secondary” 
ground in paragraph 29(2)(b)(ii) of the YCJA455 which limits detention based on the 
substantial likelihood of committing further offences category only to apply where the 
likelihood is of committing “serious offences” which are defined as indictable offences for 
which the maximum punishment for an adult convicted of is imprisonment for a minimum 
of five years.456  Another distinction is that the “tertiary” ground in paragraph 29(2)(b)(iii) 
requires “exceptional circumstances” that warrant detention.  This proviso is not found in 
clause 515(10)(c) of the Criminal Code.457 
 
446 Criminal Code, supra note 10. 
447 Youth Criminal Justice Act, SC 2002, c 1 as amended [YCJA]. 
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But detention of a young person also requires compliance with the requirements set out in 
clauses 29(2)(a) and (c) of the YCJA.458  Clause 29(2)(a) outlines that detention can only 
occur if the young person is charged with a serious offence, or, if not charged with a serious 
offence, has a history that indicates a pattern of either outstanding charges or findings of 
guilt.  Clause 29(2)(c) also requires the judge or justice to be satisfied, on a balance of 
probabilities, that no condition or combination of conditions or release would first, reduce, 
to a level below substantial, the likelihood that the young person would not attend court as 
required, second, offer adequate protection to the public from the risk that the young person 
would otherwise present, or third, maintain confidence in the administration of justice. 
Two other subsections of section 29 of the YCJA459 are also important.  Subsection 29(1) 
limits conditions that a justice or judge can impose on a young person to those that the 
young person will reasonably be able to comply with, and subsection 29(3) makes it clear 
that all youth bail hearings, no matter what the charges, are Crown onus.  Reverse onus 
young person bail hearings no longer exist. 
One of the very few reported youth bail matters that considers the COVID-19 pandemic is 
R v XY,460 a decision released by Valentine JP on July 14, 2020.  The mandatory publication 
ban covering the identity of the young person is in effect, pursuant to section 110 of the 
YCJA.461  Her Worship further protects the identity of the young person by identifying him 
as X.Y., a pseudonym.462  Without going deeply into the specifics of the allegations in XY, 
the young person’s counsel quickly concedes that the serious offence threshold is met.463 
The magnitude and multitude of the charges, as well as X.Y.’s history of prior dispositions, 
lead X.Y.’s counsel to propose a very restrictive form of release of house arrest with no 
exceptions to leave the house unless he is in the company of one of his sureties.464 
Defence counsel raises the spectre of COVID-19 during the hearing, arguing that the 
pandemic is causing delays in getting matters to trial.  Her Worship responds to this, and 
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also clearly considers, as she is required, clause 29(1)(c) of the YCJA465 that a young person 
be reasonably able to comply with any release conditions: 
I find this to be speculative.  Moreover, in-custody matters, and youth matters 
are given priority.  Alternatively, if I accept X.Y.’s argument that X.Y. can be 
waiting for a very long time until his trial is held, given X.Y.’s antecedents, I 
do not see the benefit of releasing X.Y. on the most onerous form of release – 
a house arrest bail – with no exceptions and a condition that he have no access 
to technology or social media as his aunt has requested.  As a young person, 
such a release would be tantamount to setting him up for a breach of his bail.466 
Valentine JP finds that X.Y. does not have any specific medical issues that would make 
more susceptible or vulnerable to COVID-19.   
Her Worship then goes through the enumerated factors outlined in paragraph 29(2)(b)(iii) 
of the YCJA,467 namely the strength of the Crown’s case, the gravity of the offence, the 
circumstances surrounding the offence including whether a firearm was used, and whether 
the youth is liable to a potentially lengthy custodial sentence.  She finds all to be present.468  
As well, Valentine JP finds exceptional circumstances required for detention do exist in 
this case, even taking into account the Court of Appeal’s comments that “the exceptional 
case gateway can only be utilized in those very rare cases where the circumstances of the 
crime are so extreme than anything less than custody would fail to reflect societal values.  
It seems to me that one example of an exceptional case is when the circumstances of the 
offence are shocking to the community.”469   She orders X.Y.’s detention on both the 
secondary and tertiary grounds. 
  
DELAYS IN SCHEDULING TRIALS 
There is no doubt that since the beginning of the pandemic, a considerable backlog in cases 
has developed within the case management courts.  With most court matters still being 
conducted remotely, rather than in person, and with all the attendant logistical difficulties 
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caused thereby, cases are simply not progressing as quickly through the stages of judicial 
pre-trials and preliminary hearings (where still required) to get to the stage of a trial in 
either the Ontario Court of Justice or the Superior Court of Justice.470  Courts considering 
bail, both initially and on review, have often – but not always – concluded that delay in 
getting to trial may be a relevant factor under either or both of the secondary and tertiary 
grounds. 
The case of TL,471 a bail review decision of Molloy J released on March 30, 2020, is 
discussed earlier. In reviewing the tertiary concerns, Molloy J is concerned about the 
eventual court backlog that the pandemic and resulting court closures would create: “It is 
very difficult to predict when Mr. L.’s trial will be reached, but we can expect it will be 
many months from now, probably longer.  The additional time that Mr. L. will be in custody 
pending his trial is a factor to take into account on the tertiary ground.”472  Her Honour 
expands upon this in a subsequent paragraph: 
Detention prior to trial is difficult at the best of times, which is one of the 
reasons that, on sentencing, extra credit is provided for pre-trial custody.  In 
the middle of a pandemic, serving that time in an institution is even more 
difficult.  Transmission of the virus would be so much easier within an 
institution than in a private home….It is in the interests of society as a whole, 
as well as the inmate population, to release people who can be properly 
supervised outside the institutions.  It better protects those who must be housed 
in the institutions (because there are no other reasonable options), those who 
work in the institutions (because they perform an essential service), and our 
whole community (because we can ill-afford to have breakouts of infection in 
institutions, requiring increased correctional staffing, increased medical 
staffing and increased demand on other scarce resources).473 
On March 26, 2020, as noted earlier, Justice of the Peace Lee releases his decision in 
Cotterell,474 His Worship concludes that COVID-19 is also relevant to the tertiary ground, 
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an exceptional circumstance that justifies delays beyond the presumptive ceilings set out in 
Jordan, supra note 6. 
471 TL, supra note 79. 
472 Ibid at para 34. 
473 Ibid at para 36. 
474 Cotterell, supra note 122. 
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on the basis that courts must consider the potential delay in getting matters to trial.  The 
next day, March 27, 2020, Lee JP releases another bail decision that considers COVID-19, 
that of R v Knott.475  Not surprisingly, His Worship views the tertiary ground within the 
same framework as he did the day before, opining that it may take years before a trial could 
occur.  In the circumstances, Justice of the Peace Lee orders Knott released.   
Another section 520 bail review case is R v Haughton476 which was heard on April 23, 
2020 with the decision released on May 8, 2020.  Given that the trial was already delayed, 
as it had been set to begin on April 6, 2020,477 this was clearly considered by the court to 
be a material change in circumstance. 
Another case which considers the application of a COVID-19 related delay in trial 
scheduling to the secondary ground and in which the court orders release is that of R v 
KC.478  It was heard on April 28, 2020, and the reasons for judgment were issued on May 
4, 2020. While there is a non-publication and non-broadcast order issued by the judge 
hearing KC,479 and while I cannot confirm that either a preliminary inquiry or trial has yet 
been held,480 the judge concludes “having regard to the merit in the plan of supervision, 
concern about the impact of COVID-19 and the fact that trials will be delayed and backlogs 
created by the pandemic” that release can occur.481 
On June 25, 2020, a crown onus bail hearing in R v McLean,482 on serious charges of 
kidnapping and robbery, is held in front of Justice Chapin of the Ontario Court of Justice, 
who imposes a publication ban on the case.  The accused’s specific health issues, a strong 
surety, and the potential delay in bringing the matter to trial all lead Chapin J to release Mr. 
McLean. 
 
475 R v Knott, 2020 ONCJ 157 [Knott]. 
476 R v Haughton, 2020 ONSC 1890 [Haughton]. 
477 Ibid at para 5. 
478 R v KC, 2020 ONCJ 231 [KC]. 
479 Ibid. 
480 As noted earlier, normally, any s 517(1) non-publication and non-production ceases to have 
effect once the trial has been completed or, even earlier, if the accused is discharged after a 
preliminary inquiry.   
481 KC, supra note 478 at para 24. 
482 R v McLean, 2020 ONCJ 298 [McLean]. 
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The HK483 decision is another one where the trial delay issue is raised by the defence as a 
potential material change in circumstance.  It does not succeed as the judge, in releasing 
his decision on January 8, 2021, notes that while there has been some delay, the five-day 
preliminary hearing was now scheduled to start on February 2, 2021.484 
In GP, Schreck J’s decision to release is influenced because of the possible delay of G.P.’s 
trial date as a result of COVID-19:  “In these circumstances, it is likely that the applicant 
will serve at least several more months in custody.”485 
COVID-19 is only briefly mentioned in CJ#2486 as a likely cause of further delay in getting 
C.J.’s matters to trial, as Mr. Justice Monahan concludes that he had not yet reached a “time 
served” situation.  His Honour also states: “I further accept the submissions of Crown 
counsel, which were not disputed by counsel for CJ, that trials on the remaining Toronto 
matters could be held within the next 90-120 days.”487 
In summary, the issue of a possible COVID-19 induced trial delay is frequently raised by 
defence counsel in bail hearings during the pandemic.  For some judicial officials, as noted, 
such as those in TL,488 Cotterell,489 Knott,490 KC,491 McLean492 and GP,493 it is a factor that 
leads them to release.  This is not surprising, as courts, since the release of Jordan494 in 
2016, have been required by the Supreme Court of Canada to be ever more sensitive about 
the length of time criminal cases take to get to trial. In other cases, such as HK495 and 
CJ#2,496 the specific timelines of those cases do not lead the judicial officials to the 
conclusion that potential time delays are relevant. 
 
483 HK, supra note 200. 
484 Ibid at para 21 – 23. 
485 GP, supra note 85 at para 35. 
486 CJ#2, supra note 210. 
487 Ibid at para 27. 
488 TL, supra note 79. 
489 Cotterell, supra note 122. 
490 Knott, supra note 475. 
491 KC, supra note 478. 
492 McLean, supra note 482. 
493 GP, supra note 85. 
494 Jordan, supra note 6. 
495 HK, supra note 200. 




NEW FACT SITUATIONS TO CONSIDER AS EVIDENCE – INCREASED 
AVAILABILITY OF SURETIES TO SUPERVISE  
Many potential release plans founder as a result of the lack of supervision that proposed 
sureties could provide.  One relevant side effect of the COVID-19 pandemic is that 
increasing numbers of potential sureties are possibly now either unemployed and at home 
or are now working from home.  In either case, their availability to supervise is now 
enhanced.   An example of such a case where this occurred is R v AC,497 a bail review by 
Munroe J of the Superior Court.  In the initial bail hearing held in front of Auger JP on 
March 10, 2020, just prior to the outbreak of the pandemic, one of the reasons why 
detention was ordered was that, according to Mr. Justice Munroe’s review of the hearing, 
His Worship had found that “there would be extended unsupervised periods.”498 
However, by the time of the bail review, a few weeks later, things had changed.  As Munroe 
J outlines:   
Sister works full-time as an insurance advisor.  Prior to the COVID-19 
shutdown she worked standard business hours:  9 a.m. to 5 p.m., Monday 
through Friday.  Now she works at home and her office hours are reduced to 
two days each week.  She is able to adjust her scheduled, even after the 
reopening, to ensure supervision of A.C.499 
Nevertheless, because a significant amount of the supervision of A.C. would still require 
the use of a second surety who found favour neither with Auger JP nor with Munroe J, His 
Honour rejects the release plan.500 
As noted earlier, in Kinghorn,501 defence counsel argues that a change in Delano 
Kinghorn’s release plan and the COVID-19 pandemic are both material changes.  Crown 
counsel, unlike in many other cases, submits that the COVID-19 pandemic does not 
constitute a material change.   
 
497 R v AC, 2020 ONSC 2870 [AC]. 
498 Ibid at para 52. 
499 Ibid at para 57. 
500 Ibid at para 118. 
501 Kinghorn, supra note 194. 
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The proposed change in the release plan is also, indirectly, COVID-19 related.  Mr. 
Kinghorn’s brother, the proposed surety, who at the time of the original bail hearing was 
employed as a chef at a restaurant, is now, as a result of the pandemic, laid off.  The 
proposed surety is now available to keep an eye on his brother at all times: “Accordingly, 
with the current quarantine, he would always be able to supervise Mr. Kinghorn under strict 
house arrest.”502  This increased surety availability, however, is not enough to persuade His 
Honour to release.503 
In these two cases of AC504 and Kinghorn,505 the increased surety availability, while 
considered, does not prove to be the tipping point that would lead to release.  This makes 
sense, for if the courts – as in these two cases – feel that a strong degree of available surety 
supervision is necessary, they would not likely wish to rely on sureties whose availability 
as a result of their pandemic-induced presence in their homes might only be temporary. 
 
NEW FACT SITUATIONS TO CONSIDER AS EVIDENCE – ELECTRONIC 
MONITORING 
One new development in many of the COVID-19 cases, the use of electronic monitoring, 
does appear to have made a difference in many cases.  While in existence for years, 
electronic monitoring, usually in the form of an ankle bracelet, has never been particularly 
widespread in bail releases in Ontario.  For many defendants, the added expense of having 
to pay for such a system was an effective deterrent in them suggesting it to courts as a 
possible term of their release.   
On March 27, 2020, Mr. Justice Conlan conducts a bail review in Superior Court in 
CJ#1.506  A previous bail review for C.J. in January 2020 had resulted in his continued 
detention.  Notwithstanding his lack of a criminal record, his eleven outstanding charges, 
which included trafficking offences pursuant to the CDSA507 as well as firearms offences, 
 
502 Ibid at paras 12 and 13. 
503 Ibid at para 45. 
504 AC, supra note 497. 
505 Kinghorn, supra note 194. 
506 CJ#1, supra note 210. 
507 CDSA, supra note 70. 
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the January 2020 bail review found that C.J.’s proposed terms of release at that time did 
not sufficiently address the tertiary ground concerns. 
Referring back to the January 2020 bail review, the material changes that had occurred by 
March 2020 were noted by Conlan J at paragraph 5 of his decision: “There was no 
electronic monitoring proposal at that time, nor was there any wide-sweeping global health 
crisis that had significantly impacted life in Canada.”   The proposed electronic monitoring, 
by way of an ankle bracelet, was to be administered by a company called Recovery Science 
Corporation [RSC].  Interestingly, a representative from that company participates in the 
audioconference call by which Conlan J conducts this bail review and clearly makes a good 
impression on His Honour:  “I accept the commentary of the representative from 
RSC….that the program has a strong and proven deterrent effect.”508  His Honour feels that 
the combination of the COVID-19 crisis and the electronic monitoring address the tertiary 
ground concerns and he orders the release of C.J.   
In April 2020, in response to the pandemic, the Ministry of the Solicitor General in the 
province of Ontario introduces the Electronic Supervision Program [ESP] for bail, using 
GPS monitoring, at no cost to the accused, in cooperation with a company called Safe 
Tracks GPS Canada Inc., for up to 90 individuals in custody at Maplehurst Correctional 
Complex, the Vanier Centre for Women, Toronto South Detention Centre and the Toronto 
West Detention Centre.  This results in GPS being considered more frequently,509 though 
the limitation on the number of the free GPS monitoring devices meant that many in 
custody who sought to be released with some form of electronic monitoring still had to pay 
the cost of it themselves.510   
 
508 CJ#1, supra note 210 at para 10.  A representative from RSC participated in the bail hearing in 
Nelson, supra note 179 but was not cross-examined.  Cross-examination did occur of the RSC 
official whose affidavit outlined the electronic monitoring procedures in Hoo-Hing, supra note 160 
at paras 20 – 25. 
509 See e.g. Morris, supra note 62 at para 1iv. 
510 Unfortunately, as of June 7, 2021, the availability of this ESP equipment for bail was 
suspended by the Ministry.  As of August 2021, however, this program is expected to be available 
for some inmates at the Elgin-Middlesex Detention Centre in London, as well as the Central East 
Correctional Centre in Lindsay and the Central North Detention Centre in Penetanguishene.   
72 
 
In the case of R v FD,511 Malloy J of the Superior Court holds that electronic monitoring 
cannot prevent breaches; it merely immediately detects them.  A slightly more optimistic 
opinion as to the worth of the monitoring is given in BMD, where Monahan J  states: “[O]ne 
would expect electronic monitoring to have a significant deterrent effect on those 
individuals who are subject to such monitoring, thereby inducing increased compliance 
with their conditions of release.”512 
The decision in Ledinek513 is released on August 27, 2020, having been heard by Scarfe JP 
on August 21, 2020.514 Mr. Ledinek is charged with several firearms offences515 as well a 
charge of breaching an existing recognizance,516 as a result of which he is in a reverse onus 
situation.  However, in Ledinek,517 Justice of the Peace Scarfe does not conclude that the 
possibility of a GPS ankle bracelet would be effective, as he finds that the sureties proposed 
are too weak to supervise Mr. Ledinek properly.  His Worship puts it succinctly: “While 
the presence of a GPS ankle bracelet essentially prevents him from going to the trouble, 
only the sureties can prevent trouble from coming to him.  As we have all learned from the 
pandemic, much of what we all do can be done remotely.”518  The conclusion in Ledinek, 
on both the secondary and tertiary grounds, is that Ledinek did not discharge his onus and 
his detention is necessary both for the protection and safety of the public and to maintain 
public confidence in the administration of justice.519 
R v Osman520 is a more recent – January 2021 – bail decision by Justice of the Peace 
Kellough that considers both the secondary and tertiary grounds, taking into account an 
 
511 R v FD, 2020 ONSC 3054. 
512 BMD, supra note 91 at para 58. 
513 Ledinek, supra note 38. 
514 Since most bail decisions in Ontario are rendered by justices of the peace, it is always 
surprising, at first glance, to note how few of the reported bail decisions are those of justices of 
the peace.  One of the major difficulties in being able to analyze bail hearing decisions, especially 
those given by justices of the peace, is that almost all such decisions are given orally by the 
presiding justice, often immediately upon the conclusion of the hearing itself.  Few of them are 
written, and even fewer become reported decisions. 
515 These include offences pursuant to ss 244(1), 95(1), 86(1), 91(1) and 92(1):  Ledinek, supra 
note 38 at para 2. 
516 Pursuant to s 145(5)(a) of the Criminal Code, supra note 10. 
517 Ledinek, supra note 38. 
518 Ibid at para 113. 
519 Ibid at paras 124 and 136. 
520 R v Osman, 2021 ONCJ 25 [Osman]. 
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offer on the part of the accused to be electronically monitored.  Her Worship concludes 
that electronic monitoring is in itself insufficient to address the public safety concerns in 
this case, which are strong, as a result of Mr. Osman being charged with firearms offences.   
Other cases that consider electronic monitoring as a component of a release order include 
R v AF,521 Hastings,522 Fraser,523 Shayan Syed,524 O’Brien,525 Cain,526 Rajan,527 JR,528 
Tully,529 Grant,530 R v Carrington,531 Mansour,532 McLean,533 Hoo-Hing,534 Nelson,535 
Budlakoti,536 Phuntsok,537 R v Syed,538 DP,539 Sappleton,540 Ali,541 Yusuf,542 HK,543 PK,544 
Virag545 and TL.546 
 
NEW FACT SITUATIONS TO CONSIDER AS EVIDENCE – UNDERLYING 
HEALTH ISSUES OF THE INDIVIDUAL DEFENDANT 
In many of the COVID-19 bail cases, defence counsel sought to persuade a judge or a 
justice of the peace that underlying health concerns raised the risk of their clients 
 
521 R v AF, 2020 ONSC 2880 [AF] at paras 54 – 56 and 113. 
522 Hastings, supra note 91 at paras 43 and 47 – 48. 
523 Fraser, supra note 210 at para 21. 
524 Shayan Syed, supra note 94 at para 48. 
525 O’Brien, supra note 105 at paras 37, 59 and 60. 
526 Cain, supra note 210 at paras 14 and 17. 
527 Rajan, supra note 125 at paras 31 – 33. 
528 JR, supra note 348 at para 9. 
529 Tully, supra note 133 at paras 13, 15 and 25. 
530 Grant, supra note 63 at paras 10, 22 and 26. 
531 R v Carrington, 2020 ONCJ 258 [Carrington] at para 18. 
532 Mansour, supra note 153 at para 23. 
533 McLean, supra note 482 at paras 15 and 28. 
534 Hoo-Hing, supra note 160 at para 25: “Electronic monitoring never has and never will replace 
the role of a responsible surety.  It is no news to me that electronic monitoring can be defeated by 
a negligent or unscrupulous surety.” 
535 Nelson, supra note 179 at paras 11 – 12. 
536 Budlakoti, supra note 180 at para 1. 
537 Phuntsok, supra note 210 at para 36. 
538 R v Syed, 2020 ONCJ 222 at paras, 3, 5, 11 and 36 – 47 [Shaw Syed]. 
539 DP, supra note 210 at paras 30, 43 and 44. 
540 Sappleton, supra note 212 at paras 5 and 28. 
541 Ali, supra note 120 at paras 11 – 14, 77 and 81. 
542 Yusuf, supra note 233 at paras 4, 24 – 28, 33 – 35 and 38. 
543 HK, supra note 200 at para 10. 
544 PK, supra note 257 at para 42. 
545 Virag, supra note 273 at paras 6, 9, and 57 – 60. 
546 TL, supra note 79 at paras 20 to 26. 
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contracting the virus if they were required to remain in custody.  While such evidence 
almost always was considered during an initial bail hearing, and was frequently found to 
be a material change of circumstances during a section 520 bail review, release was not 
always a given.  In most of the initial bail cases, this issue is considered within the context 
of the “all the circumstances” portion of the tertiary ground, set out in clause 515(10)(c) of 
the Criminal Code.547 
On March 27, 2020, Laliberte J of the Superior Court releases his decision in Budlakoti.548 
It is a brief decision, and again deals with the need for specific evidence of an accused’s 
medical conditions.  In this case, Mr. Budlakoti suffers from gastroesophageal reflux 
disease and celiac disease.549  While acknowledging that “it is likely very challenging for 
Counsel to get appropriate medical evidence in support of such applications” His Honour 
feels that he was not provided with enough in this case, and states that “the need for more 
cogent evidence is reinforced by the significant risks for public safety associated to the 
accused being released in the community.”550  As Mr. Budlakoti is currently facing 83 
outstanding firearms charges, the judge dismisses the application and the accused remained 
in custody. 
In Haughton, Mr. Justice Garton considers an affidavit of the defendant: 
In his affidavit, dated April 7, 2020, Mr. Haughton expressed concern about 
being in custody during the current pandemic particularly since he suffers from 
asthma.  He states that he is ‘terrified’ that if he contracted COVID-19, his 
underlying health condition would require that he be put on a ventilator and he 
worries that one might not be available.551  
However, the judge goes on to express some doubts regarding this evidence.  As His 
Honour states: 
According to Mr. Haughton, he has been using an inhaler while at the TEDC 
[Toronto East Detention Centre] because his asthma is aggravated by the 
stagnant air and humidity from the showers.  Yet his asthma is apparently not 
 
547 Criminal Code, supra note 10. 
548 Budlakoti, supra note 180. 
549 Ibid at para 8. 
550 Ibid at para 14. 
551 Haughton, supra note 476 at para 35.   
75 
 
affected by smoking cigarettes.  He testified that he ‘chooses to smoke’ and 
denied that smoking triggers or aggravates his asthma.552 
Perhaps not surprisingly, Mr. Haughton’s bail review was unsuccessful, as was a 
subsequent bail review application which added electronic monitoring to the proposed 
release. 
In MK,553 the personal circumstances of M.K., including a medical history of a collapsed 
lung, satisfy London-Weinstein J that M.K. is at a higher risk of adverse circumstances 
were he to contract COVID-19,554 yet release is denied for other reasons.  In Cahill,555 Mr. 
Justice Labrosse of the Superior Court accepts that Ms. Cahill is HIV-positive and has 
chronic lung disease, but the Crown still wishes more evidence to conclude that she is at 
greater risk of contracting COVID-19 if she were to remain in detention.  His Honour 
disagrees and concludes:   
I disagree.  This is not a circumstance where it is unclear as to how an illness 
may cause greater risk.  I do not find that further medical evidence is required.  
Clearly, being HIV-positive and having chronic lung disease places Ms. Cahill 
at a significantly greater risk.  While I appreciate that in normal circumstances, 
a court may have been justified to seek further medical evidence, the scarce 
availability of medical practitioners leaves the Court with Ms. Cahill’s 
evidence as the best available evidence.556 
Ms. Cahill is released. 
In Cain,557 London-Weinstein J clearly indicates that the pandemic weighs heavily on her 
as she conducts a section 520 bail review on April 1, 2020.  She comments that “the 
existence of the Covid 19 virus is relevant, but not determinative as to whether an 
individual plan of bail meets the primary, secondary and tertiary criteria governing 
release.”558  The specific health concerns of Mr. Cain are that in 2017 he was the victim of 
a stabbing and sustained an injury to his liver, which results in him being prone to 
 
552 Haughton, supra note 476 at para 38. 
553 MK, supra note 131. 
554 Ibid at para 30. 
555 Cahill, supra note 423. 
556 Ibid at para 20. 
557 Cain, supra note 210. 
558 Ibid at para 8. 
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infections.559  Her concerns that the pandemic could worsen prompt this interesting 
comment: “Given that matters at the jail may become rapidly worse, if present events 
occurring elsewhere are any indication, the time to determine whether Mr. Cain can be 
released and the public adequately protected, is now, before matters have worsened.”560  
She also believes that the pandemic may have resulted in an epiphany for Mr. Cain during 
the time he has spent in custody awaiting this bail review: “I am satisfied that the possibility 
of infection has had a salutary effect on the reasoning of Mr. Cain and will have an effect 
on his conduct.”561  Her Honour also does not feel the need for Cain to satisfy her that he 
has, as she labels it, “some subjective personal characteristic in order to accept that he is at 
increased risk of infection by virtue of his incarceration at OCDC [Ottawa Carleton 
Detention Centre].”562 
A further interesting point that London-Weinstein J makes is that few, if any, of the other 
COVID-19 bail cases consider whether the threat posed by the inability of inmates to self-
isolate raises any concerns regarding the section 7 Charter563 guarantee of security of the 
person.  Frustratingly, Her Honour does not consider this in any further detail, but merely 
states that she considers this factor in coming to her conclusion that Cain could be 
released.564   
On April 8, 2020, Barnes J releases a bail review decision in the matter of Phuntsok565 
which he heard on April 3, 2020.  While citing Jeyakanthan,566 Nelson567 and Budlakoti568 
with approval, His Honour’s decision is not quite as rigid as those in terms of the medical 
evidence required for COVID-19 to be successful in overcoming tertiary ground concerns:   
 
559 Ibid at para 7. 
560 Ibid at para 9.  See also R v Husbands, 2019 ONSC 6824 at para 166 per O’Marra J: “No 
reasonable person expects detainees in custody to be coddled in luxury.  However, people in 
Canada held in custody by the state have the right to be held in safe and clean surroundings.” 
561 Cain, supra note 210 at para 10. 
562 Ibid at para 11.  See, however, her subsequent comments in MK, supra note 131 which 
distinguish this finding in Cain.   
563 Charter, supra note 29. 
564 Cain, supra note 210 at para 26. 
565 Phuntsok, supra note 210. 
566 Jeyakanthan, supra note 168. 
567 Nelson, supra note 179. 
568 Budlakoti, supra note 180. 
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The applicant has provided a doctor’s note stating that he was recently treated 
for asthma in the correctional institution.  The fact that he was treated for 
asthma is not in dispute, but the Crown submits that this is insufficient 
evidence.  Ordinarily, I would agree.  However, certain pre-existing medical 
conditions are so notorious for increasing susceptibility to COVID-19 and 
reducing the survival rate from a COVID-19 infection that judicial notice of its 
effects can be taken.  Asthma is one such condition.569   
Notwithstanding this willingness to be somewhat flexible, His Honour concludes that, 
since in this case he finds the surety to be unsuitable and Mr. Phuntsok has a history of not 
following court orders, his continued detention is necessary to maintain public confidence 
in the administration of justice.570  
On April 9, 2020, Justice of the Peace Levita releases his decision in R v Ellis.571  In it, His 
Worship confirms that he requires some sort of evidence to back up the accused’s 
contention that he suffers from both asthma and pneumonia and that this would make him 
more susceptible.  As well, in these early days of the pandemic, there is as yet no issue of 
COVID-19 in the specific correctional facility where Mr. Ellis is being held.  Detention is 
ordered. 
Another case in which a section 520 application was successful – though not because of 
the specific medical symptoms of the accused – is Ali,572 a decision released on April 24, 
2020.  As in many other similar cases, the Crown did concede that in light of the COVID-
19 pandemic there has been a material change in circumstances.573  Spies J, citing JS574 and 
Nelson,575 agrees.  With respect to COVID-19, the accused did file a doctor’s note from 
July 2018 stating that Mr. Ali, at that time, had “symptoms of cough and wheeze with high 
temperatures which may be asthma or reactive airway disease variant.”576  However, Spies 
 
569 Phuntsok, supra note 210 at para 42. 
570 Ibid at paras 45 and 46. 
571 R v Ellis, [2020] OJ No 1636. 
572 Ali, supra note 120. 
573 Ibid at para 4. 
574 JS, supra note 114. 
575 Nelson, supra note 179. 
576 Ali, supra note 120 at para 48. 
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J noted that there was no evidence from Mr. Ali himself that he suffered from any 
respiratory illness.577   
In Grant,578 discussed briefly earlier in this paper in the context of the primary ground, 
Justice Edwards gives his decision on May 11, 2020.  In this section 520 bail review 
application, he concludes:  
Nonetheless, on the facts presented by Mr. Grant given his pre-existing health 
condition, I am satisfied that the fear of reincarceration is a relevant 
consideration that leads me to conclude that the proposed terms of release 
substantially lowers the risk that Mr. Grant would reoffend and risk being 
reincarcerated.579   
Grant’s health issues, primarily a tendency to get infections such as colds and influenza, 
result from his being stabbed in 2013.580  It is Grant’s health concerns that make the 
difference in this case, as His Honour concludes by stating:  “In the absence of the medical 
evidence referenced above, given Mr. Grant’s propensity demonstrated by his criminal 
record for the commission of crimes involving firearms, the application of the tertiary 
ground would have tipped in favour of his continued incarceration.”581 
In Ibrahim,582 without mentioning any reasons as to how she came to these conclusions, 
including no specific discussion of the concept of judicial notice, Her Honour makes two 
statements.  First, she comments: “Across the province, many accused persons are seeking 
release on bail because of the risk COVID-19 poses.  They rely on the fact that medical 
experts strongly recommend self-isolation and social distancing to protect against the 
spread of the virus.  These practices are difficult, if not impossible, to accomplish in jail.”583    
In the next paragraph, Bird J comes to this second conclusion: “It is accepted that people 
with underlying health conditions including asthma are more likely to experience serious 
 
577 On this point, Spies J later concludes: “However, in light of the limited evidence I do have and 
the evidence I have from Dr. Orkin about the nature of COVID-19, as well as the public 
knowledge that it can impact a person’s respiratory system, I have concluded that I should be 
cautious and presume that Mr. Ali may be at a heightened risk because of his health or at the 
very least because of the increased risk of infection in detention.”  Ibid at para 90.  
578 Grant, supra note 63. 
579 Ibid at para 28. 
580 Ibid at paras 16 and 17. 
581 Ibid at para 32. 
582 Ibrahim, supra note 98. 
583 Ibid at para 24. 
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symptoms of COVID-19 if they contract the virus.”584 During the bail hearing, Mr. 
Ibrahim’s proposed sureties, his mother and sister, both testified that he has had asthma 
since he was a child. 
 
Some health issues may be more relevant than others.  In the case of Fraser, the defendant 
is a leukemia survivor, but, as Madam Justice London-Weinstein states:  “I do not have 
any evidence before me whether persons with a history of cancer, who are not currently 
receiving cancer therapy and do not have active cancer, are at an increased risk compared 
to others in their age group.” Her Honour goes on to opine generally, in reference to the 
pandemic, that “fear of contraction may provide motivation to follow conditions by the 
court.”585  She concludes, however, that in Mr. Fraser’s case, he has not met his onus on 
the secondary ground and his continued detention is ordered.586 
On June 19, 2020, London-Weinstein J of the Superior Court releases another bail review 
decision, BE,587 which is a section 520 bail review argued before her on June 16, 2020.  
While Her Honour does issue a section 517(1) and 520(9) publication ban, I believe that a 
brief review of some aspects of this case there are some interesting aspects of this case that 
are worth reviewing, and that I do not believe violate the ban.   These include that B.E. is 
a paranoid schizophrenic and that Her Honour makes a finding of fact that B.E. is therefore 
at an enhanced risk of contracting COVID-19.588  But as the release plan “offers no 
meaningful supervision of B.E.”589 and as Her Honour feels that there was a substantial 
risk of further offences being committed by him, she orders his continued detention on the 
secondary ground.  However, she also notes that Myers590 does direct her to guard against 
individuals languishing in pre-trial custody for a longer time than their eventual sentence 
 
584 Ibid at para 25.  
585 Fraser, supra note 210 at para 30. 
586 Ibid at para 34.  I will refrain from detailed discussion of Fraser, as there is a publication ban 
pursuant to s 520(9) of the Criminal Code, supra note 10. 
587 BE, supra note 210. 
588 In coming to this conclusion, London-Weinstein J relies on submissions from B.E.’s counsel, 
not contested by the Crown, including medical evidence:  Nicole Kozloff et al, “The COVID-19 
Global Pandemic: Implications for People with Schizophrenia and Related Disorders” (May 2020) 
Schizophrenia Bull 1.  Online at:  https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/32343342/.   
589 BE, supra note 210 at para 13. 
590 Myers, supra note 51. 
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might require.591  But in these early days of the pandemic, she concludes that “that 
prejudice has not crystallized yet.”592  
In contrast to BE,593 in which schizophrenia, primarily a mental illness, is found to increase 
the risk of contracting COVID-19, a different conclusion regarding mental disorders is 
made in R v Lumley.594  While Mr. Lumley clearly has a host of mental health issues, 
Goldstein J draws a distinction and concludes: “There is no evidence that Mr. Lumley has 
any physical ailments that would make him more vulnerable to COVID-19.”595 
In HK,596 notwithstanding that the defendant has had cancer, Mr. Justice Quigley concludes 
that, since H.K. is in remission, is receiving all his medication, and is able to access his 
oncologist,597 the health issues do not overcome the other flaws in the release plan:   
The point is simple...He cannot be released when the plan of release is 
inadequate, as it is in this case, to ensure the safety of the public, and address 
the secondary and tertiary ground concerns.  I accept that the tertiary ground 
carries less weight in the present pandemic circumstances, but that does not 
permit all detained persons to get out of jail, pandemic or not, when the safety 
concerns remain, the surety is not reliable, and the plan is accordingly 
inadequate, as it is here.598 
Osman599 also considers the defendant’s vulnerability to COVID-19 due to his asthma.  
Justice of the Peace Kellough concludes that while his asthma could certainly make him 
more vulnerable to COVID-19, individual health risks to accused persons must not 
overcome issues of public safety and traditional bail concerns.   
In summary, consideration of an individual’s health risks is almost always looked at by the 
court.  But similar to the issue of electronic monitoring, it is most frequently examined 
within the context of the specific accused person’s individual circumstances.  The 
 
591 BE, supra note 210 at paras 14 and 21. 
592 Ibid at para 15.   
593 BE, supra note 210. 
594 R v Lumley, 2020 ONSC 6292, [2020] OJ No 4583 [Lumley]. 
595 Ibid at para 26. 
596 HK, supra note 200. 
597 Ibid at para 32. 
598 Ibid at para 34. 
599 Osman, supra note 520. 
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defendants’ health appears to have made the difference in Cahill600 and Cain601 and leads 
to their release. 
 
NEW FACT SITUATIONS TO CONSIDER AS EVIDENCE – THE RISK OF 
COVID IN JAIL EVEN FOR HEALTHY DEFENDANTS 
Not surprisingly, it was easier for defendants with objectively provable health concerns to 
persuade courts that being detained in a jail would be an increased risk to them.  Even for 
those whose health concerns might not be as serious, or indeed might be non-existent, some 
were still able to succeed in gaining release by raising the issue of the increased risk of 
contracting COVID-19 in a custodial setting. 
One such case is AF, where the judge held: “Accordingly, I find that the applicant will 
follow the terms of bail rather than risk being returned to jail where he is more likely to be 
exposed to COVID-19, whether or not its effects on him are ultimately non life-
threatening.”602  Another case where this issue helped lead to a release order is Carrington, 
where Justice Prutschi concludes that “detaining a presumptively innocent person in a high-
risk health environment in the midst of a global pandemic should only occur when 
circumstances absolutely demand it.”603  And, as noted earlier, the court in Cain604 indicates 
that release would have even occurred even without specific, individual health concerns 
being raised. 
The section 520 bail review of Nelson605 occurs on March 18 and 20, 2020 and the judge’s 
decision is released on March 23, 2020.  Nathaniel Nelson had originally been released on 
bail, but he is in custody as a result of a successful bail review by the Crown in September 
2019.  Mr. Justice Edwards sets out the issue clearly at the beginning of his decision:  
The material change in circumstances that underlies this bail review is the 
health crisis we are all facing in the form of the COVID-19 virus.  While there 
 
600 Cahill, supra note 423. 
601 Cain, supra note 210. 
602 AF, supra note 521 at para 95.  At para 65 of AF, the defendant had given evidence of some 
health concerns. 
603 Carrington, supra note 531 at para 50. 
604 Cain, supra note 210. 
605 Nelson, supra note 179. 
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is a new plan for release that incorporates electronic monitoring, it was 
conceded by counsel for Mr. Nelson that the real issue this court must confront 
is whether Mr. Nelson should be released on bail because of the heightened 
health risk he faces given his present circumstances as an incarcerated person 
at the Central East Correctional Centre.606 
In this case, Nelson has no medical conditions himself,607 and as the judge put it, “in a 
refreshing degree of candour”, Nelson’s counsel admits that “but for the virus, he fully 
recognized that the new plan of release was not one that had much, if any chance of 
success.”608  Justice Edwards acknowledges that he can take judicial notice of the existence 
of the virus but he sets out clear limits for how COVID-19 can be considered by a bail 
court:  “It will be important that future applications proceed with the benefit of at least 
some rudimentary evidence that could suggest an accused is more susceptible to contract 
the virus due to underlying health issues.”609  Summing up all the relevant factors, Edwards 
J concludes: 
This is a case where given the seriousness of the charges; Mr. Nelson’s prior 
criminal record, the weakness of the proposed plan of release, and the absence 
of medical evidence demonstrating that Mr. Nelson may be more susceptible 
to contracting the virus and/or a heightened risk of symptomology, I am not 
satisfied that there would be confidence in the administration of justice if Mr. 
Nelson was released from jail.  The application is dismissed.610 
One of the first decisions in which COVID-19 was considered but in which release was 
denied was that of Hastings,611 a detention review decision, pursuant to section 525 of the 
Criminal Code.612  It was heard by Monahan J of the Superior Court on April 2, 2020 and 
his decision was released the next day.   
As a result of a history of non-compliance with prior court orders, Kyle Hastings had been 
denied bail by a justice of the peace in October 2019 who “had no confidence that Mr. 
Hastings would abide by the proposed plan of release and ordered him detained.”613   
 
606 Ibid at para 2. 
607 Ibid at para 10. 
608 Ibid at para 13. 
609 Ibid at para 35. 
610 Ibid at para 42. 
611 Hastings, supra note 91. 
612 Criminal Code, supra note 10. 
613 Hastings, supra note 91 at para 21. 
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At the section 525 hearing, the Crown maintains that detention of Mr. Hastings is still 
warranted under both the primary and secondary ground of subsection 515(10).  Defence 
counsel argues material changes in circumstances, one of which was the COVID-19 
pandemic.   On the issue of the secondary ground, counsel for Mr. Hastings feels that the 
existence of the pandemic is specifically relevant, as “the threat of transmission of the virus 
in a provincial institution is so significant that it will provide an additional deterrent against 
Mr. Hastings breaching the conditions of his release.”614 
Mr. Justice Monahan quickly rejects this argument in paragraph 52 of his decision:  
The difficulty with this argument is that there is no evidence on the record to 
support it.  Mr. Hastings is 24 years old and in good health.  There are no cases 
of COVID-19 in the correctional institution where he is being detained.  Nor 
has the court heard from Mr. Hastings as to whether his fear of contracting 
COVID-19 would operate as a deterrent in his case.  It is therefore speculative 
to assume that the existence of COVID-19 would cause Mr. Hastings to alter 
his behaviour if he were released. 
Later in that same paragraph of his decision, His Honour raises the interesting possibility 
that Mr. Hastings might pose an increased risk to the public because of COVID-19 when 
he states:  “He has previously demonstrated a willingness to evade police capture in order 
to avoid being returned to custody. A heightened aversion to being in custody as a result 
of the threat of contracting COVID-19 might well cause him to repeat such behaviour in 
the future.”  Monahan J ultimately concludes that, in this case, COVID-19 does not absolve 
the concerns identified under the secondary ground.615 
In his consideration of the pandemic in McArthur,616 Quigley J states:  “There was no 
specific evidence presented at the show cause hearing, or before me, of any particular 
physical or medical disabilities or weaknesses that affect Mr. McArthur, apart from counsel 
acknowledging that he has the same reduced immune systems any person does who is 
getting close to 60 years of age.”617  Of course, since the initial bail hearing occurred in 
 
614 Ibid at para 51. 
615 Hastings, supra note 91 at para 54. 
616 McArthur, supra note 220. 
617 Ibid at para 25. 
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early February 2020, before the scope of the pandemic was realized, there is no reason why 
any such health concerns would have been discussed in detail at it. 
In Forbes, the fact that the defendant has no underlying health issues is one of the reasons 
that Leibovich J detains her.618  A similar decision is made in the oral decision of R v Barry-
Charley619 released in September 2020, before the serious second wave of COVID-19 cases 
hits Ontario, including outbreaks in many of the detention centres in the province.  The 
accused has a lengthy criminal record and is facing ten new charges arising out of his 
alleged possession of a restricted firearm and ammunition, despite being on probation and 
being the subject of weapons prohibition orders.620  Bloomenfeld J has serious concerns on 
both the secondary and tertiary grounds.  In conducting her analysis on the tertiary ground, 
she briefly considers COVID-19: “There are cases in which COVID-19 can compel the 
release of an accused on either the secondary or the tertiary ground.  I appreciate that on 
both grounds there has been a general imperative to release individuals where a reasonable 
bail can be fashioned in light of the added stress and risks of COVID-19.”621  However, 
and similar to the underlying complacency shown by Ghosh J in R v Kochanska622 
regarding the possibility of COVID-19 in the detention centres, Her Honour comments in 
Barry-Charley as follows:   
In Mr. Charley’s case, there are no particular health concerns that place him at 
an elevated risk in relation to the virus.  Further, the COVID-19 information 
covering Mr. Charley’s time at the Toronto East Detention Center indicates 
that there were no cases and no transmission.  I also have no evidence, or no 
specific evidence, that Mr. Charley has additional, or in fact any, motivation to 
stay out of trouble due to fears about susceptibility to COVID-19.623 
In PK, the fact that the defendant has no specific health concerns is a factor in Goodman 
J’s continued detention of him after a section 520 bail review.624   
 
 
618 Forbes, supra note 210 at para 32. 
619 R v Barry-Charley, [2020] OJ No 4381 (ONCJ) [Barry-Charley]. 
620 Ibid at paras 1, 8 and 9. 
621 Ibid at para 41. 
622 R v Kochanska, 2020 ONCJ 385 [Kochanska]. 
623 Barry-Charley, supra note 619 at para 42. 
624 PK, supra note 257 at para 102. 
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NEW FORMS OF EVIDENCE – CROWN INFORMATION SHEETS AND DR. 
ORKIN’S AFFIDAVIT 
Evidence regarding the availability of electronic monitoring is not the only new data 
frequently provided to bail courts in the early days of the COVID-19 pandemic.  Very 
frequently, for example in Rajan,625 the Crown files a document called an “Information 
Note:  Institutional Service Response to COVID-19” which outlines the steps taken against 
COVID-19 by Ontario’s correctional institutions, including reducing the population of jails 
and limiting the number of people being transported back and forth from jails to courts.  
The document filed in Rajan626 was dated April 1, 2020.  It is updated frequently in the 
early weeks and months of the pandemic, often with specific data relating to a particular 
correctional institution.  Some judicial officers are somewhat hostile to this document, 
given that it was not in affidavit form and notes no specific author who would then be able 
to be cross-examined, while other courts are willing to allow the documents in as evidence.  
An example of this is MK, in which the judge comments that “we are conducting these bail 
reviews in a time of crisis,” that “there are other urgent matters afoot” and that “a more 
relaxed standard is mandated in regard to the receipt of evidence given this context.”627   
In Forbes,628 evidence filed by the Crown during the bail review including the “Response 
to COVID-19 Information Note” dated April 6, 2020, indicates that, as of that date, only 
four inmates in Ontario correctional centres have tested positive for COVID-19, and that 
“no one had tested positive at the applicant’s detention center.”629  This evidence was 
certainly a factor that Leibovich J took into consideration when deciding not to release Ms. 
Forbes in her section 520 bail review. 
In Kinghorn, the Crown relies upon the briefing notes filed by the Ministry of the Solicitor 
General dated March 26, April 1 and April 6, 2020 as the basis for its insistence that 
 
625 Rajan, supra note 125 at para 59. 
626 Ibid. 
627 MK, supra note 131 at para 34, citing St-Cloud, supra note 5 at para 129. 
628 Forbes, supra note 210. 
629 Ibid at para 17. 
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COVID-19 has not caused a material change in circumstances.630  Defence counsel submits 
that the judge should put little weight on those memos, and His Honour agrees:   
While the courts need to be practical with respect to evidence in these 
circumstances, the memos stretch the limit of the evidentiary principles upon 
which I can rely.  The documents are unsigned.  They do not have any name 
attached to them as an author.  They refer to ‘risk factors’ which suggests some 
sort of expert opinion.  I have put little weight upon these documents.631 
Other COVID-19 bail cases in which Crown counsel file a COVID-19 Information Note 
include KC,632 Morris,633 Ledinek,634 JR,635 Tully,636 Jeyakanthan,637 Shaw Syed,638 DP,639 
Ali,640 Dawson,641 PK,642 Baidwan,643 Virag644 and, at the Court of Appeal, Jaser.645  
JR,646 heard on April 15, 2020 with the decision released on April 20, 2020, is a section 
525 detention review by Schreck J.  J.R. is in custody at the Toronto South Detention 
Centre and the review hearing proceeds remotely by teleconference.647  An important factor 
in Mr. Justice Schreck’s analysis of the tertiary ground is an affidavit by Dr. Aaron Orkin 
filed by the defence.648  Like the “Information Note” provided by the Crown in many bail 
hearings, Dr. Orkin’s affidavit is updated several times during the early weeks of the 
pandemic and is offered by defence counsel in many bail hearings. It is a thorough affidavit, 
the April 7, 2020 version being eight pages long, with his twenty-five page curriculum 
vitae attached as an exhibit.  Other exhibits to the affidavit include government COVID-
 
630 Kinghorn, supra note 194 at para 23. 
631 Ibid at para 24.   
632 KC, supra note 478 at paras 16 and 18. 
633 Morris, supra note 62 at para 22. 
634 Ledinek, supra note 38 at paras 22 and 23. 
635 JR, supra note 348 at paras 32 – 36, 41 – 43. 
636 Tully, supra note 133 at para 40. 
637 Jeyakanthan, supra note 168 at para 31. 
638 Shaw Syed, supra note 538 at para 78. 
639 DP, supra note 210 at para 45. 
640 Ali, supra note 120 at paras 49 – 54. 
641 Dawson, supra note 235 at para 50. 
642 PK, supra note 257 at para 50. 
643 Baidwan, supra note 263 at para 75. 
644 Virag, supra note 273 at para 40. 
645 Jaser, supra note 334 at para 102 in which the court specifically noted that, to date, there has 
not been a single case of COVID-19 in the institution in which Jaser is being held. 
646 JR, supra note 348. 
647 Ibid at paras 3 and 7. 
648 Ibid at paras 28 – 43.   
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19 case projections and various versions of the government’s Briefing Note – Institutional 
Services Response to COVID-19 produced with respect to specific detention centres.   
The affidavit clearly makes a big impact on Mr. Justice Schreck in JR.  As he states: 
Dr. Orkin’s credentials are impressive.  In addition to a medical degree, he 
holds a graduate degree in public health and is a doctoral candidate in clinical 
epidemiology.  He practices emergency medicine at two Toronto hospitals and 
is the Medical Director of the St. Joseph’s Health Centre COVID-19 
Assessment Centre.  He is also responsible for planning a COVID-19 response 
strategy for Inner City Health Associates, an organization which provides 
health services to people experiencing homelessness.  He has authored and co-
authored numerous peer-reviewed publications, including several relating to 
health are for individuals in prison.649 
Dr. Orkin’s main argument is that preventing outbreaks of COVID-19 in congregate living 
facilities is a top priority for flattening the curve of cases, but that the degree of physical 
distancing required to do so is impossible within correctional institutions because of space 
constraints, referring to it as a “geometry problem, not a policy or strategy problem.”650  
Justice Schreck clearly prefers Dr. Orkin’s affidavit to the Information Note filed by the 
Crown.  While neither document’s author is cross-examined during the detention review,651 
the fact that His Honour does not know the identity of the author of the Information Note 
is clearly important to him.  He uses the same reasoning in preferring the evidence 
contained in J.R.’s own affidavit – for example, on whether the inmates were currently 
being provided with soap by the corrections staff – to that of the unauthored Information 
 
649 Ibid at para 28. 
650 Ibid at paras 29 and 30. 
651 Ibid at para 28.  Schreck J confirms that Dr Orkin was not cross-examined and his evidence 
was not challenged by the Crown.  With respect to the Information Note, Schreck J states at para 
32:  “I was advised during submissions that one of the authors of the document is a strategic 
advisor employed by the MSG [Ministry of the Solicitor General] who does not have a medical 
background.  While the Crown has called this person as a witness during other proceedings, it did 
not to do before me.  The identity and qualifications of the other author or authors was not 
disclosed to me.”  Schreck J therefore concludes at para 38:  “There is no indication as to what 
qualifications they have to express an opinion on the adequacy of the measures undertaken by 
MSG to control the spread of COVID-19 or whether they are justified in being ‘confident’ in the 
care we are providing our inmate population.’” 
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Note.652  Citing the comments of Harris J in Rajan,653 noted earlier in this paper, Schreck J 
releases J.R., also relying on JS,654 Cain,655 TL,656 CJ#1657 and R v King.658 
In Ali,659 Spies J considers Dr. Orkin’s affidavit at great length, including the doctor’s 
statement that “even reducing the population of individuals who are in good health in 
correctional facilities is important to protect the health of those who have health problems 
in those facilities” and that “the health of a particular inmate is irrelevant to this 
recommendations and that from a public health perspective, during the current pandemic, 
it would always be in the best interest, not only of the inmate, but of the community at large 
to release the inmate to a less populated environment such as their own home.”660  Dr. 
Orkin concludes: 
My position is rooted in my knowledge of public health and COVID-19 only, 
and I do not purport to weigh or balance the risks of COVID-19 on an 
individual or population level against the public safety issues associated with 
the release of individual inmates from custody.  I realize fully that some 
inmates are violent, some are dangerous, and therefore some cannot be safely 
released into the community.  Nevertheless, my opinion is that the collective 
and congregate gathering of a group of people in correctional facilities together 
is very dangerous right now.  As a society, during these extraordinary 
circumstances, it is essential that we accurately assess the nature of these safety 
risks, so that they can be appropriately weighed against one another.661 
Recent developments arising between the date of the Ali hearing and the release of the 
decision also appear to influence Her Honour’s decision.  On April 21, 2020, an outbreak 
of COVID-19 is declared by Peel Region Public Health at the Ontario Correctional 
Institute, and all its inmates are transferred to the Toronto South Detention Centre.662  As 
 
652 Ibid at paras 36 and 42. 
653 Rajan, supra note 125 at paras 69 and 70. 
654 JS, supra note 114 at paras 18 and 19. 
655 Cain, supra note 210 at para 25. 
656 TL, supra note 79 at paras 35 and 36. 
657 CJ#1, supra note 210 at para 8. 
658 R v King, 2020 ONSC 1935, at paras 60 and 61. 
659 Ali, supra note 120. 
660 Ibid at paras 57 and 58. 
661 Ibid at para 59. 
662 Ibid at para 94. 
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Her Honour puts it:  “It seems then that what Dr. Orkin was concerned about is beginning 
to appear.”  She goes on to conclude:   
Furthermore, in my view, in these extraordinary times, although the presence 
of COVID-19 is not a free pass to ‘get out of jail’, if the secondary ground is 
satisfied and a release plan is viable and ensures that a defendant can be 
adequately supervised to protect the public from further risk, as is the case 
before me, then release on stringent terms ought to be ordered, notwithstanding 
the strength of the usual four factors justifying detention on the tertiary 
ground.663 
Justice Felix issues a thoroughly researched bail decision in Shaw Syed664 on April 30, 
2020.  While there is a subsection 517(1) ban in effect, I believe that I can state His 
Honour’s general conclusions regarding the impact of COVID-19 on the tertiary ground 
without violating the ban.  In Shaw Syed, Justice Felix, on the topic of Dr. Orkin’s affidavit, 
states that “I generally accept the information provided by Dr. Aaron Orkin in his affidavit 
as it pertains to the general circumstances in the public at large” and that “defects in Dr. 
Aaron Orkin’s specific knowledge about the current circumstances inside of institutions 
goes to weight rather than admissibility.”665 
In XY,666 the youth case discussed earlier, X.Y.’s counsel files a copy of Dr. Orkin’s 
affidavit, Her Worship discounts it because X.Y. is held in a youth facility: 
I accept the Crown’s submission that Dr. Orkin’s report does not apply to the 
Roy McMurtry Centre where X.Y. is being held because it is operating at less 
than half of its capacity.  There were only 50 young persons there as of June 
24th, 2020.  To date, there has been no reported cases amongst young 
persons…Each young person has their own room, and only interact with up to 
7 people in an area where physical social distancing can be practiced.667 
As Ontario amalgamated many youth facilities early in 2021, specifically because of their 
underutilization, this practical argument against relying on the conclusions of Dr. Orkin’s 
affidavit with respect to young persons may no longer exist. 
 
663 Ibid at para 96. 
664 Shaw Syed, supra note 538. 
665 Ibid at para 80. 
666 XY, supra note 460. 
667 Ibid at paras 46 and 47. 
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Kochanska668 is a decision that is released at the end of August 2020, worthy of 
examination because of the judge’s strong opposition to, and distaste for, the evidence 
provided by Dr. Orkin through his affidavits.669   Ghosh J begins his comments about Dr. 
Orkin relatively gently:  “Much of the medical evidence of Dr. Orkin is accepted within 
the public realm and I accept it at face value as it related to potential risks to parties residing 
in ‘congregate living facilities’ as he described.”670  But His Honour immediately begins 
to add qualifiers to his acceptance of Dr. Orkin’s evidence:  “However, the evidence is 
uncontested from federal and provincial facilities that mitigating steps in compliance with 
public health directives have been in place and that there have been no outbreaks to date 
involving locations where Mr. Kochanska will be residing.”671 
Ghosh J gets harsher in the next paragraphs: 
[24] I accord little to no weight to several aspects of Dr. Orkin’s opinion, 
specifically as it related to his observation that it is ‘extremely likely that 
COVID-19 will arrive in nearly every correctional facility in Canada, and 
therefore extremely likely that almost all inmates in these settings will be 
exposed in one way or another.’ 
[25] I find that he has opined, in improperly sweeping terms, a 
presumption that custodial facilities are incapable of observing public health 
directives.  I am not the first jurist to make such a finding:  R v Osman, [2020] 
OJ No 1774 (SCJ), paras 97 – 102; R v Paramsothy, 2020 ONSC 2314. 
[26] An expert is required to provide opinion evidence that is ‘fair, 
objective, and non-partisan’ (R v White Burgess at para 30).  Were it not for the 
Crown concession regarding the unfettered admissibility of the expert opinion, 
I may not have permitted Dr. Orkin to provide much of the evidence captured 
in the various versions of his affidavits as it related to custodial facilities: R v 
White Burgess at para 32.  His evidence on custodial facilities improperly 
exceeds the bounds of his expertise and experience.  
[27] Also, in submitting modifications to three versions of essentially the 
same expert affidavit, I find Dr. Orkin has embarked on classically 
impermissible ‘tailoring’ of his evidence to respond to judicial criticism in 
order to insulate his opinion.  These criticisms focused on his conclusory 
 
668 Kochanska, supra note 622. 
669 Ibid at paras 22 – 33. 
670 Ibid at para 23. 
671 Ibid at para 23. 
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observations, without evidence, regarding the inability of essentially any 
correctional facility to mitigate risk.  
Justice Ghosh concludes his remarks about Dr. Orkin’s affidavit as follows:  
I afford little to no weight regarding his evidence regarding how the virus will 
impact detention centres or prisons, either generally or specifically.  He is 
uninformed to opine, particularly as it relates to the Central East Correctional 
Centre (CECC) and the penitentiary, as to the real and prospective impact of 
the virus…There is no credible evidence that Dr. Orkin has ever assessed 
CECC, the penitentiary, or Mr. Kochanska and any associated risk factors 
presented by the virus.  There has been a single, effectively contained case well 
over a month ago at CECC and certainly no evidence of a minor outbreak to 
date, nor at the penitentiary for that matter.672 
With the unfair benefit of hindsight, it is easy to criticize Justice Ghosh’s decision in 
Kochanska.673  It is written, as mentioned earlier, in August 2020, when case levels were 
very low, before both the second and third waves of COVID-19 swept across Ontario and 
much of Canada.  During those waves, almost all correctional centres in Ontario suffered 
massive oubreaks of COVID-19 within their walls, thus sadly proving Dr. Orkin’s 
predictions to be quite prescient. 
It is particularly concerning that, while criticizing Dr. Orkin for speculating, His Honour is 
prepared to accept the evidence from the Crown, in the form of the same unauthored memos 
from non-medical personnel, criticized by many other judges, outlining the supposed safety 
and appropriateness of the Ministry’s attempts to keep the pandemic out of correctional 
institutions:  “I have uncontested evidence of the steps and procedures the provincial and 
federal government has in place for custodial settings during the public health crisis.  It 
supports that there are no current concerns regarding the prospect of an outbreak.”674  
Perhaps not surprisingly, all His Honour’s comments lead him to conclude that Mr. 
Kochanska should not be released pending sentencing.675  
 
672 Ibid at paras 32 and 33. 
673 Ibid. 
674 Ibid at para 44. 
675 Ibid at para 47. 
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Other cases in which Dr. Orkin’s affidavit is filed by defence counsel include AF,676 KC,677 
Mansour,678 PK,679 Jaser680 and Stone.681  It is also filed in the Saskatchewan Court of 
Appeal case of R v Shingoose.682  In almost all these cases the affidavit is favourably 
received and considered by the presiding judicial officer.  One case where the Orkin 
affidavit was mentioned by defence counsel in his submissions, but not filed, is 
Carrington.683  Without the affidavit being filed and without therefore, any meaningful 
opportunity for the Crown to respond, the judge gives it no weight in Carrington.684 
Like the other new forms of evidence frequently presented in bail hearings during the 
pandemic, some courts placed more weight than others did on the affidavit of Dr. Orkin.   
Other data, concerning such issues as the health of individual defendants, required specific 
evidence to satisfy the court as to its relevance.  But other more general facts and data, such 
as those contained in the Information Notes and Dr. Orkin’s affidavit, led many courts to 
consider the framework in which such potential evidence could be accepted by them.  This 
resulted in discussions, in many of the pandemic-era decisions, of the concept of judicial 
notice. 
 
COVID-19 AND JUDICIAL NOTICE 
Many of the COVID-19 cases in this paper contain some mention of the doctrine of judicial 
notice.  This doctrine allows courts to take note of certain facts without the necessity of 
hearing evidence in court to prove the existence of those facts: “A court may properly take 
judicial notice of adjudicative facts that are either (1) so notorious or generally accepted as 
not to be the subject of debate among reasonable persons, or (2) capable of immediate and 
 
676 AF, supra note 521 at paras 101 – 102.   
677 KC, supra note 478 at paras 17, 19 and 21. 
678 Mansour, supra note 153 at paras 33, 43 – 44 and 46. 
679 PK, supra note 257 at paras 92 – 95. 
680 Jaser, supra note 334 at para 101, where it is described as “thorough, impressive and thought-
provoking.” 
681 Stone, supra note 385 at paras 7 and 8. At para 7, Juriansz JA specifically draws attention to 
Dr. Orkin’s prediction of a second wave of the pandemic. 
682 R v Shingoose, 2020 SKCA 45 [Shingoose]. 
683 Carrington, supra note 531. 
684 Ibid at para 45. 
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accurate demonstration by resort to readily accessible sources of indisputable accuracy.”685 
With respect to COVID-19, the judges deciding many of these cases have been prepared 
to take judicial notice of certain aspects of the pandemic, often with the goal of achieving 
more efficiencies in bail hearings. 
Examples of this include Morris, where Leach J states:   
I also agree with the view that our courts are entitled to take a degree of judicial 
notice in relation to certain realities and possibilities associated with the 
COVID-19 pandemic.  For example, an applicant seeking interim release on 
bail should not be obliged, in each and every case, to lead evidence in relation 
to such matters as the known properties of the COVID-19 virus and its possible 
transmission, the possible consequences of contracting the virus, and the 
existence of prevailing restrictions and safety protocols enacted or publicly 
recommended by our various levels of government and public health 
agencies.686   
Another case where judicial notice of COVID-19 occurs is CJ#1:  
As to any suggestion that this Court may need ‘evidence’ that C.J. is, while at 
the jail, more at risk of contracting COVID-19 than if he was not in jail, I reject 
that submission….It is incontrovertible that a jail setting is not conducive to 
the types of physical distancing and other safety measures being recommended 
by all of the health authorities to help protect oneself against the virus.  To 
demand some ‘evidence’ in support of that is, with respect to any contrarian 
view, unnecessary.687   
Madam Justice London-Weinstein makes findings based on judicial notice in two of her 
COVID-19 decisions discussed earlier in this paper.  In Cain, she states: “I take judicial 
notice of the fact that this virus is contagious before a person demonstrates signs of 
infection and that persons can be asymptomatic, yet highly contagious.”688  She elaborates 
further in MK:   
I take judicial notice of the following:  1. The virus is respiratory, contagious 
and outcomes upon infection vary widely.  2.  Physical distancing and frequent 
hand washing are recommended by health professionals to protect against 
 
685 R v Spence, 2005 SCC 71, [2005] 3 SCR 458 at para 53, quoting R v Find, 2001 SCC 32, 
[2001] 1 SCR 863 [Find] at para 48.   
686 Morris, supra note 62 at para 22. 
687 CJ#1, supra note 200 at para 9. 
688 Cain, supra note 210 at para 6. 
94 
 
transmission.  3.  Physical distancing and frequent hand washing are not 
available to prisoners at the Ottawa Carleton Detention Centre.689 
On the topic of judicial notice, Justice Felix makes this interesting comment in Shaw Syed:  
“If evidence of the COVID-19 pandemic is not amenable to doctrine of judicial notice, a 
Court may have resort to the standard of credible or trustworthy evidence led on the hearing 
in support of a finding:  s. 518(1)(e) of the Criminal Code.”690 
In another case, R v Neverson,691 DiLuca J states:   
I accept that keeping people in custody increases their risk of infection, 
particularly where they may have a pre-existing medical issue.  I also accept 
the public confidence in the administration of justice must be considered from 
an informed perspective that is aware of the significant risk posed by COVID 
in the carceral setting.  In this regard, I am prepared to take judicial notice that 
the risk of infection is best managed by reducing the number of people who are 
kept in jail during the currency of the crisis.   
In Baidwan,692 discussed earlier in this paper in the context of determining material changes 
in circumstances, Skarica J believes that the second category of acceptable sources, what 
he refers to as the ‘readily ascertainable’ rule outlined above in Find,693 includes 
dictionaries, almanacs, texts and related authoritative works, but he excludes newspaper 
articles from this category.694  He also excludes expert evidence from the ‘readily 
ascertainable’ category based on the Chief Justice’s ruling in Find:  “Expert evidence is 
neither notorious not capable of immediate and accurate demonstration.  That is why it 
must be proved through an expert whose qualifications are accepted by the court and who 
is available for cross-examination.”695  He reviews the existing COVID-19 jurisprudence 
and concludes that “the gist of all the decisions reviewed above is that justices are making 
liberal use of the doctrine of judicial notice.”696 
 
689 MK, supra note 131 at para 47. 
690 Shaw Syed, supra note 538 at para 80.  As noted later in this paper in the section dealing with 
judicial notice and COVID-19, this seems to be ignored by Skarica J in Baidwan, supra note 263. 
691 R v Neverson, 2020 ONSC 2698 at para 31. 
692 Baidwan, supra note 263. 
693 Find, supra note 685. 
694 Baidwan, supra note 263 at paras 42 and 43. 
695 Find, supra note 685 at para 49. 
696 Baidwan, supra note 263 at para 39. 
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Mr. Justice Skarica concludes, therefore, that “a court must be very cautious in applying 
the judicial notice doctrine.”  He notes that since contrary evidence may not be received by 
a court where matters of fact have been judicially noticed, “improper use of the judicial 
notice doctrine has the potential of working an injustice on either party as once the judicial 
notice doctrine is implemented, both parties lose the right of cross examination on the 
accepted facts and are not capable of producing any contrary evidence.”697 
He further concludes that, since expert opinion and resulting public policy surrounding 
COVID-19 was very different in January and February 2020 as opposed to April 2020, that 
this “dramatically illustrates” that courts therefore must rigorously determine that “expert 
evidence is not capable of being judicially noticed and must be proved through a properly 
qualified expert who can be cross examined.”698  This seems to be grounded in His 
Honour’s belief that if generally accepted scientific opinions change over time, as has 
happened frequently in the rapidly evolving new world of COVID-19, they cannot be 
accepted by courts without testimony and cross-examination. 
With respect, His Honour is being quite rigid.  While he acknowledges that the rules of 
hearsay are relaxed for bail hearings, as set out both in common law699 and in statute,700 
His Honour feels that internet and media articles about COVID-19 are not trustworthy 
hearsay.701  Even if they report on opinions formulated by medical experts, they can only 
be accepted by the courts after cross-examination.  Therefore, he determines that “without 
any evidence of empirical accuracy, health models should be given little weight as they do 
not meet the test at present of trustworthy hearsay.”702  For Mr. Justice Skarica, only actual 
data summarizing existing infection and fatality rates for COVID-19 fit within the bounds 
of trustworthy hearsay evidence.703  In order for a court to rely on predictive modelling 
data, such as that presented in Dr. Orkin’s affidavit, Skarica J would require, in the midst 
 
697 Ibid at para 44. 
698 Ibid at paras 51 and 52. 
699 St-Cloud at para 136. 
700 Criminal Code, supra note 10, s 518(1)(e) which permits a justice to “receive and base his 
decision on evidence considered credible or trustworthy by him in the circumstances of each 
case.” 
701 Baidwan, supra note 263 at para 54. 
702 Ibid at para 56. 
703 Ibid at para 59. 
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of an exceptional pandemic, with medical facilities and personnel stretched to the limit, 
viva voce testimony from medical professionals subject to cross-examination.  This negates 
both the practical time concerns of those medical personnel and scientists who would be 
far more useful in the field, as well as recent trends in bail case law and the Bail Hearings 
Protocol that seek to streamline hearings as much as possible.   
Skarica J is not alone, though he is probably the most strident in expressing his concerns 
on this point.  In Jeyakanthan,704 McWatt J is of the opinion that Copeland’s conclusion in 
JS705 that “the ability to practice social distancing and self-isolation is limited, if not 
impossible” within jails is “based on speculation and not on evidence.”706  One would have 
thought that Madam Justice Copeland’s conclusion was sufficiently self-evident and 
obvious that expert evidence and cross-examination on that topic would not have been 
required.   
A little over two weeks after Skarica J’s decision in Baidwan,707 on May 4, 2020, in 
Morgan#2, discussed in greater detail earlier in this paper, Ontario’s Court of Appeal 
weighs in:  
We do, however, believe that it falls within the accepted bounds of judicial 
notice for us to take into account the fact of the COVID-19 pandemic, its 
impact on Canadians generally, and the current medical knowledge [emphasis 
added] of the virus, including its mode of transmission and recommended 
methods to avoid its transmission.708   
The Court of Appeal thus appears willing to acknowledge that expert opinion may change 
and judicial notice can be taken of it even as it evolves. 
 
 
704 Jeyakanthan, supra note 168. 
705 JS, supra note 114 at para 19.  See also Tully, supra note 133 at para 38:  “In this regard, I 
should note that I do not agree with the criticism that has been raised in some cases that the 
conclusion that there is a heightened risk of contracting the coronavirus infection in a custodial 
institution.”  
706 Jeyakanthan, supra note 168 at para 28. 
707 Baidwan, supra note 263. 
708 Morgan#2, supra note 402 at para 8. 
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THE IMPACT OF ZORA AND LEGISLATIVE AMENDMENTS TO BAIL 
DURING THE TIME OF COVID-19  
As noted earlier, the Supreme Court of Canada handed down its decision in Zora709 in June 
of 2020, just as the first wave of COVID-19 was beginning to subside in Ontario. While it 
does not directly address the pandemic in any way, it is an extremely significant case for 
the law of bail, resulting in lower courts seeking – not always successfully –  to make 
decisions in accordance with it while simultaneously considering the impact of COVID-
19.  I believe it is important in the context to a review of COVID-19 bail cases to consider 
the influence of Zora710 as well as the new sections 493.1 and 493.2 of the Criminal Code711 
on those decisions.  
 
Section 493.1 is a new section of the Criminal Code712 that was enacted in 2019.713 It reads 
as follows:   
 
In making a decision under this Part, a peace officer, justice or judge shall give 
primary consideration to the release of the accused at the earliest reasonable 
opportunity and on the least onerous conditions that are appropriate in the 
circumstances, including conditions that are reasonably practicable for the 
accused to comply with, while taking into account the grounds referred to in 
subsection 498(1.1) or 515(10), as the case may be.   
 
In effect it codifies the Supreme Court’s conclusions in Antic that terms of release imposed 
under subsection 515(4) of the Criminal Code714 may “only be imposed to the extent that 
they are necessary” to address concerns related to the statutory criteria for detention and to 
ensure that the accused can be released.715   
 
 
709 Zora, supra note 8. 
710 Ibid. 
711 Criminal Code, supra note 10. 
712 Ibid. 
713 Enacted by An Act to amend the Criminal Code, the Youth Criminal Justice Act and other Acts 
and to make consequential amendments to other Acts, SC 2019, c 25, s 210. 
714 Criminal Code, supra note 10. 
715 Antic, supra note 7 at para 67(j). 
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The Supreme Court in Zora specifically refers to this new section716 within its discussion 
of the need to minimize conditions that are imposed. Equally important is the new 
subsection 515(2.03) of the Criminal Code717 which speaks of restraint in requiring 
sureties. As well, subsection 515(2.01) places an obligation on the Crown to show why any 
less onerous form of release than that which it is proposing would be inadequate.   
 
One aspect of the Cotterell718 decision is that the justice of the peace specifically concludes 
that the “ladder principle”719 – requiring a justice to release on the least restrictive terms 
possible – applies in reverse onus situations.  Notwithstanding some case law that holds 
that the ladder principle does not apply in reverse onus cases,720 I would agree with Lee JP 
and argue that it does, based on a combination of Zora721 and the recent Criminal Code722 
amendments.   
 
Zora directly addresses all the main aspects of the ladder principle and the principle of 
limiting bail conditions to what the bail regime permits.723 It is important to remember that 
Mr. Zoa was in a reverse onus bail scenario, as he was initially charged with possession for 
the purpose of trafficking.724  It would be bizarre if the Supreme Court of Canada would 
have written all that it did about these principles if they did not actually mean them to apply 
to Mr. Zora. Or at the very least one would expect the Supreme Court to have said 
something about that limitation.  
    
 
716 Zora, supra note 8 at para 26. 
717 Criminal Code, supra note 10. 
718 Cotterell, supra note 122. 
719 See Antic, supra note 7 at para 44. 
720 There is some ongoing debate as to whether the ladder principle applies in reverse onus 
situations.  Cases such as R v Mead, 2016 ONCJ 308, R v Downey, [2018] OJ No 6133 (ONSC), 
and R v Pascal, 2018 ONSC 2896 have held that it does apply, while others such as R v 
Sakhiyar, 2018 ONSC 5767, R v Anderson, 2018 ONSC 5720, [2018] OJ No 5246, R v Ishmael, 
2019 ONSC 596, Forbes, supra note 210 and Carrington, supra note 531 have held that the 
ladder principle does not apply in reverse onus situations. 
721 Zora, supra note 8. 
722 Criminal Code, supra note 10. 
723 Ibid at paras 21 and 24. 
724 Pursuant to CDSA, supra note 70, s 5(2).  By virtue of the Criminal Code, supra note 10, s 
515(6)(d), Mr. Zora was in a reverse onus situation. 
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The reverse onus provisions of the Criminal Code725 are in subsection 515(6) which only 
speaks to detention or release. There is nothing there about conditions or form of release. 
If an accused satisfies his or her reverse onus and shows why detention is not justified, 
subsection 515(7) then requires that “the justice shall make a release order under this 
section”. That seems like a clear direction to apply the remaining provisions of section 515 
to determine the form and terms of release. I would submit that there is nothing in 
subsection 515(7) that seeks to modify the balance of section 515, “reverses” anything in 
subsections 515(2), (2.01) or (2.03) or undermines the principle of restraint in section 
493.1. 
 
Notwithstanding the Supreme Court’s decisions in Antic726 and Zora,727 and the specific 
enactment of section 493.1 of the Criminal Code,728 many COVID-19 bail decisions 
continue to impose onerous release terms with little or no justification as to why the justices 
imposing them feel they are necessary.  Here are some examples. 
 
In TL, there is a release term that requires the accused “to present himself at the front door 
within five minutes of law enforcement attending to ensure that he is in compliance with 
the bail.”729 
The release terms in TK,730 even though Goodman J indicates no primary ground 
concerns,731 include some that frankly do not appear appropriate. Terms imposed in TK 
include requirements that T.K. report in person weekly to the Hamilton Police Service, that 
he present himself to the police at the front door of his residence upon demand, or respond 
 
725 Criminal Code, supra note 10. 
726 Antic, supra note 7. 
727 Zora, supra note 8. 
728 Criminal Code, supra note 10. 
729 TL, supra note 79 at para 39.  Other than a mention earlier in Molloy J’s decision, at para 13, 
that T.L. had dispositions, over a decade earlier as a youth, for failing to comply with 
recognizances, there is no explanation whatsoever as to why such a draconian term would be 
required as part of T.L.’s bail plan. 
730 TK, supra note 69. 
731 Ibid at para 45.  
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to the telephone upon the request of the police in order to ensure compliance with the order, 
and that he deposit his passport – if he has one – with the Hamilton Police Service.732 
Similar, however, to TK,733 the release terms in CJ#1734 appear to be overly broad and not 
fully in compliance with the directives in Antic.735  They include terms that absolutely ban 
any use of computers or cell phones, as well as requiring him to deposit any passport with 
the police and remain in Ontario, notwithstanding his complete lack of a criminal record 
and no indication of any concerns whatsoever with respect to the primary ground of 
release.736 
The release terms imposed by London-Weinstein J in Cain include one that he keep the 
peace and be of good behavior.737 While inclusion of this condition is mandatory in 
probation orders, pursuant to clause 732.1(2)(a), conditional sentence orders, pursuant to 
clause 742.3(2)(a), and peace bonds, pursuant to subsection 810(3), all of the Criminal 
Code,738 the Supreme Court in Zora generally frowns upon as a condition in a bail 
release.739  Notwithstanding this, a similar term was also imposed in Cahill.740  
 
In Ali,741 the judge releases the defendant on twenty-four strict terms, again including some 
terms that do not appear appropriate or relevant.  These include that he keep the peace and 
be of good behaviour, that he remain in the Province of Ontario, that he surrender all travel 
documents including passports and not apply for any travel documents and that he be 
amenable to the routine and discipline of the household of the residence where he is to be 
under house arrest.742 
 
732 Ibid at para 75(f), (g) and (h). 
733 TK, supra note 69. 
734 CJ#1, supra note 210. 
735 Antic, supra note 7. 
736 CJ#1, supra note 210 at para 12. 
737 Cain, supra note 210 at para 27.   
738 Criminal Code, supra note 10. 
739 Zora, supra note 8 at para 94. 
740 Cahill, supra note 423 at para 42n.  
741 Ali, supra note 120. 
742 Ali, supra note 120 at para 100(a), (b), (c) and (u).  The terms that he remain in Ontario and 
surrender all travel documents is particularly baffling, since Spies J states at para 6:  “The Crown 
raised no concerns under the primary ground either before the Justice of the Peace or before me.  




“Be amenable clauses” are specifically criticized by the Supreme Court in Zora: 
[B]road conditions requiring an accused to follow or be amenable to the rules 
of the house or follow the lawful instructions of staff at a residence may be 
problematic, especially for accused youth. In J.A.D., the Court of Queen’s 
Bench for Saskatchewan found that such a condition was void for vagueness 
and an improper delegation of the judicial function (para. 11). These types of 
conditions prevent the accused from understanding what they must do to avoid 
violating their condition, as the rules of the house can change based on the 
whims of the person who sets them (K. (R.), at paras. 19-22). Imposing a 
condition that delegates the creation of bail rules to a surety or anyone else 
bypasses the judicial official’s obligation to uphold the principles of restraint 
and review and assess whether the rules of the house truly address any of the 
risks posed by the accused.743 
Such problematic terms do not only occur in Ontario bail cases.  In the Saskatchewan case 
of Shingoose,744 the defendant’s counsel, in its draft form of release which it presents to 
the court, is willing to agree to some extremely onerous provisions, presented in the context 
of specifically addressing COVID-19 concerns and the protection of the public, including 
that Mr. Shingoose “come to the door of your residence when asked to do so by your bail 
officer or designate or police officer who may be checking the residence and curfew 
conditions of this order.”745 
As noted earlier, on June 25, 2020, Justice Chapin releases the accused in McLean.746 The 
release terms include two specific ones that appear to fly in the face of the Supreme Court’s 
instructions in Antic747 and Zora.748  First: 
You should make yourself available either by phone or in person as may be 
required at any time during house arrest/curfew, and in particular, you shall 
answer the phone at any time during house arrest/curfew, and present yourself 
to Ministry staff, Police Services and/or persons who are authorized by the 
Ministry associated with the Electronic Supervision Program at the door of 
 
743 Zora, supra note 8 at para 95.  An example of a recent bail case where a court followed the 
Supreme Court’s instructions in Zora on this issue is R v Stevenson, 2020 ONCJ 291 at para 61. 
744 Shingoose, supra note 682. 
745 Ibid at para 33. 
746 McLean, supra note 482. 
747 Antic, supra note 7. 
748 Zora, supra note 8. 
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your residence at any time during house arrest/curfew for the purpose of 
confirming your presence and compliance.749   
The second problematic term is as follows: “Obey house rules and take counseling as 
directed.”750  The Supreme Court in Zora, issued on June 18, 2020, exactly one week before 
Justice Chapin releases her decision in McLean,751 directs that bail courts should be wary 
of imposing counselling terms on individuals whom they release: 
[O]ther behavioural conditions that are intended to rehabilitate or help an 
accused person will not be appropriate unless the conditions are necessary to 
address the risks posed by the accused. As described by Cheryl Webster in her 
report for the Department of Justice, “conditions such as ‘attend school’ or 
‘attend counselling/treatment’ may serve broader social welfare objectives but 
are [usually] unrelated to the actual offence alleged to have been committed” 
(Webster Report, at p. 7). There may be exceptions, such as in S.K., where the 
judge found that an “attend school” condition was sufficiently linked to the 
accused’s risks. However, even if a condition seems sufficiently linked to an 
accused’s risks, the question is also whether the condition is proportional: 
imposing such conditions means that the accused could be convicted of a 
criminal offence for skipping a day of school.752 
In Rajan, Harris J releases the defendant on strict terms, including one that he “keep a copy 
of the recognizance on your person at all times.”753 
In Hoo-Hing,754 some of the release terms seem excessive and unconnected to the alleged 
offences.  Notwithstanding that Ms. Hoo-Hing had no criminal record, and there were no 
primary ground concerns,755 His Honour imposes a term that she surrender her passport to 
the police upon release.756    
Other release terms for Ms. Hoo-Hing include complete bans on using the Internet or a 
cellphone unless under the direct supervision of one of her sureties.  These terms are not 
unusual, and are traditionally imposed in many bail releases, especially for those involving 
 
749 McLean, supra note 482 at para 41.8. 
750 Ibid, para 41.12. 
751 Ibid. 
752 Zora, supra note 8 at para 93. 
753 Rajan, supra note 125 at para 75k.  Inclusion of this term is also problematic.  See Zora, supra 
note 8 at para 98. 
754 Hoo-Hing, supra note 160. 
755 Ibid at para 28. 
756 Ibid at para 43j. 
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allegations, for example, of drug trafficking or child pornography.  They raise an interesting 
question as, since the beginning of the pandemic, all case management courts in the Ontario 
Court of Justice, where matters such as retaining counsel and obtaining disclosure are 
overseen, have been held remotely.  Accused persons are strongly encouraged to “attend” 
these courts by way of Zoom or telephone call.  While it is beyond the scope of this paper, 
it is worth considering whether extremely strict bail terms such as Internet or telephone 
bans in effect preclude some accused persons from participating in their court appearances 
without potentially breaching one or more of the terms of their release.  A related issue is 
whether some terms, such as the passport bans in Hoo-Hing757 and Ali,758 are as relevant 
when, for periods during the pandemic, most international flights from Canada were 
stopped, and the land border with the United States was closed.  
As there is nothing in subsection 515(4) of the Criminal Code759 that requires a justice to 
explain why any specific terms are included in a release order, it is often difficult to 
understand why some terms are imposed.  This can be frustrating when trying to discern 
the motivation for such terms.  Though it would be very difficult to prove, there may well 
be a tendency on the part of justices, when releasing defendants in what they believe to be 
“close call” cases, to seek to manifest – even if it is done subconsciously –  that they are 
not being “soft”.  They can show their appreciation of the seriousness of these cases by 
imposing an array of terms and conditions, even if they really cannot be justified according 
to the Supreme Court’s decisions in Antic760 and Zora761 as well as section 493.1 of the 
Criminal Code.762 
I acknowledge that a review of some of the release terms imposed in some of these bail 
decisions may seem somewhat tangential to the topic of the relationship of COVID-19 and 
bail.  However, it is important to keep in mind that one of the real concerns expressed by 
the Supreme Court of Canada in Antic763 and Zora764 is the increased number of 
 
757 Hoo-Hing, supra note 160. 
758 Ali, supra note 120. 
759 Criminal Code, supra note 10. 
760 Antic, supra note 7. 
761 Zora, supra note 8. 
762 Criminal Code, supra note 10. 
763 Antic, supra note 7 at para 67j. 
764 Zora, supra note 8 at paras 6, 53 – 58, 61 – 62, 83 – 98. 
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administration of justice charges being laid for breach of bail terms.  Convictions for such 
charges impact the availability of the secondary ground for release, as they make it easier 
for judicial officers to conclude that there is a substantial likelihood that there will be 
further criminal offences committed.  This, in turn, may limit the opportunity for 
defendants to argue successfully that COVID-19 should lead to their release on the 
secondary grounds.765     
Ledinek766 is one of the few COVID-19 bail decisions that specifically notes section 493.2 
of the Criminal Code,767 a relatively new section768 that requires justices making bail 
decisions to give particular attention to the circumstances of not only indigenous accused 
persons, but those “accused who belong to a vulnerable population that is overrepresented 
in the criminal justice system and that is disadvantaged in obtaining release.”  This section 
came into force on December 18, 2019.769  In the context of Ledinek,770 the Crown had 
sought to file as evidence at the bail hearing a parole assessment that had been conducted 
on Mr. Ledinek in 2019 that had concluded that “Mr. Ledinek has been assessed as being 
a High Static Needs/High Dynamic Risk case with a Medium reintegration potential.”771  
In this case, His Worship Scarfe, while admitting the document as evidence, assigns it no 
weight in his consideration of the case,772 relying on the conclusions of Schreck J of the 
Superior Court in the case of R v EB,773 in which His Honour states: 
To be clear, I make no finding that the actuarial assessments in this case are 
invalid.  However, in my view, s. 493.2 requires that I take into account the 
 
765 This may have an even greater impact on indigenous bail applicants, discussed in detail later 
in this paper.  See Zora, supra note 8 at para 79: “Indigenous people, overrepresented in the 
criminal justice system, are also disproportionately affected by unnecessary and unreasonable 
bail conditions and resulting breach charges.” citing R v Murphy, 2017 YKSC 34 at paras 31 – 34; 
R v Omeasoo, 2013 ABPC 328, 94 Alta LR (5th) 244 at para 44; Set Up to Fail, supra note 1 at 75 
– 79 and Ewert v Canada, 2018 SCC 30, [2018] 2 SCR 165 at paras 57 – 60. 
766 Ledinek, supra note 38. 
767 Criminal Code, supra note 10.  
768 Enacted by An Act to amend the Criminal Code, the Youth Criminal Justice Act and other Acts 
and to make consequential amendments to other Acts, SC 2019, c 25, s 210. 
769 By virtue of An Act to amend the Criminal Code, the Youth Criminal Justice Act and other Acts 
and to make consequential amendments to other Acts, SC 2019, c 25, s 407, the coming into 
force of s 210 of that Act, which enacted ss 493.1 and 493.2 of the Criminal Code, supra note 10, 
was effective 180 days after Royal Assent which had occurred on June 21, 2019. 
770 Ledinek, supra note 38. 
771 Ibid at para 80. 
772 Ibid at para 90. 
773 R v EB, 2020 ONSC 4383 [EB]. 
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possibility that the types of actuarial assessments the Crown is relying on to 
meet its onus on the secondary ground may be affected by cultural bias.  In this 
case, I was provided with the results of the risk assessments without any 
explanation as to how those results are to be interpreted.  I do not say this to be 
critical of counsel.  Calling expert evidence of this nature is inconsistent with 
the expeditious nature of bail hearings.  However, its absence necessarily limits 
the extent to which this type of evidence may be properly relied upon.774 
At the end of his decision in Ledinek,775 Justice of the Peace Scarfe returns to the section 
493.2 issue: 
[120] As previously mentioned, section 493.2 requires me to consider the 
fact that Mr. Ledinek is a member of a vulnerable community that is 
overrepresented in the criminal justice system.  He is black.  Black persons 
traditionally have a harder time getting bail and are therefore overrepresented 
in the remand population as well.  This is wholly undesirable.   
[121] Gangs represent a widespread cultural challenge, which has existed 
for a long time.  Mr. Ledinek has most likely experienced systemic racism, 
poverty and all the other disadvantages that come with being in a marginalized 
group that has experienced multi-generational trauma.   
[122] How does one reconcile this with concerns for public safety? 
In answering this question, His Worship again returns to the EB decision of Mr. Justice 
Schreck, where His Honour states:   
While s. 493.2 requires the court to consider the circumstances of Indigenous 
accused and members of vulnerable groups, it does not supersede s. 
515(10)….If there is a substantial likelihood that the accused will commit 
further offences if released and thereby compromise public safety, the fact that 
systemic or background factors contributed to that substantial likelihood does 
not change the result.  A dangerous person is no less dangerous because he or 
she is a member of a vulnerable group.776 
In coming to his conclusions regarding the secondary ground, Scarfe JP reviews bail 
jurisprudence in detail, including Morales777 and R v Budge,778 before concluding that Mr. 
Ledinek has not met his onus.  In coming to this conclusion, His Worship not only 
comments that “both sureties failed to convince me through their testimony that I can rely 
 
774 Ibid at para 56. 
775 Ledinek, supra note 38. 
776 EB, supra note 773 at para 42.  See also R v Sim (2005), 78 OR (3d) 183 (CA) at para 18. 
777 Morales, supra note 25. 
778 R v Budge, [2012] OJ No 2538 (ONSC). 
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on them to enforce the strict terms they are proposing”779 but he also reviews the worthiness 
of the defence proposal that GPS electronic monitoring form part of Mr. Ledinek’s release. 
By no means are all bail decisions subsequent to the enactment of section 493.2 of the 
Criminal Code780 taking it into account.  On October 9, 2020, the decision of Monahan J. 
in CJ#2,781 a section 525 detention order review, is released.  The hearing occurred on 
October 1 by way of audio conference.  At C.J.’s initial bail hearing on May 12, 2020, he 
had been detained on the secondary ground by the justice of the peace.782 At the detention 
review, C.J.’s counsel put forth the identical plan that had been rejected by the justice of 
the peace, including a referral to an organization called Sound Times, which provides 
support to those involved in the criminal justice system with mental health issues.  Neither 
the justice of the peace at the initial hearing, nor Mr. Justice Monahan in this review, does 
any analysis as to whether C.J.’s seemingly apparent mental health issues783 require the 
application of section 493.2 of the Criminal Code.784  There is case law indicating that 
individuals with mental health issues are part of the vulnerable population overrepresented 
within the criminal justice system.785  While it may not have made any difference in the 
result, this lack of consideration of section 493.2 in CJ#2786 is nonetheless concerning.  
Perhaps not surprisingly, the section 525 application is dismissed on the secondary 
ground.787   
A recent case in which section 493.2 was applied by a judge in consideration of the tertiary 
ground is R v NY,788 a section 525 detention review decision rendered by Schreck JA of the 
 
779 Ledinek at para 108. 
780 Criminal Code, supra note 10. 
781 CJ#2, supra note 210. 
782 Ibid at para 7. 
783 The accused himself denies having any mental health issues.  Ibid at paras 12 and 24. 
784 Criminal Code, supra note 10. 
785 “In making bail decisions, a judge must take into account and recognize the circumstances of 
vulnerable and disadvantaged accused, including racialized populations, the homeless, the poor, 
or those suffering from mental illness or addiction.”  R v Gibbs, 2019 BCPC 335 at para 20.  See 
also Zora, supra note 8 at para 79, Set Up to Fail, supra note 1 at 75 and Rankin, Micah B. 
“Using Court Orders to Manage, Supervise and Control Mentally Disordered Offenders:  A Right-
Based Approach” (2018) 65 Crim LQ 280. 
786 CJ#2, supra note 210. 
787 Ibid at para 28. Another case in which mental health concerns also play a large role, but which 
unfortunately contains no direct reference to s 493.2 of the Criminal Code, supra note 10, is 
Lumley, supra note 594. 
788 R v NY, 2021 ONSC 1398. 
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Superior Court on February 23, 2021.  While there is a publication ban in effect, I believe 
that I can nonetheless make some general comments about the case.  On the tertiary ground, 
while His Honour believes that all four specific factors outlined in clause in 515(10)(c) of 
the Criminal Code789 weigh in favour of the accused’s continued detention, Schreck JA 
nonetheless releases, and one fact he considers is that the accused is African-Canadian, part 
of a vulnerable group overrepresented in the criminal justice system, and therefore entitled 
to benefit from what he describes as the remedial nature of section 493.2 of the Criminal 
Code.790  
 
COVID-19 WITHIN THE CONTEXT OF GLADUE  
Section 718.2 was added to the Criminal Code in 1995.791  It sets out various principles 
that a court shall take into consideration when imposing a sentence.  Clause 718.2(e) reads 
as follows:   
All available sanctions, other than imprisonment, that are reasonable in the 
circumstances and consistent with the harm done to victims or to the 
community should be considered for all offenders, with particular attention to 
the circumstances of Aboriginal offenders.  
The cases of R v Gladue792 and R v Ipeelee793 are leading Supreme Court of Canada 
decisions that consider these principles in the sentencing context.  Yet almost immediately 
after the case was decided, the principles found in Gladue794 began to be applied in non-
sentencing situations, including bail.  This approach is confirmed as being correct by 
Winkler CJO in Robinson795 and is now codified in clause 493.2(a) of the Criminal Code.796  




789 Criminal Code, supra note 10. 
790 Criminal Code, supra note 10. 
791 An Act to amend the Criminal Code (sentencing) and other Acts in consequence thereof, SC 
1995, c 22, s 6.  Royal assent was given on July 13, 1995. 
792 R v Gladue, [1999] 1 SCR 688, 133 CCC (3d) 385 [Gladue]. 
793 R v Ipeelee, [2012] 1 SCR 433, 280 CCC (3d) 265. 
794 Gladue, supra note 792. 
795 Robinson, supra note 413. 
796 Criminal Code, supra note 10. 
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There is a general recognition that the bail system operates in a manner that 
disadvantages individuals living in poverty and those with mental health or 
addictions issues. Aboriginal people, who are disproportionately impacted by 
substance abuse issues, poverty, lower educational attainment, social isolation 
and other forms of marginalization, are being systematically disadvantaged as 
a result.797 
These same social concerns, especially those of poverty accompanied by overcrowded 
housing with limited opportunities for social distancing, as well as widespread health 
concerns such as diabetes, also make indigenous Canadians much more at risk of 
contracting COVID-19.798  One would therefore expect to see secondary and tertiary 
ground considerations of COVID-19 frequently arising in bail cases involving indigenous 
Canadians.  One would also presume, given the longstanding and shameful 
overrepresentation of indigenous Canadians in detention centres and prisons, that an 
acknowledgment of the application of the Gladue799 principles would occur with some 
regularity in these COVID-19 cases reviewed in this paper.  While they certainly do in 
some cases, especially those from outside Ontario, reported bail cases of indigenous 
Ontarians during the time of COVID-19 seem suspiciously rare, raising the possibility that 
the Gladue800 principles are simply being ignored.801  Those decisions that do identify the 
accused as an indigenous person oddly do not make much direct mention of the interplay 
between COVID-19 and indigeneity. 
Morris802 is an example of this. As discussed earlier in this paper in the section dealing 
with COVID-19 cases in which detention was ordered pursuant to the secondary ground, 
it is a lengthy decision by Mr. Justice Leach.  He outlines one reason why he feels that the 
 
797 Set Up to Fail, supra note 1 at 75. 
798 On the issue of the health of Canadian prisoners and how it is generally worse than the 
general population, see Adam Miller, “Prison Health Care Inequality” (2013) 185:6 CMAJ 249 at 
249-250 and Liviana Calzavara et al, “Prevalence of HIV and Hepatitis C Virus Infections among 
Inmates of Ontario Remand Facilities” (2007) 177:3 CMAJ 257 at 260-261.  Specifically with 
respect to indigenous Canadians, who are much more prone to tuberculosis, see Fiona 
Kouyoumdjian et al, “Health Status of Prisoners in Canada:  Narrative Review” (2016) Can Family 
Physician 215 at 217. 
799 Gladue, supra note 792. 
800 Ibid. 
801 See Jillian Rogin, “Gladue and Bail:  The Pre-Sentencing of Aboriginal People in Canada” 
(2017) 95 Can Bar Rev 325. 
802 Morris, supra note 62. 
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threshold for a de novo review under section 520 of the Criminal Code803 of Mr. Morris’s 
continued detention is met: 
In my view, a de novo hearing also was justified by the need, acknowledged 
by Crown counsel, to consider the Indigenous background of Mr Morris and 
the overrepresentation of those with Aboriginal heritage in our criminal justice 
system, in relation to the question of whether or not Mr Morris should be 
granted bail and judicially ordered interim release. In that regard, I note and 
acknowledge that the evidence of the Cree heritage of Mr Morris, provided by 
Ms James in her affidavit included in the application filed in this court, may 
have been available at the time of the hearing before the Justice of the Peace. 
However, the reality is that it was not mentioned during that hearing, it 
accordingly was not considered by the Justice of the Peace, and it obviously is 
a consideration that must be taken into account in deciding whether continued 
interim detention of Mr Morris is appropriate.804 
Despite this reference to the Indigenous background of Mr. Morris, there is little 
subsequent discussion of any Gladue805 factors in Morris.806 Unfortunately, Leach J only 
briefly returns to the issue of Mr. Morris’s Indigenous status at the end of his ruling, in 
which he upholds the ongoing detention of Mr. Morris: 
Of course, continued detention of Mr Morris, even on an interim basis, 
inherently would add to the tragic overrepresentation of those with Aboriginal 
heritage in our criminal justice system. That is a significant concern. In my 
view, however, it is outweighed in this particular case by the presence of other 
significant and serious concerns under the primary and second [sic] grounds 
for detention, noted above, that would not be adequately addressed by the 
proposed plan of release. While I think that would be true in any event, in the 
particular circumstances before me, I also note that the possible impacts of the 
Aboriginal heritage of Mr Morris on his life, past involvement with the criminal 
law and current situation may be less clear in this case than others; e.g., insofar 
as the Aboriginal heritage of Mr Morris apparently is derived solely from his 
father, with whom he apparently has had absolutely no contact since he was a 
newborn.807 
There is, therefore, no real investigation in Morris808 of whether the combination of 
indigenous heritage and the possibility of contracting COVID-19 could provide an even 
 
803 Criminal Code, supra note 10. 
804 Morris, supra note 62 at para 12. 
805 Gladue, supra note 792. 
806 Morris, supra note 62. 




higher likelihood of tipping the scales towards release of such persons when considering 
either or both of the secondary and tertiary grounds.  
Another case in which the accused is apparently an indigenous person is that of R v RA.809  
It is a short and succinct section 525 detention review in which Ramsay J concludes that 
the initial bail detention was appropriate:  “The combination of the previous record, both 
its length and the number of breaches of bail and the two escapes, with the seriousness of 
the offence and the high probability of conviction make this an obvious case for detention 
on the secondary ground.”810  His Honour briefly considers COVID-19:  “There have been 
no cases of COVID-19 in the Niagara Detention Centre so far.  Nevertheless, the prospect 
of infection in the gaol figures into the analysis on the second and third grounds…For my 
purposes it is enough to say that if detention is for the time being to be imposed even more 
sparingly than usual, this accused still qualifies.”811 
It is only after these comments that His Honour notes, almost as an aside: “The accused 
may benefit from the application of Gladue principles…on sentence if he is convicted of 
the present offences.  I do not know much about his roots, but at this point it is doubtful 
whether Gladue principles would do more than reduce any potential sentence 
somewhat.”812  The dismissive air of this statement appears to indicate that, unfortunately, 
this judge is perhaps unaware either of the applicability of Gladue813 principles to bail 
matters as developed in case law noted earlier, or of the mandatory applicability of section 
493.2 of the Criminal Code814 to this case. 
One recent bail case where Gladue815 principles are applied is R v Papequash,816 a decision 
of Nakatsuru J released on January 28, 2021.  I do note that Papequash817 has no mention 
whatsoever of COVID-19.  The justice of the peace was concerned about the lack of a 
surety and detained Deeandra Papequash at the original bail hearing.  Notwithstanding 
 
809 R v RA, [2020] OJ No 1416 (ONSC) [RA]. 
810 Ibid at para 9. 
811 Ibid at para 7. 
812 Ibid at para 8. 
813 Gladue, supra note 792. 
814 Criminal Code, supra note 10. 
815 Gladue, supra note 792. 




having been provided with a previous Gladue818 report that had been written about 
Deeanadra Papequash, the justice of the peace simply commented: “I understand that 
you’re of Native descent? That’s certainly a consideration.”  His Honour, in his review, 
makes it clear that “failure to consider Gladue principles at a bail hearing is a serious error 
of law.  Just giving lip service to Gladue principles is as big an error.”819   
  
His Honour eloquently reviews the justice of the peace’s insistence on a surety through the 
lens of Gladue:820 
The unavailability of a surety is not surprising.  Deeandra Papequash suffers 
from a host of afflictions that people of Indigenous background commonly 
suffer from.  These are the products of colonialism and discrimination. Their 
difficult childhood laid the foundation for their difficult adult life. I have no 
doubt that intergenerational trauma had a hand in their early abandonment as a 
child, their suffering of sexual abuse at the hands of relatives, and the poor and 
abusive parenting by their mother.  These in turn have led to their addictions 
and marginalization. Deeandra Papequash is disconnected from their 
Saskatchewan community.  What ties they have in Toronto have been frayed 
by their mental illness, their addictions, their lack of education and skills. In 
turn, this has led to a pattern of impulsive and anti-social behavior. The result? 
They have few friends or family with means or ability, willing to come forward 
as a surety.  Even when there has been someone, these sureties did not seem to 
have been very good ones. One surety that the applicant had while on a 
previous release, is said to have acted badly by trying to extort money from 
them.821   
 
His Honour also notes that he must consider Deeandra Papequash’s criminal record in light 
of Gladue as well.822 
 
 
818 Gladue, supra note 792. 
819 Papequash, supra note 816 at para 7. 
820 Gladue, supra note 792. 
821 Papequash, supra note 816 at para 20.  In his decision, Nakatsuru J explains that 
Papequash’s preferred pronouns are they/them. 
822 “The criminal record must also be seen through a Gladue lens. The record is a bad one. There 
are breaches.  There are similar assaultive offences.  Obvious concerns about public safety are 
raised by the criminal record if the applicant is released on bail.  That said, I can see how at least 
some of the prior convictions are related to the Fetal Alcohol Syndrome and the addictions.  These 
impairments can originate from the dislocation and hardship caused by colonialism and residential 
schools. While this does not extinguish the secondary ground concerns, it provides an explanation 
and a context for this criminal record.” Papequash, supra note 816 at para 22. 
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Other COVID-19 bail decisions from other provinces also give only a cursory 
consideration to Gladue823 factors when looking at Indigenous persons and COVID-19.  
One decision that briefly considers indigeneity in the context of a bail review is the April 
14, 2020 Alberta Court of Queen’s Bench’s decision of R v CKT.824  It is a review, pursuant 
to section 520 of the Criminal Code,825 of an order from an Alberta Provincial Court judge 
denying bail to Mr. C.K.T. on the secondary ground.  The reviewing justice, Lema J, quotes 
from the hearing judge as follows: 
 
Despite your Gladue factors, which I have taken into account, I am of the view 
that the protection of the public requires your continued detention. Given your 
history of breaching court orders and, in particular, breaching firearms-related 
court orders, I do not have confidence that you would abide by conditions that 
would keep the public peace and, therefore, I am denying release on the 
secondary grounds.826 
There is no other direct mention of C.K.T.’s Indigenous status anywhere in the review 
decision of Lema J.  His Honour, however, has a lot to say about COVID-19 which, in his 
opinion, has overly influenced bail decisions.  He holds that “while the pandemic is 
undeniably an unprecedented and globe-shaking phenomenon, it is not a factor in the 
secondary-ground exercise…with one exception” which is when it bears on an accused’s 
willingness to comply with release conditions.827  As, in this case, His Honour sees no 
linkage to public protection, he concludes that “the accused’s Covid-19 concerns do not 
constitute a material change of circumstances.”828  He conducts a thorough review, citing 
many Ontario cases, of decisions on the relationship between COVID-19 and the secondary 
ground, going through those which considered the pandemic not to be a factor at all, those 
which accepted it as a factor a) but with no differential risk perceived, b) requiring medical 
evidence of extra susceptibility, c) offset by evidence of correctional centre responses, or 
d) limited to potential impact on compliance with release plans.    
 
823 Gladue, supra note 792. 
824 R v CKT, 2020 ABQB 261 [CKT]. 
825 Criminal Code, supra note 10. 
826 CKT, supra note 824 at para 11. 
827 Ibid at paras 6 and 7. 
828 Ibid at para 19. 
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Once he has completed this review, Lema J provides his thoughts on the secondary ground: 
Reduced to its core, the focus is simply public protection and safety.  The 
choice is between release (on any number and variety of terms) and 
detention…Detention is ordered if it is necessary to protect the public.  The 
current pandemic and the remand system’s response to it are not relevant in 
making that call.  The remand system, as the place of detention, is taken as a 
given in the ‘public protection’ inquiry.  Its state or condition, from time to 
time, even during a pandemic, is irrelevant to gauging the necessity of 
detention for public protection.829   
His Honour therefore concludes by stating:  “Accordingly, I disagree with the cases finding 
that an actual or perceived heightened risk of Covid-19 infection alone is relevant to the 
‘secondary ground’ analysis, even if bolstered by medical evidence of increased 
susceptibility, and even where ‘institutional response’ evidence is provided.”830  As there 
was no evidence, in this case, of any evidence about a “turned-around ‘compliance attitude’ 
on the part of CKT,”831 the only framework in which Lema J feels that COVID-19 could 
impact secondary ground considerations, His Honour dismisses the application, and 
criticizes those decisions such as Cain832 and TK833 where the judges do not specifically 
outline what details convince them that the accused in those cases now show a greater 
willingness to comply with terms of their release.834   
On April 16, 2020, Madam Justice Hildebrandt of the Court of Queen’s Bench of 
Saskatchewann gives her decision in the section 520 bail review of R v Bear.835  Mr. Bear’s 
counsel alleges that, because trials are delayed as a result of the pandemic, this is a material 
change in circumstances when considering that Bear is a 75 year old diabetic currently in 
custody awaiting his trial.836  While Her Honour concludes that the COVID-19 pandemic 
has raised a material change in circumstances, it does not justify release in the particular 
 
829 Ibid at paras 41 – 43. 
830 Ibid at para 47. 
831 Ibid at para 49. 
832 Cain, supra note 210. 
833 TK, supra note 69. 
834 CKT, supra note 824 at paras 53, 54 and 73. 
835 R v Bear, 2020 SKQB 109 [Bear]. 
836 Ibid at para 1. 
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case of Mr. Bear, whom she describes as “somewhat of an infamous character in 
Saskatchewan jurisprudence.”837   
Bear’s counsel files a report, this time not by Dr. Orkin, but instead by two prison health 
researchers from Hamilton, Ontario, Claire Bodkin and Tim O’Shea, specifically retained 
on behalf of Mr. Bear.  Their report is dated April 10, 2020: 
In general congregate settings of all kinds are very high risk for COVID-19 
outbreak.  As noted by recent articles in the prestigious medical journals The 
Lancet Public Health and the New England Journal of Medicine, crowded 
conditions, limited ability to practice physical distancing, a lack of access to 
hand sanitizer and other personal and environmental hygiene supplies, a 
population that has a higher prevalence of chronic disease and infectious 
disease than the general population, and correctional staff moving between 
community and correctional settings daily all create a perfect storm for 
COVID-19 transmission, illness and death.838 
This report also, unlike most of the other Indigenous COVID-19 cases, does specifically 
make the link between what I have earlier referred to as the interplay between indigeneity 
and COVID-19: 
Finally, we understand that Mr. Bear is an Indigenous person.  There is 
significant and we think appropriate concern from Indigenous peoples that 
COVID-19 will disproportionately affect the health of their peoples and 
communities.  While a full review of the impact of colonization on the health 
of Indigenous peoples in Canada is beyond the scope of this letter, there is a 
wealth of medical literature on the ways that colonization has caused poor 
health status among Indigenous populations in Canada.  This has been echoed 
by Dr Theresa Tam, Canada’s Chief Medical Officer of Health, who stated 
“We must recognize that First Nations, Inuit and Metis are at higher risk of 
severe outcomes from COVID-19 given health inequities, higher rates of 
underlying medical conditions and unique health challenges such as those 
faced by remote and fly-in, fly-out communities.839 
Nevertheless, despite this thoughtful consideration of Mr. Bear’s indigenous status, though 
the Gladue840 principles themselves are never specifically discussed, Her Honour detains 
Mr. Bear, noting his long history of non-compliance with prohibition orders.  She 
comments as well that “I similarly have no confidence that he will behave responsibly in 
 
837 Ibid at paras 6 and 8. 
838 Ibid at para 24. 
839 Ibid at para 39. 
840 Gladue, supra note 792. 
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relation to health precautions such as distancing or remaining in his residence.  This, in 
turn, would increase the risk for others in Little Pine First Nation and surrounding 
communities.”  Hildebrandt J therefore dismisses Mr. Bear’s application and confirms the 
order remanding him in custody until his trial.841 
The next day, on April 17, 2020, the Saskatchewan Court of Appeal considers a request for 
judicial interim release pending appeal from a conviction and sentence, pursuant to 
subsection 679(3) of the Criminal Code,842 in Shingoose.843  In this case, Mr. Shingoose 
had been sentenced on February 13, 2020, prior to the first reported case of COVID-19 in 
Saskatchewan, and Jackson JA acknowledges that Mr. Shingoose’s health issues were, 
reasonably, not considered by the sentencing judge: 
Put simply, when he was sentenced, Mr. Shingoose’s compromised immune 
system was not an issue for the purposes of sentencing. The sentencing judge 
did not mention that aspect of the pre-sentence report that described Mr. 
Shingoose as diabetic and nor did he need to do so.  He did, however, mention 
the impact that the residential school system has had on Mr. Shingoose and the 
link between that experience and his alcoholism.844   
This is the only specific, albeit indirect, mention of Mr. Shingoose’s Indigenous status in 
the decision.  With respect to COVID-19, the court takes into account that Mr. Shingoose 
is 69 years old, is diabetic, and that his condition appears to have deteriorated while in 
custody.845  Madam Justice Jackson concludes that, after reflecting on the potential health 
effects of COVID-19 on Mr. Shingoose, “a reasonable member of the public would agree 
that his detention pending his appeal is not necessary in the public interest.”  She grants the 
application and releases Mr. Shingoose.846 
Shingoose847 also provides a very thorough analysis of the “not frivolous” standard in 
clause 679(3)(a).848  This analysis is detailed enough that it clearly indicates that the court 
 
841 Bear, supra note 835 at paras 41 and 42. 
842 Criminal Code, supra note 10. 
843 Shingoose, supra note 682. 
844 Ibid at para 43. 
845 Ibid at para 7. 
846 Ibid at paras 52 and 54. 
847 Ibid. 
848 Ibid at paras 10 – 23. 
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had time available to consider Gladue849 factors and the application of section 493.2 of the 
Criminal Code850 had it chosen to do so. 
On April 23, 2020, Martin J of the Manitoba Court of Queen’s Bench releases his decision 
in a section 520 review in R v Muminawatum.851  While apparently section 520 reviews in 
Manitoba are often straightforward, in this one, Sheldon Muminawatum raises “a few 
uncommon issues which warranted a deeper analysis” one of which is his assertion that he 
should be released from custody because of COVID-19.852 The other reasons that he puts 
forward as material changes in circumstances include the resulting lengthier amount of 
time he would now have to spend in custody awaiting his trial and the proclamation of 
section 493 [sic].853 
While it is exciting to see an appellate court considering the application of section 493.2, 
in this case His Honour does not give it any real thought.  This is because he concludes that 
it does not amount to a material change in circumstances within the context of section 520 
because the transcript of the original bail hearing indicates that both sections 493.1 and 
493.2 were raised by defence counsel.854  
With respect to the COVID-19 issue, Martin J refers to both Paramsothy855 and CKT,856 
from Ontario and Alberta respectively, before concluding, after a review of the specific 
evidence from Mr. Muminawatum’s experience in custody, that “the Covid-19 pandemic, 
at this time, and specific to Manitoba provincial jails, is by itself a material change in 
circumstances for purposes of a s. 520 bail review application.”857  He further criticizes the 
decision in CKT858 and other cases that COVID-19 is not relevant to the secondary ground 
 
849 Gladue, supra note 792. 
850 Criminal Code, supra note 10. 
851 R v Muminawatum, [2020] MJ No 101 (MBQB) [Muminawatum]. 
852 Ibid at para 5.  “In Manitoba, the s. 520 review is usually relatively straightforward, with the 
reviewing judge normally issuing an oral decision on-the-spot.” 
853 Ibid at para 6.  The statutory reference should be to ss 493.1 and 493.2, not s 493. 
854 Ibid at para 31. 
855 R v Paramsothy, 2020 ONSC 2314. 
856 CKT, supra note 824. 
857 Muminawatum, supra note 851 at para 48. 
858 CKT, supra note 824. 
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as being “a view that is overly rigid.”859  In an interesting comment, His Honour notes that 
logically COVID-19 has to be relevant to both the secondary and tertiary grounds: 
Against all of this, I cannot conclude that Covid-19 is not a relevant factor, 
even where detention has been ordered on the secondary ground.  To find 
otherwise would, in the unique circumstances of this pandemic, undermine the 
public’s confidence in the administration of justice.  Ironically, it would mean 
that accused persons, detained on the tertiary ground, would be able to rely on 
Covid-19, as a material change in circumstances, while a bunkmate, denied bail 
because of the secondary ground, could not.  Depending on the circumstances, 
it could also mean that Covid-19 could be considered in a s. 525 application 
for an accused denied bail, but could not be considered for that same person on 
a s. 520 application.860 
Notwithstanding his conclusion that the material change in circumstances exists, Martin J 
concludes that it does not assist Mr. Muminawatum as he finds that continued detention is 
necessary for the protection of the public.  In so finding, he relies on the applicant’s 
criminal record, including at least seven breaches of previous bails and four convictions 
for failing to attend court.  His Honour’s brief concluding remark with respect to the 
applicant’s indigenous status is simply: “I accept and consider s. 493 [sic] and Gladue 
considerations generally.”  Equally briefly, he concludes that “at this point, Covid-19 is not 
a factor weighing in favor of release.  There are no cases of Covid-19 in Manitoba 




As this paper shows, many of the COVID-19 bail cases arrived in the courts very soon after 
the first wave of the pandemic hit Ontario in March 2020.  Higher courts, those more likely 
to provide written reasons, were initially concerned with bail reviews.  Some accused, 
many of whom may not even have attempted to get bail upon first being arrested, sought 
to use the pandemic as a basis on which to formulate a plan of release that probably would 
not have been approved by the court prior to COVID-19.  Cases decided in the first days 
 
859 Muminawatum, supra note 851 at para 51. 
860 Ibid at para 58. 
861 Ibid at paras 61, 62 and 64. 
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and weeks of the pandemic, such as TK,862 JS,863 Cotterell,864 Knott,865 TL,866 Cain867 and 
Rajan,868 all point to the unprecedented and terrifying nature of the pandemic as being a 
key factor, when considered under either the secondary and tertiary grounds, in leading to 
accused individuals being released in greater numbers. 
Yet, as correctional centres remained COVID-19 free in the early weeks and months of the 
pandemic, other judges and justices of the peace, perhaps now more confident that the 
pandemic would not be as apocalyptic as originally thought, begin to look at cases and 
determine that, for many individuals when considering their specific circumstances, the 
existence of COVID-19 does not warrant a release from custody that otherwise would not 
have occurred.   
The onset of the second and third waves of COVID-19 in Ontario, at the end of 2020 and 
in the spring of 2021, likely made courts again more sympathetic to the COVID-19 
argument being made on accused persons’ behalf.  Certainly, by that time, the province’s 
assurances that its safety measures would continue to keep correctional centres pandemic 
free had proven false and illusory.  Unfortunately, Dr. Orkin was correct, and virtually 
every detention centre in Ontario, at some point in the last few months, has had a wave of 
COVID-19 cases sweep through its resident and staff population. 
Fewer of these cases during the second and third waves have been reported.  The initial 
glut of COVID-19 bail cases – those that argued the issue of the material change in 
circumstances – dried up as time marched on, and every individual who had been detained 
pre-COVID who wished to have a bail review had the chance to have one.  As discussed 
earlier, COVID-19 cannot itself be a material change in circumstances on a bail review if 
it was in existence at the time of the initial bail hearing.  
 
862 TK, supra note 69. 
863 JS, supra note 114. 
864 Cotterell, supra note 122. 
865 Knott, supra note 475. 
866 TL, supra note 79. 
867 Cain, supra note 210. 
868 Rajan, supra note 125. 
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The third wave of COVID-19 subsided in Ontario in the late spring and early summer of 
2021, and daily case counts were as low then as they have been since the early autumn of 
2020.  And while case counts begin to rise again in August 2021, perhaps now is the time 
to consider how the ebb and flow of the pandemic creates opportunities for new arguments 
to be made in courts on the issue of bail.   
On May 12, 2021, Goldstein J of the Superior Court of Justice gives his decision in R v 
Patel.869   Ismail Patel had been detained by a justice of the peace on 22 criminal charges, 
some of which involve firearms.870  At the time of his original bail hearing, Mr. Patel had 
contracted COVID-19 while in custody at the Toronto South Detention Centre.  One of the 
factors considered by the justice of the peace was that, if Patel was released and infected 
his sureties, his entire bail plan was at risk of falling apart.871    
At the bail review, Mr. Patel’s counsel argues that, since his client has now recovered from 
COVID-19, this constitutes a material change in circumstances.  His Honour disagrees, 
relying on the Court of Appeal majority’s decision in JA,872 as he must:  “The effect of 
COVID-19 must be ‘significant in the sense that when considered along with the other 
evidence on the bail proceeding, it could reasonably be expected to have affected the 
result.”873  Goldstein J’s review of the justice of the peace’s decision satisfies him that 
Patel’s COVID-19 infection was just one of the factors taken into account at the original 
bail hearing:  “When the reasons are read as a whole, it is clear that she detained Mr. Patel 
not because he might have infected his sureties, but because the public would have been 
outraged that a man in his position were released.  In other words, the justice of the peace 
would have detained Mr. Patel regardless of his COVID-19 status.”874 
As the population of Ontario gets vaccinated, and as the third wave of COVID-19 subsides 
but with a fourth wave now looming, what conclusions can be drawn and what lessons can 
be learned from these COVID-19 bail cases?  The Court of Appeal in JA,875 as indicated 
 
869 R v Patel, 2021 ONSC 3459, [2021] OJ No 2752 [Patel]. 
870 Ibid at para 1. 
871 Ibid at para 17. 
872 JA, supra note 409. 
873 Patel, supra note 869 at para 18, citing JA, supra note 409 at para 55. 
874 Patel, supra note 869 at para 20. 
875 JA, supra note 409. 
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earlier, has set out the framework and the issues that need to be considered in bail reviews.  
Many of their conclusions are relevant to initial bail hearings as well.  The existence of 
COVID-19, or presumably of any other future pandemic, is always worthy of consideration 
by a court.  In theory, it could be relevant to any of or all the primary, secondary or tertiary 
grounds.  But it is most likely to be looked at within the framework of the tertiary ground 
in clause 515(10)(c) of the Criminal Code,876 as part of “all the circumstances” though this 
phrase also appears in clause 515(10)(b) as part of the wording of the secondary ground.   
It is also the tertiary ground that fundamentally considers the concept of maintaining public 
confidence.  The Supreme Court’s expansion of the use of the tertiary ground in St-Cloud877 
is noted earlier in this paper.  At the time, it was criticized by some academics who believed 
that it would result in increased pre-trial detention.878 
In the early days of the pandemic, some cases were decided – perhaps in an understandable 
state of panic – on the basis that if the primary and secondary grounds were satisfied, 
COVID-19 should negate any need for an accused being detained on the tertiary ground.  
As 2020 unfolded, more of the cases coalesced around the concept that an individual 
accused, seeking to rely on COVID-19 as a reason that would justify release from custody, 
would need to present some specific evidence, tailored to that individual, that would likely 
indicate a greater susceptibility to the pandemic.  As is so often the case in many legal 
decisions, then, there is no formula to be followed, and no list of boxes to be checked, but 
rather the specific relevant facts regarding COVID-19 that pertain to the specific individual 
will continue to guide further decisions regarding bail. 
At the beginning of this paper, I briefly outlined that bail – even prior to the pandemic – 
has been a contentious and troubling issue in our criminal courts.  COVID-19 has not made 
things any easier.  Figuring out how to provide relevant COVID-19 medical evidence to 
the courts, and how to do so efficiently within the existing framework of the doctrine of 
 
876 Criminal Code, supra note 10. 
877 St-Cloud, supra note 5. 
878 See Don Stuart, “St-Cloud:  Widening the Public Confidence Ground to Deny Bail Will Worsen 
Deplorable Detention Realities” (2015) 19 CR (7th) 337 (WL Can) and Davis MacAlister, “St-




judicial notice, has not been simple.  COVID-19 has added another layer to an already 
complex and complicated situation that all too often causes individuals to remain in 
custody, despite the admonitions of the Supreme Court of Canada in Antic879 and Zora.880   
It is interesting that COVID-19, as an ingredient in the recipe for bail, seems most 
frequently to fit within the tertiary ground, building upon the Supreme Court’s conclusion 
in St-Cloud that its previous rare applicability is no longer appropriate.881  Indeed, in an 
ever complex society, consideration of any new societal developments – such as the 
COVID-19 pandemic – within the context of bail will likely occur through expanded use 
of the tertiary ground.  It is an interesting side effect of the pandemic that more frequent 
use of the tertiary ground may now result in releases becoming more common, rather than 
rarer, as noted above in some of the post-St-Cloud882 academic papers. 
As outlined in a recent academic paper which summarizes some of the COVID-19 case 
law,883 there are three ways, resulting from COVID-19, in which public confidence may 
now be more amenable to bail releases.  First, the public would object to denying bail to 
defendants and exposing them to COVID-19 given the high rate of infections in detention 
centres.884 Second, newly detained defendants may import COVID-19 into jails and put 
fellow inmates as well as prison staff at risk.885 Third, as those in custody get released, their 
return to the community risks spreading the pandemic from detention centres into the 
general public.886  As Skolnik states:  “COVID-19 has forced courts to place greater 
emphasis on defendants’ and inmates’ fundamental interests when interpreting the notion 
of ‘public confidence.’”887 
 
879 Antic, supra note 7. 
880 Zora, supra note 8.  See Holly Pelvin, “Remand as a Cross-Institutional System:  Examining 
the Process of Punishment before Conviction” (2018) 61:2 Can J Corr 66 at 67 which notes that 
roughly 38% of individuals who were remanded into custody in Ontario courts in 2015 were 
eventually found not guilty. 
881 See St-Cloud, supra note 5 at paras 5, 53 and 54. 
882 Ibid. 
883 Terry Skolnik, “Criminal Law During (and After) COVID-19” (2020) 43 Man LJ 145 at 167 – 
168.  
884 TK, supra note 69 at para 60. 
885 Rajan, supra note 125 at paras 69 and 70; Fraser, supra note 210 at para 16.  See also Jenny 
Carroll, “Pre-Trial Detention in the Time of COVID-19” (2020) 115 NW UL Rev 57 at 78 – 80. 
886 Kazman, supra note 284 at para 18. 
887 Skolnik, supra note 883 at 170 – 171. 
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Whether this emphasis on considering the interests of defendants within the context of the 
tertiary ground will continue post-pandemic remains to be seen.  But it is an intriguing 
possibility. In closing, all justices of the peace and judges considering bail applications, at 
any stage, should always keep the words of Iacobucci J from Hall in mind:  “At the heart 
of a free and democratic society is the liberty of all its subjects.  Liberty lost is never 
regained and can never be fully compensated for; therefore where the potential exists for 
the loss of freedom for even a day, we, as a free and democratic society must place the 
highest emphasis on ensuring that our system of justice minimizes the chances of an 
unwarranted denial of liberty.”888  The COVID-19 pandemic and its direct impact on 
accused persons may indeed help the judiciary focus on these important words as they 
consider applications for bail.  
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